

# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

# Governmental Affairs

Wednesday, Oct. 1, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

## CIA Yields, Delivers Data To Pike Panel

50 Words

Deleted

By Colby

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby defused a move to hold him in contempt of Congress by turning over a stack of subpoenaed documents to the House intelligence committee late yesterday with only a few dozen words deleted.

The secret records were delivered to Chairman Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) with a covering letter declaring that they were being submitted only with the understanding that President Ford would have the last word on what could be made public.

Pike accepted custody of the documents pending a meeting of the full committee today to decide whether to accept the arrangement. Quick approval is expected.

"This crisis is over," said one committee source. "Now we can get on with our work."

A dispute with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger over access to State Department witnesses remains to be settled, but the committee apparently plans to step up its investigation of U.S. intelligence agencies and keep up the pressure on Kissinger at the same time.

CIA special counsel Mitchell Rogovin handed the subpoenaed documents to Pike and explained to the committee chairman the reasons for the scattered deletions. They ranged from the names of secret agents to derogatory remarks about various personalities that Pike agreed were unnecessary to the committee's work.

Pike told the Associated Press that in his judgment Colby was no longer "in con-

tempt of Congress" and that only extremely sensitive material, covering about 50 words in all, had been deleted.

Pike reportedly was inclined to keep pressing for a vote of confidence from the full House on the committee's battle for classified documents as a matter of principle, but it appeared unlikely that the full committee would want to keep pushing that point.

President Ford cut off the committee's access to all new classified information and demanded the return of secret documents the committee already had when it insisted on the right to declassify sensitive information on its own. Overriding CIA objections, the committee disclosed a four-word phrase earlier this month about Egyptian communications security on the eve of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Colby then refused to honor a fresh committee subpoena for secret documents bearing on the Communists' 1968 Tet offensive in South Vietnam and maintained that the dispute over who had the right to make them public would have to be settled first. Meanwhile, Pike and the committee kept insisting that the administration had no right to lay down any conditions before complying with congressional subpoenas.

The dickering led to a meeting between President Ford and House leaders last Friday. But White House aides followed up the conciliatory gesture with a hard-line proposal not only giving Mr. Ford the last word on what to make public, but also setting down new, broadly worded restrictions on what information would be supplied to the committee even in confidence.

By a vote of 10-3, the committee decided Monday to reject the "compromise" and carry the battle to the House floor with a resolution deplored the administration's non-compliance with its subpoenas and directing Colby to comply with the Tet subpoena "forthwith."

The next step for the committee's resolution would have been the House Rules Committee.

The CIA letter delivered with the subpoenaed records yesterday reportedly made no mention of any restrictions on the types of information to be supplied to the committee.

As a matter of practice, the agency will probably continue to delete the names of secret agents and similar data from the documents it supplies. But the CIA will have the burden of explaining the reasons for the deletions and Pike will be free to insist, for example, on knowing the identity of a secret agent in any specific case where it might be pertinent.

If the committee wants to make any classified records or testimony public, however, the government agency involved will be given a chance to voice its objections at an executive session. If no agreement is reached, the dispute will go to the President.

Any written certification by the President that disclosure would, in his view, be "prejudicial to the national security" would bind the committee and keep the disputed material from being made public. The committee could still litigate the issue in the courts but that is not considered likely.

"It's not a great victory for us, to be quite blunt about it," a committee source said.

At the same time, Pike has said he has been assured that the President himself will review any material the committee insists on making public despite the intelligence community's objections.

While the dispute with the administration over classified documents appeared virtually settled, however, the committee stepped up a notch after an abortive hearing yesterday morning on the 1974 Cyprus crisis.

It foundered over what the State Department's former director of Cypriot affairs, who had been called as a witness,

described as explicit orders not to disclose the recommendations he made improve U.S. policies.

Pike accused Kissinger of blocking the committee's investigation with "preposterous" restrictions on witnesses under his control.

The Cyprus expert, Thomas D. Boyatt, a Foreign Service officer now awaiting reassignment, said he was told by Lawrence S. Eagleburger, deputy under secretary of state for management, yesterday morning not to tell the committee about the recommendations he made, not even in executive session.

"I don't think it's the President of the United States who's causing our difficulties," Pike told reporters later. "I've said it before and I'll say it again, I think it's Secretary Kissinger."

In first enunciating the silence edict to the committee last week, Eagleburger cited the Red-hunting investigations of the 40s and 50s as a major reason for Kissinger's order prohibiting junior and middle-grade officials at State from testifying about policy recommendations they made to their superiors.

Eagleburger suggested that foreign service officers might be discouraged from giving their "candid advice" if they felt it would not remain confidential.

Pike made plain that he felt Kissinger was more interested in protecting himself. The New York Democrat dismissed the State Department's hints of a potential resurgence of McCarthyism as "wholly a red herring."

"I don't think this committee has taken to exposing junior members of government agencies and departments as evil," Pike declared. He said the committee's preliminary work indicates instead that "it is at the upper level that things go wrong, that messages don't get passed on, that advice is ignored."

WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, Oct. 1, 1975

### Moynihan Rejects CIA Label's Clout

Reuter

UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 30—U.S. Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan said today that to be described as a CIA agent "should not be seen either to add to or detract from the public reputations of

those so charged."

He was responding to a letter circulated last night by Spanish Ambassador Jaime de Pinies who quoted from a book in which Mexican President Luis Echeverria was linked with the CIA. Moynihan said tens of thousands of statesmen and women have been accused of CIA ties.

NEW YORK TIMES  
3 October 1975

## SENATE UNIT FINDS TAX DATA MISUSE BY F.B.I. AND C.I.A.

Revenue Service Was Used  
to Harass Groups Seen  
as Political Hazards

By NICKLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 2.—The Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation used the Internal Revenue Service, apparently illegally, to harass groups that they felt were politically threatening, according to evidence presented today at a Senate hearing.

Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho who is chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an opening statement today, "The committee has found evidence indicating that the F.B.I. has widely misused the I.R.S. tax information to disrupt political activists." He said the bulk of this evidence would be made public in hearings on counterintelligence.

### Commission Disclosure

At today's two-and-a-half-hour session it was disclosed that the F.B.I. had obtained a list of contributors from tax returns in a scheme to disrupt the fund-raising of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.'s Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The C.I.A. was disclosed to have urged the I.R.S. to open an investigation of Ramparts magazine in 1967 in an effort to head off a series of articles on C.I.A. infiltration of the National Student Association.

Earlier this year the report of Vice President Rockefeller's Commission on the C.I.A. said the agency had obtained tax return information illegally. But the evidence on the Ramparts incident showed that the C.I.A. wanted to go further and use the information to harass the magazine.

The two incidents were the first time it has been established that intelligence agencies used the I.R.S. for this purpose. During the Senate Watergate hearings, it was established that the Nixon Administration sought to use the revenue service to punish its political enemies.

In a C.I.A. memorandum dated Feb. 2, 1967, an unidentified C.I.A. official reported that

he had briefed Thomas Terry, then assistant to the Commissioner of I.R.S. and Leon Green, then an assistant to the assistant I.R.S. commissioner for compliance, on the "current status of the Ramparts matter" and he sought their "cooperation."

The memorandum said: "I told the mo of the information and rumors we have heard about 'Ramparts' proposed exposes with particular reference to the U.S.N.S.A. [United States National Student Association] and [partial deletion, presumably a designation for C.I.A.] I impressed upon them the director's concern and expressed our certainty that this is an attack on C.I.A. in particular, and the Administration in general, which is merely using USNSA and [deletion] as tools."

The memorandum went on to say: "I suggested that the corporate tax returns of Ramparts, Inc., be examined and that any leads to possible financial supporters be followed up by an examination of their individual tax returns. It is unlikely that such an examination will develop much worthwhile information as to the magazine's source of financial support, but it is possible that some leads will be evident."

The C.I.A. man went on to say that the "political sensitivity of the case is such that if we are to go further than this, it will be necessary for the agency to make a formal request for the returns under a procedure set forth in Government regulations."

"If such a request is made, the commissioner will not be in a position to deny our interest if questioned later by a member of Congress or other competent authority," the memorandum said. "This matter contains the elements for political repercussions against the Internal Revenue Service as well as this agency and Mr. Terry feels that we can make no move until he has briefed the commissioner."

### Owners' Tax Return

In a memorandum dated Feb. 15, the same or another identified C.I.A. official, reported that he had access to the tax return information of Edward Keating, who had reported that he owned Ramparts. In general the memorandum indicated that Mr. Keating's ownership was routine, but in the following paragraph it appeared the C.I.A. was giving I.R.S. advice on how to proceed in a tax case:

"The statement of ownership, management and circulation published in January, 1967, issue of Ramparts as required by law and postal regulations lists five stockholders, . . . This is not consistent with the sole ownership of Keating as reported to Revenue as recently as fiscal year 1965. We intend to check this fact and so does Revenue inasmuch as Keating has been claiming 100 per cent losses on his own tax return."

In May, 1967, the C.I.A. reported in a memorandum that it was passing information from

Washington Post  
3 Oct. 1975

## Grain Data Collected By CIA

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has been collecting detailed information from private U.S. companies on their sales of grain to the Soviet Union and other countries, even though the same data is gathered by the Department of Agriculture.

The grain export information — obtained by the agency's domestic collections branch, which often debriefs businessmen who travel abroad — is used to make assessments of the strategic balance in grain supplies.

CIA officials have indicated in the past that they consider grain supplies to be an important element of national security, and possibly a useful gauge of international behavior of the Soviet Union, a major grain importer.

A recent series of detailed CIA inquiries to grain companies includes requests for information on worldwide Russian demand for grain, and estimates of world sales to the Soviet Union, or East Europe, including American grain sales on a weekly basis.

A Department of Agriculture spokesman said yesterday that he had no idea why the CIA was collecting the information. In 1973, Congress gave the department responsibility for compiling weekly reports of all grain sales abroad. In addition to those weekly reports, U.S.-based firms are now required to inform the department within 24 hours of any sale exceeding 100,000 metric tons. Referring to the duplicate commercial export intelligence gathering of the CIA, the chief of one major grain company said this week: "They stay in touch with us all the time."

Edward W. Cook, chairman of the board of Cook Industries, Inc., of Memphis, said in an interview that he often reports the same information to both the CIA and the Agriculture Department. "They stay in contact with people who are doing business with areas in which they are interested," he said. "It could be Brazil, could be Russia, or it could be France." Cook said the CIA gets no more information about the sales than the Agriculture Department gets, adding, "There doesn't seem to be much coordination in Washington." A department official said recently that it sometimes seemed that the CIA's export data was reaching top officials of the Agriculture Department before the department's own. CIA officials could not be reached for comment yesterday.

NEW YORK TIMES  
28 September 1975  
New Effort to Make Public  
C.I.A. Budget Is Scheduled

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 26 —

Representative Robert N. Giaimo, a member of both the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the Select Committee on Intelligence, will attempt again next week to make the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency public for the first time since 1947.

Traditionally the annual cost of the C.I.A.'s operations are disclosed as part of the Depart-

ment of Defense's appropriations.

Mr. Giaimo, Democrat of Connecticut, led an unsuccessful fight to get the Appropriations Committee to publish the figure Thursday. He said that he planned to offer an amendment to the defense appropriations bill to remove the agency budget item from the section where it is disguised as a defense request. If this amendment is successful, he said he would offer an amendment to make the figure public.

For years authoritative intelligence sources have said that the C.I.A. spends \$750-million to \$1-billion a year.

its informants to the I.R.S. The memo said:

"If they determine that non-bona fide transactions are involved, they will inform me and will discuss further the investigative procedures to be used by I.R.S. in ascertaining whether or not there are violations of the internal revenue codes involved."

Sheldon Cohen, Commissioner of the I.R.S. of the time, said he could not recall authorizing

the release of tax information on Ramparts to C.I.A. He said he had talked to Mr. Terry and Mr. Green last week and neither of them could recall talking to him about the matter.

Under Federal Law, it is a crime for anyone to make an unauthorized dissemination of the information from a Federal tax return. The current I.R.S. Commissioner, Donald C. Alexander, has ordered an investigation of this and several other cases. It was confirmed by revenue service officials.

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
28 September 1975

## MORALITY VS. NATIONAL SECURITY

# U.S. Intelligence: Should Anything Go?

BY SALLY PETT

AP Special Correspondent

WASHINGTON—He began by recalling that when he finally told his daughter what he did for a living, which was espionage work, she said, "But isn't that kind of dirty, Daddy?"

He ended the interview with a kind of summation:

"In 25 years, I've had to do things I'm not particularly proud of. It's been a double life, sometimes unorthodox and illegal. But I think I've been useful, and I'm not envious of any man's moral standards."

He put on his glasses and dug into his wallet. He hoped, he said, he was not about to be carry. Then, from a tattered scrap of paper, this big, powerful-looking man read aloud, with some emotion, the words of Nathan Hale:

"I wish to be useful, and every kind of service, necessary to the public good, becomes honorable by being necessary. If the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar service, its claims to perform that service are imperious."

It was the rationale of Dave Phillips' life with the Central Intelligence Agency. His daughter had thought he worked for the Department of State. It has been, of course, the rationale of the CIA, the FBI, the military intelligence agencies and, in fact, of all the heroes and rogues in history who served the altar of national security.

Now, in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam, the morality and the mentality of the huge American intelligence apparatus are being questioned as never before.

Do the techniques of intelligence inevitably compromise a democracy? What is the morality of men who seek, in the name of country, to turn men of another country into traitors, men who lie, steal, break and enter, blackmail and bug? Should Mr. Bond, at long last, be housebroken?

How secret should a secret operation be in a free and open society? At what point, such as in that village in Vietnam, do we risk the destruction of liberty in the name of its salvation? In a world which is not a rose garden, are the questions themselves naive and likely to bring more damage than they would correct?

How does a nation that historically wed itself to the principle of self-determination justify secret plots to change the leaders and the lives of other nations? How did honorable, intelligent men bring themselves even to discuss assassinations?

Are we forever locked into the thinking of the generation that always remembers Munich and Pearl Harbor? Is there no alternative to that view because another Pearl Harbor could be the last?

If anything goes

most anything to in a cold war and an uneasy detente?

It was Pearl Harbor that Harry S. Truman had in mind when he asked Congress to set up the CIA in 1947. Clark Clifford helped write the legislation. Before he became secretary of defense in 1968, Clifford served eight years on the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, most of them as chairman.

"Basically," he said recently, "an intelligence operation is an anachronism in a democracy. It is secret. It sometimes uses questionable means. The public can't be informed about it or even told its cost. It is inconsistent with democracy, but it remains a necessity if we are to preserve our form of government. We can't fly blind in the world today."

But the CIA troubles Clifford profoundly, for startling reasons, and so he urges new legislation by which a joint oversight committee of Congress would tether the agency within new, sharply defined limits.

He is particularly troubled by the growth of the "intelligence syndrome" over the years of the cold war.

"As the agency went on growing," he said, "there developed a psychology within the CIA: those who were experienced in international intelligence were uniquely qualified not only to carry out orders but to conceive new projects.

"As time went on, they developed a concept of a higher loyalty, higher even than that which they owed to their own director and the President, a loyalty to country which carried with it the idea that others, only temporarily in government, would not be able to understand the great rewards that awaited the country if they were left alone.

"I know this existed. I'm not guessing. Their thinking was that Presidents and directors come and go while they were devoting their lives to this service. So, they found concepts to blunt what the Russians might be doing in their covert operations, maybe overlooking the fact that the Soviets operated from a dictatorship and we, a democracy.

"In my years on the President's advisory board, which had the power of the President behind it, I felt we were given full information in some areas but not in others. They held back on us and they held back on the President. They thought that nonexperts really were not qualified to make decisions in these areas; they would make them."

Clifford chose not to cite specific examples. But a former CIA officer, in his time one of its top men, agreed with Clifford's picture of the extraordinary elitism by which information was denied the President of the United States and the man he appoints to direct the intelligence agency.

ficer said. "They tended to regard elected officials as transitory. And they sometimes withheld things from the director, depending on the director. In an internal investigation, the agency's inspector general also was sometimes blocked off from certain areas.

"You see, the compartmentalization was intense and information wasn't always restricted only on a need-to-know basis. It was sometimes kept from those who should know but might object to a given idea."

By law, the CIA is responsible to the President and reports directly to the National Security Council, of which the President is chairman. The other members are the Vice President, secretary of state, secretary of defense, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA director.

The NSC, too, Clifford says, was at times kept in the semidark as a result of agile footwork and a relentless momentum that would develop within the CIA for a given project.

"Let me give you a hypothetical example," the former secretary of defense said, "and my guess is there was a lot of this going on.

"We start with the CIA director telling the NSC, 'Here's a little project we have in mind. We've researched and studied it thoroughly. It's not very expensive and we want to go to Point A on it.'

"It sounds innocent, and so it is authorized. That's the last the NSC hears about it.

"When he gets to Point A, the director reasons, 'Well, it isn't very far to Point B and we'll get a much better result. At Point B, he feels that task is incomplete and he goes to C. At C, he says, 'Well, this has been helpful but if we're really going to accomplish our purpose we have to go to D.'

"Now we're launched on God-knows-what, and D turns out to be a complete catastrophe. When he is asked about it later, the director says he was authorized to do this. What gets lost is that he was never authorized to go beyond Point A."

It is the insistent contention of the CIA that it may operate in the dark but not in a vacuum, that what it does secretly is simply the invisible arm of what the President, in his foreign policy, does publicly.

It is also the implicit contention of recent history that elitism in government, or what David Halberstam called "The Best and the Brightest," was not confined to the 125 serene, verdant acres the CIA occupies in the pines of Langley, Va. From Franklin D. Roosevelt to Richard M. Nixon, Congress was told less and less by increasingly powerful Presidents. Father knew best, and Big Brother was not far behind.

tack on Pearl Harbor, which might have been much less of a surprise if any arm of government had put together the separate pieces of information--separate departments had.

In that war, the men who later became the nucleus of the CIA served in the Office of Strategic Services. They performed with great dash and distinction, breaking enemy codes, parachuting behind enemy lines, snatching enemy leaders. It was our last declared war, the last one we didn't debate, and the rules were few. In the CIA, as a result of real accomplishments and the times, a mystique grew up around these former warriors, many of whom came from the Ivy League, many of whom were idealistic liberals. "It was our Peace Corps," one said.

The mystique was aided and abetted by Joseph Stalin, who seemed intent on gobbling up Europe and more through ubiquitous tentacles. Spies brought him the secrets of the atomic bomb. On this side of the world, there were Joseph McCarthy seeking to frighten Americans about the Communists under their beds and John Foster Dulles seeking to make anticomunism a moral crusade in the world.

It was a time when Americans had only five years' respite between wars, when colonial empires were collapsing and much of the globe appeared ripe for plucking by an apparently monolithic enemy, when Americans were not questioning American motives and Presidents were still trusted; a time when scientists and technicians seemed to hold the future in their hands and laymen were cowed by experts.

"To argue with the CIA," said Tom Braden, a former member and now a critic, "was to argue with knowledge."

The late Stewart Alsop, columnist and former OSS man, sought to explain how some of the best minds in the Kennedy administration agreed to the Bay of Pigs invasion:

"The answer lies somewhere in the mystique of the secret service professional vis-a-vis the amateur. Somehow in such a confrontation, the amateur tends to put a childish faith in the confident assertions of the professional."

And this from an intelligence official, talking to the Washington Post about dealing with the Forty Committee, a supersecret oversight group within the executive branch:

"They were like a bunch of schoolboys. They would listen and their eyes would bug out. I always used to say that I could get \$5 million out of the Forty Committee for a covert operation faster than I could get money for a typewriter out of the ordinary bureaucracy."

Basic to the understanding of the intelligence mentality, its practitioners say, are several facts of international life: the world remains a dangerous place despite detente; the KGB, the Russian intelligence apparatus, is very good and ubiquitous and has the advantage of operating from a closed society; intelligence, in any case, cannot be operated within Marquess of Queensberry rules.

CIA Director William E. Colby:

"If you get to the logical end of detente, then we would have established a relationship with the Soviet Union of mutual respect for each other's strengths, so that our differences can be negotiated about rather than fought over. This, in turn, should encourage the Soviets to believe that they ought to be more open with their information. But that's not the situation now."

"Today the Soviet attaches can go to almost any newsstand in this country, pick up a copy of a technical aviation or space magazine, and from it learn a vast amount of detail about our weapons systems. Unfortunately, we have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to get comparable information about the Soviet Union."

On another occasion, Colby contrasted his job with that of his Russian counterpart, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, head of the KGB. "Mr. Andropov faces a veritable cornucopia of easily acquired information about America from published and public sources. Out of this, he must pick those facts which are significant and assemble them into an accurate assessment of America."

"My task is to search for individual facts kept in the utmost secrecy in closed societies, and with these facts try to construct whole assessments, in somewhat the way one extrapolates a reproduction of the skeleton of a brontosaurus from a thigh bone. Without . . . clandestinely acquired information, our brontosaurus could in some situations be very deformed indeed."

Thus espionage.

And espionage, Dave Phillips points out, is a crime in every country of the world. So, obviously, is treason. One is fed by the other. Like other governments, the government of the United States sends men abroad to spy and encourage treason and would rather not hear of the crimes within the crinies—bribery, theft, blackmail, bugging.

"All of it distasteful but vital," says Dave Phillips, clinging to his Nathan Hale quote. It was his daughter who reacted with dismay when he told her how he served his country. Phillips recently resigned after 25 years in the CIA to form an association of former intelligence officers in the hope of helping the agency's image.

"My daughter's reaction shook me up," he says. "I can remember when kids used to romanticize and think highly of intelligence work." Right and wrong become inoperative, useless words in espionage, says Sam Halperin, who was CIA executive assistant in clandestine services. He retired recently after 20 years with the OSS and the CIA. He is a short, thin man who looks more like a Brooklyn accountant than a James Bond.

"I draw the line on torture," he said. "But if I was told to recruit, I'd use all the tricks of the trade—money, sex, blackmail, anything that gives me control over people. That's what getting spies means and every-

thing else is hypocrisy."

Rough as espionage is there seem to be limits, practical if not moral limits.

"In that culture," said Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "spies don't kill other. In fact, they scrupulously avoid it. Now, I'm not talking about double agents. But while they watch each other carefully, the KGB leaves the CIA alone and the CIA leaves the KGB alone. They don't shoot each other. It would be as inefficient as gang warfare."

"It's a game of wits, not muscle," Dave Phillips said. "For example, it would be easy for us to kill a courier carrying the other side's secret documents, but they'd do the same to us, and pretty soon nobody would have couriers."

"Pragmatically, it doesn't make much sense," Sam Halperin said. "If you're a KGB man and you kill me, you then have to go to the time and trouble of learning who my replacement is."

CIA men insist, however, that the Russians are not above killing defectors or others who have "turned sour" and might carry off secrets with them. The KGB, they say, has a special department for carrying out eliminations known grimly among American intelligence people as "the Department of Wet Affairs." Wet for blood.

Does the CIA have a similar specialty?

"I have never heard of anything like that practiced by any intelligence system in the Western World," said a longtime veteran of American counterintelligence.

Would he admit it if he had?

"No," the man said.

In the beginning, the CIA was primarily intended to coordinate and evaluate for the President the information received by the government's various intelligence arms. The law establishing it said nothing about what has come to be known as "covert operations," the manipulation of events in other countries.

But the law did say that the CIA was to perform "such other functions" as the National Security Council might direct. With that catchall phrase as its authority, the CIA over the years has conducted covert operations around the world with massive resources of money, men and tricks neat and dirty. In Western Europe, Iran, Guatemala, Greece, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam and other countries, it has poured money into elections and engineered or tried to engineer the overthrow of governments thought to be inimical.

The general rationale was "they do it, we have to; it's them or us. Or as Colby said in a recent interview, quoting Vince Lombardi, "Winning isn't the main thing. It's the only thing."

"But the question," Sen. Church, said "is how much like the devil do we want to be? At one point, do we become our own worst enemy?"

Church admitted there are no easy answers. He thinks a good argument could be made for the infusion of CIA

money into the Italian elections of 1947, which defeated the Communists, and helped keep a war-wobbly Europe from sliding into Stalin's lap. Similarly, he thinks a good case might be made more recently for CIA intervention in Portugal (apparently it didn't intervene) on the grounds that a Communist or Russian-backed minority sought to thwart the democratic will of the demonstrated majority.

But there is no justification in terms of political morality or American security for the CIA intervention in Chile, Church said.

"The Marxist Allende government was the choice of the Chilean people, made in a free and honest election. Furthermore, Chile did not pose any threat to the United States unless it was the dagger pointed straight at the heart of the ITT."

"Besides the moral question of our right to control the affairs of another country covertly, there is a practical question. What is the political cost to the United States of such ventures, even when successful?"

"Sooner or later, they become known but the advocates never consider the price we pay for these things throughout the Third World, where we are resented and feared and, in many places, hated fully as much as the Soviet Union."

The CIA's general answer to criticism of its covert operations is that they were legally authorized and that the agency, a creature of the President, was carrying out his foreign policy. Thus, the question of CIA morality becomes the morality of that policy.

And that policy was best summarized, according to one of its critics, by a statement he attributed to Henry A. Kissinger. The critic is Morton Halperin, a former assistant to Kissinger on the National Security Council. He was one of 13 government officials whose phones were tapped by the Nixon administration in its search for security leaks to the media.

Halperin said Kissinger once said, during a meeting of the Forty Committee, which is an arm of the NSC: "I don't see why we should permit a country to go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people."

Kissinger has denied making this statement.

CIA Director Colby is fond of pointing out that a covert operation provides a President with "a choice between sending a diplomatic protest or sending in the Marines." He is also given to observe frequently that the CIA has been a product of its time and changes with the times. In May of this year, he said the CIA now conducts "very few" covert "political and paramilitary operations."

"This is the result of the changed world . . . but I must point out that this changed world seems to be changing again. Our country might again need the capability to provide some quiet influence or assistance to friends abroad without necessarily

formal diplomatic or military might of the United States."

Most covert operations, we are told, are small and routine. "Mostly, intelligence work is a lot of little transactions," said John Gross, a former CIA deputy director.

"Generally, it's a case of making friends so you can influence people to do or not do something," said Dave Phillips, who was CIA chief of Latin-American operations. "Like trying to slow down the flow of hard drugs to the United States or to have someone get tough with terrorists kidnapping our diplomats. And that friend might be a newspaperman or a government official or a local Bernard Baruch or the mistress of the foreign minister."

"A foreign minister, for example, is not likely to tell the American ambassador that his country is about to devalue its currency or blast us in the United Nations. Only intelligence people can gather this kind of information and hope to influence the events with covert action which makes it appear indigenous to the country and not the desire of the U.S."

Intelligent people tend to view the world in terms of unpleasant choices and if you question A, they ask back, would you prefer B. Thus Sam Halperin has little patience with persons who say it's all right to spy but immoral to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries:

"The essence of espionage is getting spies and a spy, by definition, is a traitor to his country, and what is so moral about turning people into traitors? In my book, it's much more moral to buy an editorial in a foreign newspaper or put money into an election."

"We interfere in the internal affairs of other countries all the time by giving or withholding something—military assistance, the AID program, food, loans, whatever. What the hell is so different about the President deciding we've got to win a foreign election covertly?"

"Teddy Roosevelt didn't need the CIA to detach the Panama peninsula from Colombia. Eisenhower ordered troops into Lebanon, Johnson sent them to the Dominican Republic. Wilson chased Pancho Villa. All of this was interference. The Germans and the Italians interfered in the Spanish Civil War, the West didn't, and we got Franco. Maybe we should have kept Hitler from marching into the Rhineland. That would have been interference, and what's the difference whether it is overt or covert?"

None of the intelligence people approached for this article saw anything immoral in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. It was poorly planned or badly executed but it was not, in their eyes, morally wrong. After all, they said, nobody had elected Castro and he was talking about exporting Marxist revolution in Latin America and he was inviting the Russians in only 90 miles from American shores and the Russians did

There is a kind of relentless momentum implicit in this logic that, gathering speed, can gallop easily toward the ultimate in covert operations—political assassination. It usually carries with it the reminder that the world might have been spared tragedy beyond measure if somebody had killed Adolf Hitler.

And if Hitler, why not Stalin, why not Castro? After all, this reasoning goes, wouldn't it have been better to kill one man than to have hundreds die in the Bay of Pigs and later risk the deaths of millions in the missile crisis?

Church said his committee had "hard evidence of CIA involvement" in assassination plots. Colby said there had been suggestions to assassinate, but they had been turned down.

Former CIA men interviewed for this story denied knowledge of any such plots but they did say they could understand how some persons might have considered them.

"In any big crunch," a man long in counterintelligence said, "there are always people below the top level who talk about miracle solutions for problems. But I can't imagine any CIA director even contemplating assassination without going to the President or secretary of state."

"Castro represented a real threat," another former CIA officer said; "and if I'd been President I would've considered assassination as an option."

"I can imagine," Dave Phillips said, "a few people getting together and saying, 'The Mafia did a remarkable job for us in the European ports during World War II. Why don't we talk to them about knocking off Castro?'

"But is that involvement? Or if we support an indigenous movement to overthrow a government, there is no way we can turn the taps on or off and know what the people are going to do. If the overthrow results in an assassination, is that involvement?"

In any case, Colby said, he is opposed to assassinations because "I think they're wrong and they frequently bring about absolutely uncontrollable and unforeseeable results—usually worse results than by continuing to suffer the problem you're facing."

Church, whose committee will attempt to prescribe limits for the American intelligence community, says, "No agency of government can be licensed to commit murder."

It would seem, then, there finally is a line beyond which the perceived needs of national security must not trespass.

But . . .

"Murder," Church said, "cannot be permissible when undertaken against leaders of countries with which we have peaceful relations or be an instrument of foreign policy against small countries whose leaders could not possibly threaten us."

Does that exclude the leaders of large countries who . . .?

"We're in a field of vagaries where it is impossible to draw clear lines,"

it, but there are those who contend, for example, that to avoid a nuclear catastrophe a President might have to take an action short of war, and assassination might become necessary.

"But the President of the United States must never become a glorified, 'Godfather,' with 'hit men' available to carry out his orders."

There is, or there is supposed to be, a double standard in intelligence by which the golden rule is neatly reversed. We do to others what we don't do to ourselves. We may spy, lie, bug, bribe, break and enter, steal or blackmail abroad but not at home. This is the law.

"But the problems which have arisen in the domestic field cannot be fully understood and evaluated," said Erwin Griswold, a member of the Rockefeller Commission, which investigated the CIA, "unless they are viewed against the role which the CIA has undertaken to play outside the United States. Because of the secret nature of its operations, legal and moral limitations may not always be kept in mind. In this situation, it should not be surprising that personnel, when working in the United States, should not always feel that they are subject to ordinary restraints."

Thus, the CIA has spied on Americans in the United States, maintained dossiers, intercepted and opened mail, infiltrated protest groups and engaged in wiretaps and break-ins.

The CIA insists none of this was "massive" and says that where it occurred it was necessary to national security. Its proponents also remind its critics of the unsettling riots in the '60s and '70s. They recall a statement

by FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley:

"Let me remind those who would criticize the FBI's actions that the United States Capitol WAS bombed; that other explosions rocked public and private offices and buildings; that rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid siege to military, industrial and educational facilities; and that killings, maimings and other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence from New England to California."

Against this background, the CIA says it sought to determine whether there were foreign connections behind the eruptions.

"Remember," the veteran of counterintelligence said, "that the KGB succeeded in its biggest recruitment of spies back in the '30s, when there was the Oxford Cambridge group which said it wouldn't fight in its country's wars."

"That was similar to the recent wave of protests against the Vietnam war. It was a time ripe for Soviet recruitment, and many of the protest leaders traveled abroad."

"Intelligence simply cannot operate within basic American precepts," said Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, former executive director of the CIA. "And it is incredibly naive to be shocked by the fact that letters were opened. This is done by every intelligence system in the world."

Colby said the CIA no longer opens mail. He also said the current uproar over its methods has caused damage. He speaks of other friendly intelligence systems abroad growing wary of dealing with the CIA. Of agents quitting because of a fear of exposure. Of "people we were just about to do business with changing

their minds." Of American corporations now afraid of finding themselves on the front page as "CIA fronts."

"And all that means," he said, "is that we're not getting the information we should be."

Church said neither he nor his committee intends to emasculate the CIA but they are concerned by the growth of Big Brother government.

"We've come a long way down that road. It's time to stuff the intelligence genie back in the bottle before we wake up one morning to find we have spawned a secret police and a government which has become the enemy of the people."

Church admitted that laying down new specific ground rules for the American intelligence apparatus in an unpretty world would be delicate and difficult. "The range of permissible activity will always have to depend on the good sense of the men running our government. The whole solution cannot be found in the written law no matter how carefully it is written."

Which leaves us where? In the whole search for rules, limits, standards in a field which has few, a scene keeps coming to mind from a movie, "Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid."

Cassidy is talking quietly with a mutineer in his gang of cutthroats. Suddenly Cassidy jerks his knee into the man's groin and the rebel goes down, surrendering to the knife at his Adam's apple.

A moment later, Cassidy is asked what they talked about. He smiles and says, "Oh, he wanted to know the rules in a knife fight."

LONG ISLAND PRESS  
18 Sept. 1975

## More disturbing CIA revelations

Central Intelligence Agency officials, led by its director, William E. Colby, have testified about the use of deadly biological and chemical poisons in overseas spying activities. Not only have agents been supplied with such substances to kill themselves rather than make damaging confessions to potential captors, but handy gadgets like battery-powered dart guns that shoot poisons have also been stockpiled for offensive use.

Thus the investigation of CIA activities by a Senate select committee has assumed a James-Bond atmosphere — fictional spies and their super weapons brought to life. But the CIA hasn't just been involved in realistic theater, it has also been involved in military coups abroad, and in equally illegal and dangerous spying at home. Moreover, some CIA officials have gone so far as to defy an order from the President of the United States.

This is the most startling and scary testimony to emerge from the public hearings. To his credit,

former President Nixon ordered such biological weapons as a deadly shellfish toxin destroyed. The CIA disobeyed the order.

Mr. Colby also deserves some credit. When he learned that the poisons had not been destroyed as ordered, he told the Senate investigators. His predecessors, particularly Richard Helms, left much to be desired, both in the way they did their job and in their later recollections.

Mr. Helms yesterday, for example, said he intended to obey the presidential directive to destroy the poison stockpile, but never issued a written order to have it done. His assertion that the retention of the poison supply was "one of the few instances I know of in 25 years where an order has been disobeyed" must be suspect. We wonder if it is rather an instance where the truth became known, to the embarrassment of CIA officials.

The revelation of CIA actions, and non-actions, makes more urgent than ever the need for better oversight of the spy agency. We believe Mr. Colby can do the job which must be done, but no director — no matter how competent — should be allowed to operate without the full knowledge of the White House and Congress.

NEW YORK TIMES  
25 September 1975

# U.S., SOVIET, CHINA REPORTED AIDING PORTUGAL, ANGOLA

Secret Funneling of Millions  
Seen as Part of Struggle  
to Control and Influence

## C.I.A. LINKED TO EFFORTS

European Socialists Said to  
Be Conduit—Russian Total  
Is Put at \$50-Million

By LESLIE H. GELB  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 — Millions of dollars are being poured covertly into Portugal and Angola by East and West, according to four official sources in Washington. The funneling of the funds is part of the continuing struggle for control of the Mediterranean and for influence and raw materials in Central Africa.

United States money for the Portuguese Socialist party and other parties is being funneled by the Central Intelligence Agency through West European Socialist parties and labor unions, the sources said. The C.I.A. involvement, the sources said, amounted to several million dollars a month over the last several months.

It is also reliably reported that the Soviet Union and its East European allies have poured \$50-million to \$100-million into Portugal since April, 1974, and hundreds of tons of military equipment into Angola since March alone.

### Chinese in Zaire

The sources also said that about 200 Chinese military advisers were operating from bases in Zaire to help at least one of the two liberation fronts being supported by Washington.

Until the spring, most of the Western aid to anti-Communist forces in Portugal was being given secretly by the West German Social Democratic party and the Belgian Socialist party without any American involvement.

The sources said that the funds earmarked for two anti-Soviet liberation fronts in Angola had been dispersed mainly through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. In order to maintain good relations with Mr. Mobutu, the State Department has been seeking to arrange a refinancing

of hundreds of millions of dollars in Zaire's short-term debts and to increase American aid to Zaire to about \$60-million this year, from about \$20-million.

In Angola and Portugal, the sources estimated, Soviet aid is far more than American aid and, at least in the case of Angola, has included several direct shipments of arms.

It is reliably said that the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, East Germany and others have transferred the bulk of the funds going to the Portuguese Communist party through a bank in Lisbon and a bank in Zurich.

### Soviet Aid Outlined

The following details were reliably supplied on Soviet aid to its supporters in Angola: In March, several Soviet planes landed in the Congo Republic, Zaire's neighbor, with arms and equipment that were then shipped to Angola; In April, about 100 tons of arms were delivered in southern Angola by chartered aircraft; in April, two Yugoslav vessels unloaded arms in Luanda, the capital of Angola; in May and June, four Soviet merchant ships unloaded vehicles, machine guns, bazookas, rifles and ammunition, off Angola, and two East German and one Algerian vessel delivered similar materials.

The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola reported is close to controlling Angola, which is scheduled to become independent Nov. 11. In Portugal, the anti-Communist situation stabilized somewhat last week with the installation of a Government including members of the Socialist party.

The Washington sources said that C.I.A. operations in both countries have been approved by President Ford and are being carried out, as prescribed by law, with the knowledge of several Congressional committees.

Both sides, first Moscow then Washington, were filling the coffers of their supporters in Portugal at the very time when President Ford and the Soviet party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, were signing a pledge in Helsinki, Finland, not to interfere in the internal affairs of other European nations.

### Kissinger Voices Alarm

Secretary of State Kissinger, speaking to representatives of African countries last night and answering Soviet charges of Western involvement in Portugal, said: "We are most alarmed at the interference of extracontinental powers who do not wish Africa well, and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence."

The C.I.A. cash-funneling operations to Portugal were said to have revived dormant but traditional connections between the agency and anti-Communist West European socialist and labor movements. And the operation in Angola, the sources said, led to the reactivation of Holden Roberto, head of the National Union for the Liberation of Angola, the man chosen

in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy and the C.I.A. to forge a link between the United States and the indigenous groups who were expected to drive Portugal from Angola one day.

Two of the forces stressed that all odds now favored victory by the Soviet-backed Popular Movement in Angola, unless the United States and China rushed huge transfusions of aid, which is considered highly unlikely.

As described by these sources, the main purpose for the covert American effort in Angola was to underline the Administration's support for President Mobutu, the man on whom Secretary of State Kissinger is banking to oppose Moscow's interests in Africa and to further Washington's interests in various international forums.

The funds going to Portugal from the United States and Western Europe were said to be aimed at keeping non-Communist parties intact, in the streets, and in the business of competing with the Communists for the support of military leaders and soldiers.

One source said: "The President almost blew the whole Portugal thing last week in his interview with The Chicago Sun-Times. But nobody picked him up."

This was a reference to Mr. Ford's reply to a question about the absence of C.I.A. involvement in Portugal. He noted "our strong stand" along with NATO allies against a Communist government in Lisbon, then said: "I don't think the situation required us to have a major C.I.A. involvement, which we have not had."

The source was pointing to the fact that Mr. Ford was not denying that the C.I.A. had an involvement.

The sources maintained that William E. Colby, the director of the agency, had notified members of six-Congressional subcommittees several months ago of the covert operations, and that no serious objections were raised. Mr. Colby gave the notifications after the operations were already underway, as he is permitted to do under the law.

### Requirement Cited

An amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 stipulated that no funds could be spent by or on behalf of the C.I.A. for covert operations "unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the Senate and House Appropriation and Armed Services committees, and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on International Relations."

In each case, the full committee delegated the duty of overseeing the C.I.A. to a subcommittee with a term limit.

tions, the members of these subcommittees are regarded as conservative.

The sources either did not know or would not state when the covert operations began. But two of the sources indicated that the funds going to Portugal predated an interview given by Mr. Ford to U.S. News & World Report early last month when he talked of the virtual impossibility of C.I.A. involvement in Lisbon.

Speaking of aid going "quietly" from Moscow and Western Europe to warring factions in Portugal, he said:

"I think it's very tragic that, because of the C.I.A. investigation and all the limitations placed on us in the area of covert operation, we aren't able to participate with other Western European countries."

"The American people shouldn't handicap themselves from meeting the challenge, as we were handicapped in South Vietnam and as we are handicapped in trying to be a participant in Portugal."

One of the sources said that Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger made the decision some time after they went to Brussels for a NATO meeting in late May. It was after consultations with heads of state there, the source continued, that they saw how strongly the West European leaders felt about maintaining a non-Communist Portugal.

The source then explained: "We wanted to show them that we would stand with them on this one, and also more money was needed."

Another source said that the West Europeans were already "giving plenty" and would have given more, but "it's just that we can't keep our hands out of anything."

Two of the sources said that West European trade unions that they would not identify were smuggling small arms and ammunition to the Portuguese Socialists. The Portuguese Communists, they said, had been previously armed by Moscow.

The decision to begin covertly financing these anti-Communist forces marked the latest step in a long process of reversing policy toward post-Salazar Portugal. For almost a year following the death of António de Oliveira Salazar, the administration's policy was to lament privately but say nothing publicly about the leftward trend among the Portuguese military leaders. The theory was that more harm than good would come of any American involvement.

But the recent decision to take a strong anti-Communist stand in Portugal, including covert financing, was very much in keeping with the history of American policy toward the countries on the northern rim of the Mediterranean.

Beginning with the Communist-inspired instability in Greece and Turkey after World War II, and running through the threat of a Communist take-over in the Italian government in the early nineteen-sixties, the C.I.A. has been active in this region. Much the same holds true for Africa, particularly begin-

ning with Moscow's attempt to gain a foothold in Zaire, which was previously the Belgian Congo. From the time Patrice Lumumba was ousted, through the short career of Moise Tshombe, until General Mobutu came to power, a number of authoritative sources related, the CIA has maintained its largest African station in Zaire.

At about the same time, in the early sixties, the sources said, President Kennedy determined that Portugal, an American ally in NATO, could not sustain control over her African colonies indefinitely and that contact must be made with future revolutionary leaders. In 1962, on the advice of the CIA, among others, Mr. Roberto, the brother-in-law of General Mobutu, was selected as a future leader for Angola.

#### Roberto 'Deactivated'

The sources said that from 1962 to about 1969, the CIA supplied Mr. Roberto with money and arms, but to little avail. At that point, they said, he was deactivated and put on

M. Roberto was reactivated

this spring, according to the sources, at about the time it became clear that the then Communist-leaning government in Portugal ordered its armed forces in Angola to give active support to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement or the Liberation of Angola headed by Agostino Neto.

But the sources said that CIA operatives and American diplomats judged that United States support should also be thrown behind Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

It could not be learned whether Chines and American officials had ever discussed or ought to coordinate their efforts against Mr. Neto. What was learned was that American funds were being used to buy arms for both Mr. Roberto and Mr. Savimbi, and that the Chinese were providing military advisors for Mr. Roberto and perhaps for Mr. Savimbi as well.

It could not be learned whether any CIA operatives

were also acting as military advisers.

#### Cabinda a Key Factor

At take in Angola, besides the enlargement of Soviet influence, a region deemed rich in copper, industrial diamonds and oil. Of particular interest to the United States and to President Mobutu, the sources said, is Cabinda, an oil-rich area bordering on Zaire and separated from Angola by the Congo River. There, the sources related, the Gulf Oil Corporation continues to pump over 100,000 barrels a day. The sources said that the Administration believed that Mr. Mobutu would like to annex Cabinda in the likely event of a Communist tak-over in Angola.

All the sources said, that it was Zaire, that was of primary concern to the Administration. It is believed that Mr. Kissinger is about to select Sheldon E. Vance, a former Ambassador to Zaire and a close friend of Mr. Mobutu, to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He would replace Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Sec-

retary. Mr. Davis was in charge of Deane R. Hinton, the ambassador who was ordered out of Zaire some months ago amid charges by President Mobutu that the CIA had designs on the President's life.

It was Mr. Vance, two of the sources said, who this summer began to contact Zaire's many creditors in the United States and elsewhere to see if the millions in debts that were soon to come due could be refinanced. It could not be learned whether Mr. Vance had completed this task or had succeeded.

In the meantime, the State Department has approached several Congressmen with a view toward increasing American aid to about \$15-million. This year, Zaire was to receive about \$20-million, but the State Department is now aiming for \$60-million. This would consist of \$20-million in development aid, \$20-million in Export-Import Bank loans, and \$20-million in Food for Peace credit. Several officials said that so far, Congressional response had been decidedly negative.

BALTIMORE SUN  
2 October 1975

Ernest B. Felterson

## Irresponsibility and the System

Washington. On the surface, an astounding degree of irresponsibility has been displayed on both sides in the congressional investigation of the CIA.

The agency has been disclosed to be careless of American citizens' right to privacy, the public's right to know what the public's employees are doing and to control those activities. It has been demonstrated that the manly cliche covering high-level administration—"the buck stops here"—itself stops when it comes to the upper reaches of the intelligence community.

Among the congressmen, the disclosure of information provided on a confidential basis has gone beyond anything attributable to mere carelessness.

Members of both houses have aggressively pushed into public view facts that are of surpassing interest to the CIA's counterpart agencies in Moscow and elsewhere. They have done this even after being warned that to do so was to give aid and comfort to the potential enemy. Such favors are not prudent even in a period of alleged detente.

And yet, when the Congress is done and erstwhile hawks and doves have been alternately outraged by what is laid on the record, we will understand that this has been another healthful functioning of our cumbersome system. Skim a few of the outrages and consider:

• The Central Intelligence Agency illegally opened the mail of leading politicians, including Richard Nixon, Edward Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey.

• The agency kept a store of super-deadly shellfish toxin after Nixon ordered that all such material be destroyed.

• It did indeed get into the business of assassination of foreign leaders, to what extent and with what success still fortunately not spelled out in public.

• And at nearly every new disclosure, we have heard top officials of the agency allow that they personally did not know about that, or that they gave orders that were not carried out, or that we used to do that but we don't any more—unless of course it still goes on without the head man's concurrence.

It is entirely possible that the head men involved were telling the truth when they said they did not know, and it may even be standard procedure in the spy trade for the front man to avert his eyes carefully while his anonymous underlings continue dirty tricks deemed essential to the national security. Eventually, however, he must be called on to account for everything that was done by his agency, whether he literally or formally knew about it or not. The buck cannot be passed downward.

As for the Senators and congressmen, some of them have intentionally put out data considered by the agency and by congressional tradition to be secret.

The great flap over the House committee's access to further CIA papers, which may and may not have been solved by the agency's producing a stack of slightly censored material, was provoked by earlier disclosure of key words from a classified document.

Robert Giaimo of Connecticut is dedicated to making public the total spending figure for CIA activities, a matter long held to be

of high value to the KGB.

The Soviet agency makes our side work hard to guess out comparable figures hidden in the annual budget from the Kremlin. Without waiting for a vote on the issue, Giaimo said Tuesday that CIA funds were covered by a \$2 billion-plus line in the Air Force budget.

Irresponsible publicity seeking?

Perhaps. But the drive for publicity, which means the drive to get re-elected, is a fundamental of life in Washington.

It is required of an intelligence official that he keep as much of his work under cover as possible, and it is demanded that the men who make the laws and vote the money try to drag out as much supporting data from the agency as they can.

The tug-of-war between Congress and the executive, between secrecy and publicity, is built into the system.

When the emotion drains away, the CIA may be marginally weaker, but the system will be demonstrably stronger. Consider Watergate a precedent.

WASHINGTON POST  
26 September 1975

# U.S. Silence Bolsters Report of Aid to Portugal and Angola

By Murray Marder  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Ford administration gave unintended credence yesterday to reports that the United States is supplying millions of dollars to anti-Communist forces in Portugal and Angola to offset larger Communist aid, by refusing to confirm or deny the accounts.

"It's on of these 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' situations," said one official, describing the administration's dilemma.

Central Intelligence Agency funds conveyed to Portugal's Socialists through Western European political parties and other groups ranged from about \$2 million to nearly \$10 million a month since June, the Associated Press reported, citing a State Department official source. Last night one high official scoffed at that range of figures, but gave no others.

Portugal's Socialist Party leader, Mario Soares, made an official disclaimer. "We have never received aid of that sort, even less so from the United States," he said, attributing the report to "journalistic speculation."

The aid to Portugal's anti-Communists reaches them circuitously, nevertheless.

It has been known across Europe for months that Western European Socialist and Christian Democratic parties have been sending millions of dollars into Portugal. The purpose was to counter reportedly huge amounts of aid to Portugal's Communist Party from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.

Outside nations similarly have been channelling money, plus weapons, to the competing pro-Communist and anti-Communist liberation forces in Portugal's huge African colony of An-

gola, due to become independent on Nov. 11. The Soviet Union and China, have been known to be involved in this activity, supporting opposing groups.

Until yesterday, the Ford administration's position was that it was staying out of any entanglement in either country.

The United States and the Soviet Union have cross-warned each other against intervention in Portugal.

President Ford publicly, and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger privately, have portrayed the United States as being blocked from using the CIA to help anti-Communist parties in Portugal, because of the furor over CIA operations elsewhere. Mr. Ford has described this as a "very tragic" limitation on covert operations.

The Ford administration yesterday, however, shifted to a "no comment" position in response to a barrage of questions initially touched off by a report in The New York Times that the United States was participating in the competing flow of aid.

Kissinger acknowledged in a press conference on Sept. 9 that the prospects of the anti-Communist forces in Portugal had suddenly improved.

The United States, Kissinger said, "supports the emergence of a pluralistic system there reflecting the public's view" and he said, "we are working in the closest harmony on this problem with our European allies."

Last week a new overwhelmingly anti-Communist Portuguese coalition cabinet was sworn into office, with major roles for the Socialist and Popular Democratic parties.

White House press secretary Ron Nessen, State Department spokesman Robert L. Funseth and a CIA spokesman yesterday declined to confirm or

deny that American money has been channeled to Portugal or Angola.

Administration officials conceded that by not denying the reports they lent credence to the accounts. What particularly troubled many U.S. officials was that their silence tended to equate the covert American aid sent to Portugal and Angola with the amounts of Soviet aid.

U.S. sources said that equation is unwarranted, because, they contended, the amount of Soviet support is much higher. These American sources said they were barred from being specific about U.S. support.

Sen. Lloyd M. Bentsen (D-Tex.) said in July that on the basis of information from the State Department and the CIA, Soviet aid to Portugal's Communists reportedly ranged from \$2 million to \$10 million a month. Kissinger said at that time that the information he had "makes \$10 million seem high."

In Angola, there are three contending liberation movements, one backed by the Soviet Union, with at least one of the two opposing groups backed by China and now the United States as well.

Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Africa, who visited Angola last month and talked with leaders of all three forces, yesterday said:

"It's a very bad idea for us to become involved in any way." Clark said that publicly and privately. "I've taken a very strong position with high officials of the State Department" cautioning that "outside intervention by the superpowers obviously is only going to escalate the conflict."

NEW REPUBLIC  
20 SEPTEMBER 1975

## The Classifieds

### Literature

ROCKEFELLER AND HIS C.I.A. "SOCIALIST" FAKE LIBERAL AND REAL RIGHT WING AGENTS in the media (New Republic through National Review), government, union misleaderships ("Soares" Woodcock through "Salazar" Meany), etc. peddle the SAME anti-Communist, anti-Soviet LIES. They offer you the SAME fascist LOOTING by Chase Manhattan and the World Bank from New York City to Bangladesh in your "choice" of "progressive" "moderate", or "conservative" guise. Have these C.I.A. lightning rod sham choices diverted your energy away from the real alternative: NEW SOLIDARITY, Marxist newspaper of the U.S. Labor Party (N.C.L.C.). Exposes the C.I.A. hand behind crises in N.Y.C., Portugal, India etc. and the C.I.A. crimes that Rockefeller and church conceal (C.I.A.-N.S.C. direction of agent—provocateur groups like Black September, etc.) 50 issues \$12.00. Camerino Publications, Inc., 231 IV, 29 St., New York, New York 10001

CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
23 SEPTEMBER 1975

People  
Documents' leak easy to pinpoint

There has been a lot of fuss in Washington lately about whether Rep. Otis Pike (D., N. Y.) has been leaking classified material to such undesirables as the American people and the national press. Just last week President Ford himself angrily demanded the return of any classified material in Pike's possession as chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Just last week Pike wrote Ford a letter

NEW YORK TIMES  
27 September 1975

## Europe Socialists Deny Routing C.I.A. Funds to Party in Lisbon

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Sept. 26.—The General Secretary of the Socialist International denied today that Western European Socialist parties were passing on money to the Portuguese Socialist party that was provided by the American Central Intelligence Agency.

"There has been no such involvement whatsoever," the General Secretary, Hans Janitschek, said. A Washington dispatch in The New York Times yesterday telling of such an involvement, he said, "does great damage to the cause of socialism in Portugal and also in other Western European countries."

Mr. Janitschek said that he was seeking advice about how to undertake legal action against The Times, a paper that he said he had hitherto regarded as "one of the finest in the world."

"What I particularly resent," he said, "is that The New York Times did not feel it necessary to check with me before publishing this account." Had that been done, he went on, he would have informed the paper that any assistance given the Portuguese Socialist party by sister parties of the Socialist International came not from the C.I.A. but from party members, and was "very limited indeed."

The Times report did not mention the Socialist International, but spoke of Western European Socialist parties and labor unions.

### A Denial in Stockholm

STOOLHOLM, Sept. 26 (Reuters)—Sweden's governing So-

cial Democratic party emphatically denied today any transferring of funds to the Portuguese Socialist party on behalf of the C.I.A.

"Everyone who has visited Portugal and seen the Socialist party at close hand," a Social Democratic spokesman here said, "can testify that the party is hardly wallowing in money. On the contrary, its economic situation is very difficult."

The Portuguese Socialist leader, Mario Soares, is expected here Monday to attend the annual congress of the Swedish party.

### U.S. Sources Confirm Aid

WASHINGTON, Sept. 26 (AP)—A State Department official said today that the Central Intelligence Agency had been sending \$2-million to \$10-million a month to the Portuguese Socialists, but offered no overall total for aid thus far.

The official's comment came as sources in the State Department and the intelligence community confirmed that the aid was going to Portugal's Socialist-Communist labor unions and

The sources said aid was sent through a roundabout network involving C.I.A. contacts within Western European countries, such as West Germany's Social Democratic party.

Other conduits for the covert aid, the sources said, were anti-Communist labor unions and business organizations that operated within member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NEW YORK TIMES  
22 September 1975

## Hunt Said to Link Nixon Aide in Plot To Kill Anderson

WASHINGTON, Sept. 21.—E. Howard Hunt Jr., who is serving a jail term in Florida for his role in the Watergate burglary, has told "associates" that he was asked about five years ago by a "senior" official in the Nixon White House to assassinate the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, according to a report today in The Washington Post.

Neither Mr. Hunt nor his lawyer, William A. Snyder, would comment on the article, which was displayed across the top of Page One in The Post. Mr. Anderson said today that he did not think it was possible that anyone in the Nixon White House would have seriously suggested his murder.

The Post said that the assassination plan was alive for "several days" in December, 1971, or January, 1972, and

"canceled" at the last minute. The article did not identify the White House official or give the reason for the cancellation.

In his book, "An American Life," Jeb Stuart Magruder, a former Nixon campaign aide, wrote that G. Gordon Liddy, another convicted Watergate conspirator, had taken him seriously when he offhandedly remarked, "Boy, it'd be nice to get rid of that guy [Mr. Anderson]."

Mr. Magruder, who was also involved in the Watergate scandal, wrote that his assistant realized that Mr. Liddy had taken Mr. Magruder's comment literally. Mr. Magruder wrote that he had immediately called Mr. Liddy back to his office to explain, "Gordon, I was just using a figure of speech about getting rid of Anderson."

"Well, you better watch that," answered Mr. Liddy, according to Mr. Magruder's book. The Post article said that there was no connection between the Hunt assassination plan and the Liddy incident.

NEW YORK TIMES  
28 September 1975

## McGOVERN SEEKING C.I.A. LISBON CURB

Plans Legislation to Extend  
\$55-Million to Portugal and  
Ban Covert Activity

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 27.—Senator George S. McGovern announced today that he would introduce legislation to ban further United States covert intelligence activity in Portugal and to give the Government of Portugal \$55-million in regular economic aid.

In a speech prepared for delivery to the Senate on Monday, the South Dakota Democrat, who recently returned from a visit to Portugal, says that Moscow's secret support for Portuguese Communists is no excuse for covert American involvement. He charges that Central Intelligence Agency's interference "will poison the politics of that country."

The Senator's proposed ban is in response to an article in The New York Times on Thursday. It cited official sources as acknowledging that the United States, through the C.I.A.'s connections with West European Socialist parties and labor unions, has channeled several million dollars a month since last spring to help non-Communist parties in Portugal.

### Denied by Socialist

White House and State Department spokesmen would neither confirm nor deny this report yesterday, but the Portuguese Socialist party leader, Mário Soares, denied the allegation.

The report also cited official sources as saying that the C.I.A. had been channelling money and arms to bolster two national liberation fronts in Angola against a third front that is heavily supplied by the Soviet Union and its East European allies. The report also said that about 200 Chinese military advisers were helping one or perhaps both of the anti-Soviet fronts.

Interviews with a number of Senators and Representatives indicated that there would be little support for Mr. McGovern's proposed ban. Most of those interviewed said that because of information that Moscow's covert aid in Portugal and Angola predicated and exceeded covert American action, C.I.A. involvement has been appropriate and justifiable.

A few felt with Mr. McGovern that such aid would damage non-Communist elements in Portugal and should be stopped, and one Senator said that he would introduce an amendment

to ban covert American intelligence activity in Angola.

Administration officials said that they now expected moves in Congress to prohibit these activities but hoped that the measures could be killed in committee or with the argument that no action should be taken until the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence make recommendations early next year.

### Panels Had Been Informed

As prescribed by law, William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, had informed members of six Congressional subcommittees of the operations in Portugal and Angola. Informed sources said that no serious objection had been raised by the legislators.

Mr. McGovern's amendment to the pending foreign aid bill would authorize \$20-million for development projects in Portugal and \$35-million to assist refugees from Angola over the \$20-million already in the bill for this purpose.

In his statement, the Senator also called for channeling this aid, as far as possible, through multilateral international organizations. "Multilateral aid is the best way to meet Portugal's critical economic needs without raising the threat of perception of interference with Portuguese self-determination," the statement reads.

Since last spring, official sources said, the C.I.A. has been providing arms and financial aid to Angolan liberation groups through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. For this assistance, the State Department has been seeking to work out aid and financial arrangements to help President Mobutu with his mounting financial debt.

### Soares Criticizes U.S.

Special to The New York Times

LISBON, Sept. 27.—The Portuguese Socialist leader, Mário Soares, criticized the United States today when he learned that the State Department had refused to confirm or deny a New York Times report that millions of dollars had been channeled to his party from Washington through West European Socialist parties and labor organizations.

"That's a mean trick of the United States government," he said, "because we didn't receive any money."

The Portuguese Socialist party has always taken great care not to receive any help in money from anyone," he said. "Maybe there has been some diplomatic support, that sort of thing, but no money."

Mr. Soares said that there had been some supplies, such as copying machines, from the West German Socialists but that he had paid no attention to these details. "As a lawyer, I must remind you that it is up to the one who makes the accusations to give the proof, not the other way around," he said.

WASHINGTON STAR  
19 September 1975

# IN FOCUS *Ex-'Spook' Can't Shake the Stigma From 15 Years Ago*

By John Fialka  
Washington Star Staff Writer

For 15 years now Eric H. Biddle Jr. has been trying, unsuccessfully, to come back from the cold.

On the surface, he has every possible credential one might need to succeed in Washington. He has excellent social connections, coming from a famous, "main line" family in Philadelphia. His academic credentials are impeccable, he prepped at the Haverford School and graduated from Harvard.

He is regarded by his friends and even some of his enemies as an honest, hard worker. He has demonstrated experience and skill at overseeing multimillion dollar programs. "He is the ideal civil servant," states an evaluation report once done by one of his supervisors, "with a very high standard of performance to which he consistently adheres."

Yet, Biddle, at age 46, has seen his hopes for a meaningful career in the federal government shattered.

FOR FIVE YEARS he has been a "nonperson" at Action, the agency where he works. He is not invited to policy meetings. He may not compete for high-level promotions. Although he was, until recently, a GS-15, his work was reviewed by a GS-12. Frequently he has been assigned to do nothing, and, frequently, his superiors have tried to act as though Biddle does not exist.

Why? Because Eric Biddle is still regarded as a "spook." He succumbed, along with many of his Ivy League peers in the early 1950s to the blandishments of government recruiters who promised jobs with the "most exciting agency in Washington." It was the heyday of the Central Intelligence Agency and Biddle was one of the thousands of bright young men who signed on. Although Biddle resigned in 1960, no one has ever let him forget it.

Now the "agency," as Biddle calls it, sometimes with respect and sometimes with gentle criticism, is going through its blackest days, tarred with attacks from the press, Congress and even the White House.

Many of Biddle's class of "bright young men" are now getting a taste of what Biddle has had. He believes there are hundreds, if not thousands, who are having great difficulty finding jobs. There have been complaints of discrimination against ex-CIA agents by private employers, but Biddle's case, now pending in District Court is believed to be the first one charging that his civil rights are being violated by the discrimination of one federal agency against another.

Biddle believes that the majority of his former peers are still in the CIA.

"Because, in the first place it is interesting work and they are devoted to it. It is also hard to get out, very hard if you're married and have a family. Now it must be much harder than ever."

IT IS DIFFICULT for him to convey to a younger generation, a child of the Sixties, the aura, the feeling that young, liberal idealists were charged with in the early Fifties.

"I wanted to serve my country. It was the old Rooseveltian concept of service. That's why I majored in government. The CIA was considered to be the most exciting place in Washington. That's why so many of my peers were recruited, because of the aura of mystery and adventure."

"I was asked, for example, when I was interviewed whether or not I was willing to jump — parachute — into the Soviet Union. I didn't know whether that was a realistic possibility or not, I had no idea. I sort of gulped and said yes."

The State Department, once the Mecca for blue bloods like Biddle, had been demolished by the McCarthy era. But the CIA was unscathed. "Because we had passed such a rigid security screening, we were immune from suspicion of disloyalty, even though most of the people I knew were rather liberal in politics. For example, they were for Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and skeptical of candidate Eisenhower's promises to 'roll back' the Iron Curtain."

He had taken Russian at Harvard. And, in the spring of 1952, Biddle took nine months of more intensive Russian lessons at the Navy's language school in Anacostia. The competition for overseas assignments was intense, especially for the Eastern European sector, and Biddle was sure that was where he wanted to be.

He wanted action and he got it. During the next two years he trained, dispatched and monitored agents, some of them, he says, for missions within the Soviet Union. This is the art of spy handling, or "agent running." Biddle, the practitioner, stayed in the background, operating from bases in Germany and elsewhere.

HE DESCRIBES IT as a kind of gentlemanly game. Although there was considerable thievery and trespass, there was none of the James Bond hugger-mugger. Poison darts did not whiz around the arena and CIA and KGB agents were not continually trying to waste each other with exotic weaponry.

"The two absolute no-nos were that you did not take away the other guy's diplomatic pouch and you didn't kill or even physically harm anybody on the other side because that went both ways and there was no knowing when

During those years, however, he began to feel symptoms of career frustration. "I was hired toward the end of the CIA's big recruiting drive. They had recruited too many people. The people in key positions were guys not much older than me. I could see the promotional possibilities were going to be very, very slow."

So when Biddle returned to Washington in 1955, he was tempted to accept a fellowship for Russian studies at Columbia University in New York. His supervisor, on the very day Biddle mentioned that, came up with an assignment to Greece.

Eastern Europe might have been where the action was, but Greece, in those days, was where much of the "action" was mounted. "We, I mean the United States, practically ran that country in those days. There were a lot of (CIA) operations there. Besides, Greece was a decidedly better place to live than Germany." Biddle spent much of his free time exploring ancient monuments.

Another reason Biddle enjoyed Greece was because he fell in love with a Greek woman. He wasn't entirely sure he wanted to marry her, but he decided he would clear the possibility, anyway, with his superiors.

They turned him down flat, even though he'd offered to subject the woman to a complete security check. CIA intelligence officers were not permitted to marry foreign nationals, he was told. That was the beginning of the end for Biddle's CIA aspirations. "It was totally unjustified. It was ridiculous to make a generalization that all foreigners are automatically security risks."

IN THE LATE FIFTIES, when Biddle returned from Greece, he made it clear to his superiors that he was leaving the agency as soon as he could find an acceptable job.

He began spending long weekends in New York, visiting personnel offices on Mondays. At first he found few takers. "When you leave the agency, you have this peculiar burden, you can't say what you've done. The only thing I had to talk about was my foreign experience and languages."

Finally, in March 1960, Biddle decided to make a clean break with the agency and spend all of his time looking for a job. He resigned and was given a glowing letter of recommendation from G.M. Stewart, then the CIA's director of personnel.

For a while Biddle worked for a drug company in Philadelphia, later he shifted to a major international engineering company in San Francisco, but he decided that working in the private sector was, after his experience, just not that interesting.

In November 1963 when John F. Kennedy was assassinated, Biddle was sure he had to "get back into the game" and do meaningful work."

At first he decided that the way to

do that was to become active in the Episcopal Church. In 1964 he started work at Union Seminary at Columbia University in New York on a masters degree in religious studies. To finance his education, he worked for the National Council of Churches.

The following year, however, he decided that he needed a higher paying job and returned to Washington, looking for full-time government work.

Biddle has always been fussy about working in Washington. In 1952 the exciting new agency, the magnet for the idealists, might have been the CIA, but that era was gone, perhaps forever. The new magnet was now the Peace Corps and, of course, that was where Biddle had to be.

In the late summer of 1965, Biddle had an interview with one of the corp's chief "talent scouts" that he has never forgotten. It was the way she did it.

He had been in an outer office, completing his forms, when a lower echelon official told him that, because of his CIA background, he could never be eligible for a position in the Peace Corps.

"I said I'm not satisfied with that answer. I want to talk to somebody higher up." Then he was introduced to a woman who seemed, at first, very interested. After running through his background, Biddle added that there was something he felt she should know.

"Is it intelligence?" she asked, cheerily.

"Yes," said Biddle.

"Bye," said the woman, sweetly, waving at him.

**LATER THAT YEAR**, Biddle signed on as an inspector for the Office of Equal Opportunity, which was then in charge of waging President Johnson's War on Poverty.

Biddle's work as an inspector for OEO often required him to travel to various communities to see whether the antipoverty funds were being abused. According to several of Biddle's associates, his work was legendary. "He had all sorts of strange ways to dig up information. The people out in the field were afraid of him," said one.

The problem was that Biddle didn't march to any recognizable drummer. In the late 1960s, during the great emotional outpouring for inner city blacks, Biddle was at work digging up stories of wholesale diversion of poverty program funds in the black community, and was investigating the financing of such groups as the Black Panthers.

Later, at a time when there was considerable sympathy for the plight of the American Indian, there was Biddle, pointing out that leaders of the American Indian Movement had police records and that bands of armed thugs fought over government money and positions at various Indian reservations, assertions that later turned out to be true.

By 1970, it became perfectly clear to many OEO workers that if they wanted a lengthy career in a government agency, OEO was not the place to be. The Nixon administration had marked the agency for extinction.

Biddle then signed on with a new agency, the Office of Voluntary Action, but not, however, without a few skirmishes with minor White House officials who concluded that Biddle would be "too anti-Communist."

**BIDDLE'S NEW BOSS** was Christopher Mould. Mould was impressed with his work, promoted him to GS-15 and assigned him to a new task force that was drawing up plans for a new agency, Action, which would merge the Peace Corps, Vista and other volunteer groups into one unit.

It was arranged that Biddle would go over to Action when the agency was authorized to begin. It was arranged, that is, until Mould took it upon himself to tell Joseph Blatchford, then the head of Action, about Biddle's CIA background.

Blatchford, Mould has later sworn in an affidavit supporting Biddle's case, "concluded that Mr. Biddle could not remain in any part of Action because of the damage his presence might cause the Peace Corps overseas."

Mould, who became associate director for Action, asserts in the affidavit that, as a result, "Mr. Biddle was persona non grata in Action and was given little or no work and was essentially isolated from the day to day work of the agency."

At the time, however, it was not clear to anyone just how long Biddle's "nonperson" status would continue. Biddle, who worried about his previous rejection by the Peace Corps, remembers being reassured by Mould: "Don't worry, you're going into Action, not into the Peace Corps."

But Biddle did worry. He worried enough to ask the CIA why there was such a taboo about joining the Peace Corps. He was told, he said, that in the early days of the Peace Corps, when Sargent Shriver was its director, there was a secret agreement with then-CIA director Allen Dulles that, in order to keep Peace Corps volunteers above all suspicion, the CIA would never use the corps for a "cover," and that no ex-CIA agent could be hired by the Peace Corps within five years after resigning from the CIA.

**OFFICIALLY**, Biddle was a GS-15 program analyst in the agency's domestic Policy and Program Development section. Unofficially, he was given few assignments and encouraged to find another job. He tried, sending resumes at first to other agencies. The Office of Management and Budget, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Commerce's East-West Trade section were among his first choices.

Later, as his search became more desperate, the list was broadened to include the Departments of Health Education and Welfare, Agriculture, and the General Services Administration. There were no takers.

"In the old days at CIA," Biddle reminisced to a reporter, "we used to laugh about Agriculture, that being sent there would be like dying or something. The CIA was the swinging place to be."

In February 1972, when Howard Phillips was assigned the task of demolishing OEO, he asked Biddle whether he'd be interested in a temporary transfer to OEO to work as a program auditor. Biddle, who was bored and frustrated, accepted.

Unlike any of the former directors of OEO, Phillips used all of Biddle's reports and then some in his all-out effort to abolish the agency. Biddle was not pleased by the highly political nature of Phillips' attacks and, when Michael P. Balzano Jr. took over as the head of Action, Biddle was back after his old job.

**IN THE MEANTIME**, however, someone had leaked the story of Biddle's former CIA experience to the press. There were several headlines about the existence of an "ex-CIA man in Action," and at least one article talked about "former spooks" serving in OEO.

Because Biddle was still officially an employee of Action, Blatchford felt it necessary to issue a memo emphasizing that the Peace Corps would always maintain its bar against former CIA employees. Referring to Biddle as "this individual," Blatchford noted that he had made considerable efforts to find Biddle another job. "Action cannot and would not discharge this man, who has civil service rights," said Blatchford.

Under the Balzano regime, although he had had assurances that there would be no more discrimination, it became clear to Biddle one morning that there was still a problem.

He had made arrangements to go to night law classes at George Washington University, arrangements that seemed to be satisfactory to his superiors at the time.

One Aug. 27, just before law school was to begin, he received a memorandum from Marjorie Lynch, who was then the agency's associate director for domestic and antipoverty operations. The agency, she said, had decided on a "partial decentralization" of Biddle's office. The part that was being decentralized was Biddle, who was being assigned to Kansas City.

When Biddle threatened to take up the matter with the Civil Service Commission, plans for the "partial decentralization" were suddenly dropped.

**THEN, LAST SEPTEMBER**, Biddle's unit was hit by a reduction in force. Biddle's GS-15 slot was abolished. Shortly afterwards, a friend, Fred Patrick, then head of Action's Internal Audit staff, offered Biddle a GS-14 slot and Biddle accepted, provided there was an understanding that he would not be prohibited from doing anything in the job's description, which mentioned auditing trips to scrutinize Action's foreign and domestic operations.

The real test of this came this spring when Patrick quietly assigned Biddle to audit Peace Corps activities in Belize and Costa Rica. Nobody objected, so Biddle went. There were no coups in Central America while he was there, and no foreign leaders were seen to be stricken by mysterious poisons. But when the trip was discovered there was an explosion in

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
21 SEPTEMBER 1975

## Action..

Patrick, according to a letter he later sent Biddle, was summoned by Jorge Cordova, then Action's general counsel, and told that the Peace Corps ban on CIA employees extended to people auditing the Peace Corps. Based on meetings with Cordova and other Action officials, Patrick wrote Biddle that "the opinion of the general counsel will serve as a restriction prohibiting your future involvement in Peace Corps work assignments."

Eric Biddle is on familiar grounds now. He is fighting a gentlemanly but desperate battle. In December, he took his case before the Civil Service Commission, which rejected his argument that his civil rights have been violated.

In August he brought suit in District Court, here, against Balzano, Action and the Civil Service Commission. All along, his opposition has been formidable, but gentlemanly.

For example, Phillip Bourbon, Action's personnel director, asserts that Biddle's charge of discrimination is "simply not true." He defends the agency's latest regulation on the matter as being necessary to keep the Peace Corps inviolate.

The regulation now prohibits all former government intelligence officers from holding any job in the Peace Corps or any Action support facilities that deal with the Peace Corps. Bourbon said the regulation extends to former intelligence agents from the armed forces and might even bar a former FBI agent, although he said that would have to be examined on a "case-by-case basis."

Biddle is convinced that the regulation was written expressly for him. Bourbon denies it.

"He (Biddle) is a good man," said Bourbon, "I don't think anybody's ever questioned that."



WASHINGTON STAR  
23 September 1975

## Ex-Spies Here to 'Show We're Human'

The new Association of Retired Intelligence Officers is going to stay out of partisan politics but is trying to do its best to polish the tarnished image of intelligence. Its founder, "show we're human too."

About 170 ex-spies and other former members of the intelligence community at 425 members are former CIA agents. Although Phillips said he was held "so we would have an identity," according to founder David A. Phillips of Bethesda.

The two-day convention closed last night with a press conference and banquet at the Ramada Inn in Alexandria. House Committee on Intelligence and announcement of the appointment of 10-member CIA board of governors.

Although some who attend

the convention were touchy about discussing intelligence part from the library.

operations at all, most, like Lewis Regenstein, 32, the John Horton, who spent 27 years in CIA clandestine operations in the Far East and Latin America, expressed concern about the future of legitimate intelligence gatherings. "I don't think there's any doubt that the exposures and revelations have hurt our work," Horton said.

At the press conference, The association's oldest and youngest members also were present.

Vienna-born Hugo Knopfmacher, 85, said he fled the Soviet Union via the Gobi Desert in 1920. He joined the CIA in 1952 and worked as a research engineer.

"We have always tried to find the truth," Knopfmacher said.

that the convention was being held at the same time the House Committee on Intelligence was holding hearings on CIA excesses.

He said it was a coincidence that the convention was being held at the same time the House Committee on Intelligence was holding hearings on CIA excesses.

Although some who attend

WASHINGTON STAR  
19 September 1975

*Retired Agents Don't Fit the Image*

# 'Old Grads' Gather to Defend CIA

By John Sherwood  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The ghostly Oliphant CIA skullmasks with the beady eyes simply were not there. These spooks might have looked the role during their active role-playing days, but it's hard to flash a sinister cover when retired and attending a mini-spy convention-reunion at a local motel.

Maybe at the Hilton-Bosphorus, but not at the Ramada Alexandria. Coffee urns, styrofoam cups and beehive hairdos a spook do not make. These faces were IBM, Federal Triangle GS.

The two-day convention was the first of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers (ARIO), who came in out of the rainy cold yesterday to come out publicly in a kind of evangelical "Fairness to the CIA" polity.

Some of the old, spook spark was still crackling, however, in the cover of someone who looked like a bowling lady. The visitor reached for a paper, and she stopped him, asking the

proper authority if it was okay to hand out the stuff.

IT WAS extremely difficult for these retired intelligence people, most of them ex-CIA types, to admit openly that this was how they spent most of their lives.

The paper concerned was entitled "Periscope," and it handed out the official ARIO line:

"It is the belief of ARIO that neither the Central Intelligence Agency nor any other intelligence organization of our government needs defending or justifying. However, recent events have made it clear that a great deal of patient explaining is called for. People just do not understand what intelligence is and how important it is to their survival. Unfortunate as it is, they really do believe the wild-eyed cowboy tales they read in the press and get the impression that intelligence officers are a lot of maniac-poisoners, burglars and assassins."

The spirit behind this offensive defense is a

youthful-looking David Phillips — ex-actor, ex-playwright, ex-editor of "The South Pacific Mail," and now, ex-CIA intelligence officer.

During a tape-recorded interview yesterday with Phillips and a Westinghouse newsman, a suspicious bystander got to the point where he didn't trust anyone.

**WAS THE GUY** with the tape recorder a plant? Was the ashtray bugged? Was the retired Phillips a newly hired tool of his alma mater? Why did that certain just move? What was in those sugar cubes? Why is my head spinning?

The convention's workshops were closed.

Okay, Phillips. What did The Director (Colby) say about this move on your part to blow your cover and talk? "He said he preferred that I stayed in the agency," said Phillips. "But he didn't object. In fact, he wished me luck." Of course, Colby also knew that it was Phillips' intention to defend, not to attack.

How do we know the CIA isn't paying you to do this, Phillips was asked? "You don't," he said. "Obviously I can't prove I'm not under cover, except that I testified under oath before the Senate Church committee that I no longer have any connection with the CIA."

Do you think this convention is being spied upon by the CIA?"

"IT WOULD be impossible" said Phillips. "They would be crazy to pull off any domestic, covert spying at this stage of the game."

Some 150 attended the convention (including 31 from Maryland, 53 from Virginia and 41 from Washington), assembled mainly to develop some kind of pro-CIA statement to be announced tonight.

Phillips, of 8224 Stone Trail Drive, Bethesda, said

he retired early four months ago to fight for the CIA cause when it appeared it needed fighting for.

"I started getting people together through my Christmas card list," he said, "and went on from there. Now we are in the process of establishing chapters and scheduling volunteer speakers."

Phillips, who spent most of 25 CIA years in Latin America, is now on a pro-CIA lecture tour. He refused to quote his lecture fee, saying that was a question for his agent.

"LET'S SAY this, though," he added. "My agent told me I could make between \$5,000 and \$10,000 a year speaking for the CIA, but could make from \$50,000 to \$100,000 speaking against it."

He described himself as "not an assassin, a burglar, or a purloiner of documents, but a manager of spies. Mostly, I attended meetings. I had managerial responsibilities. But I can't go into detail about my duties."

However, he added, "if there was even one political CIA assassination I would be surprised."

The "tragedy" of the whole intelligence controversy, he said, is that an agency such as the CIA cannot defend itself by quoting "the good things it has done. Because of its very nature, it cannot give out such information."

JUST BEFORE leaving for the picnic last night that rain forced indoors at Stone Ridge School in Rockville, the boyish Phillips was asked once more about any double-agent status.

"No," he said, quietly. "I've told you the truth."

But there was one more question.

During your early years as a playwright, what was the name of the one successful play you wrote?

"The Snow Job," he said, trying not to laugh.

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
24 SEPTEMBER 1975

SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL? . . . Ear hears that Gordon Liddy had one of those super-secret CIA laser zap guns that Congress took a peek at recently. The weapon has a beam that locks in on a target and zippo, what happens next is so secret even Ear can't hear it. Only five were made. Liddy told a pal that he once carried his while toting \$40,000 from the White House to a downtown bank. He was said to be disappointed that no-one held him up. "It's so simple even a child can use it," Liddy said.

TIME Magazine  
6 October 1975

## Those Secret Letter Openings

In the view of the ever-vigilant CIA, even Richard Nixon may not have been above suspicion. When he was campaigning for the presidency in 1968, the agency secretly opened a letter that he received from Ray Price, a speechwriter traveling in Moscow; the contents dealt only with Nixon's election prospects. Idaho's Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, disclosed last week that the Nixon letter was one of many thousands that were illegally photographed and filed away from 1952 to 1973, when the program was stopped on orders from former CIA Director James Schlesinger, now Secretary of Defense. Even after Nixon became President, he apparently was not aware of the purloined-letter program—an indication of how far the CIA had escaped Executive control.

**The Watch List.** The operation was centered in the U.S. post office at New York's Kennedy Airport, where as many as six CIA agents worked in cooperation with top U.S. postal officials to open, scan and photograph the letters. Anyone whose name was on a "watch list" had his mail opened if it was sent to or came from the Soviet Union. The committee revealed three names on the eclectic list: Biologist Linus Pauling, the left-leaning Nobel laureate; Labor Leader Victor Reuther; and John Steinbeck, the late novelist.

The mail of many people not on the list was also scrutinized. Among them: Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns, Senator Hubert Humphrey, Senator Edward Kennedy, Congresswoman Bella Abzug, Martin Luther King, his widow Coretta and Jay Rockefeller, a likely Democratic candidate for Governor of West Virginia. Church had a personal quarrel with the CIA because it had opened a letter that he wrote to his mother-in-law in Boise, Idaho, while he was touring Russia in 1971. Also routinely monitored was mail to or from Harvard University and the Ford and Rockefeller foundations.

Nixon's apparent unawareness of the program was disclosed by Tom Huston, 34, reputed author of the 1970 White House plan that proposed illegal break-ins, wiretaps and mail intercepts to counteract radical activity. The plan, he now concedes, was largely irrelevant because the CIA had already adopted many of those practices. "If we had known all these tools were being used and were still not getting results," said Huston, "it might have changed our whole approach." Mainly because of the opposition of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General John Mitchell, the plan was rejected by Nixon five days after he had approved it. As if nothing had happened, the CIA continued its illegal mail spying.

Huston still defended these practices in the context of the tumultuous 1960s. What had worried him was "revolutionary violence ... the lives and property of people who were being subjected to violence, the 20,000 bombings that occurred in one year and the 39 police officers who were killed." The White House was also worried that the violence might be partially directed or funded from abroad.

the opinion of the President's men, did not seem to be making a sufficient effort to establish the connection.

Huston admitted that his—and the CIA's—remedies could have become worse than the disease. "The biggest mistake I made was that I assumed the integrity of the intelligence people would be so great that despite the sweeping nature of their powers, they would be used only in the most narrow and restricted circumstances. I didn't consider that the person using that power would not be [former CIA director] Dick Helms but [convicted Watergate burglar] Howard Hunt." And, he added, "the danger is that you move from the kid with the bomb to the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker, and so on down the line. The risk is that you slip over from a national security purpose to a political purpose. You end up with those people going into the Watergate."

**Vitally Important.** Sounding scarcely different from the most critical Senators, Huston, now an Indianapolis lawyer, said, "It seems to me that these intelligence agencies operate in a world of their own. They are not accountable to anyone. The problem is that you must give these agencies enough independence to protect our liberties and yet still hold them accountable to higher authority."

One of the week's witnesses still clung to the notion of unaccountability. James J. Angleton, '57, had been chief of the CIA's counterintelligence until he was pressured to retire last year because of his unyielding cold war stance. From 1955 to 1973, Angleton was in charge of the mail program. He told the committee that the operation was especially useful because the Soviets did not realize it was going on. Angleton refused to retract a statement he had made earlier in closed session: "It is inconceivable that a secret-intelligence arm of the Government has to comply with all the overt orders of Government." Certainly Angleton had not done so. He conceded that it was an error to examine the mail of Nixon or a person of the stature of Church. "But from a counterintelligence point of view," he added, "it was vitally important to know everything possible about contacts between U.S. citizens and Communist countries."

Angleton described how helpful the CIA had been in the case of the Weatherpeople who blew up a Manhattan town house, where they were making bombs in 1970. FBI files contained little information about one of the fugitives, Kathy Boudin. The CIA, on the other hand, was able to supply more than 50 intercepted letters dealing with Boudin's activities.

The committee then decided to find out just how much one surprisingly important person knew about the letter-opening program and other activities by intelligence agencies that harassed groups and individuals on the extreme left and right. The Senators voted unanimously to ask Richard Nixon to testify. Compounding the former President's problems, U.S. District Judge John Lewis Smith ordered Nixon to give a sworn deposition in the civil suit filed against him and other White House officials by Morton Halperin, a one-time National Security Council aide whose phone was tapped for 21 months from

## Not Poison, Just Some Drugs

It was as hairy and scary as assassination plots come, and the alleged target was one of the nation's most prominent muckrakers, Columnist Jack Anderson. Or so, at least, reported another top journalist, the Washington Post's Bob Woodward. Last week he wrote that Watergate Burglar E. Howard Hunt told some of his former CIA associates "that he was ordered in December 1971, or January 1972, to assassinate Anderson." Citing "reliable sources," Woodward said the order came from "a senior official in the Nixon White House." A poison was to be supplied by a former CIA physician, and it was guaranteed to leave no traces. The plan was eventually dropped, wrote Woodward, for reasons unknown.

The plot, he added, was devised because Anderson was widely hated in the Nixon Administration for printing stories based on national security leaks. Example: the disclosure that Nixon secretly favored Pakistan in the India-Pakistan war.

After the Post story ran, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence pressed to obtain Hunt's testimony to get to the bottom of the accusations. The CIA pledged its cooperation. Anderson himself expressed shock. He recalled that he had received threats from the Mafia, but "I just didn't believe anyone [in the Nixon Administration] would seriously suggest murder."

By Hunt's own account, nothing so serious as murder was ever considered—but a drugging of Anderson was indeed contemplated. In an interview with TIME Correspondent David Beckwith, Hunt, who is serving a 2½- to 8-year sentence at Florida's Eglin Air Force Base prison camp for his role in the Watergate break-in, gave his version of the plot. According to him, former White House Counsel Charles Colson suggested that Anderson might be discredited if he appeared on his live radio program under the influence of a drug that would cause him to ramble incoherently. With another Watergate conspirator, G. Gordon Liddy, Hunt set up a lunch with a physician who worked for the CIA.

**Wild Ideas.** Hunt and Liddy explored with him methods of drugging a man to make him incoherent. The three discussed placing on the steering wheel of the victim's car a drug that enters the body directly through the skin, but that idea was abandoned as too chancy. Then they considered slipping a pill or capsule filled with a hallucinogen into the victim's regular medicine bottles—but there was no telling when the pill would be taken. Finally, the three debated dropping a drug into the victim's drink at a cocktail party, but since Hunt knew that Anderson is a teetotaler, the proposal fell by the wayside. After the meeting broke up, Hunt decided the plan would not work.

"It was just another wild idea that never got beyond the proposal stage," said Hunt. "Liddy and I engaged in a fact-finding mission, not an operation." For his part, Colson angrily denied he had ever heard of such a plan. But Howard Hunt, busy last week assisting in the cleanup at the prison camp after Hurricane Eloise, had for the last word. Said he: "I simply followed orders."

THE NEW REPUBLIC

4 October 1975

## The "Company"

# Banality of Power

With the recent revelations of myopic US intelligence on the outbreak of the October 1973 Middle East war, congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency may be on the scent of one of the agency's most important secrets: its bureaucratic banality. Behind the imperial manner and machinations, the CIA has always belonged more to Max Weber than to Ian Fleming, a hostage to clients, careerism, inertia and root mediocrity.

Understanding the banality, as well as the outrages of the CIA (the two are often synonymous) seems essential to authentic reform of US national intelligence operations. Bureaucratic influences account for some of the more serious and ridiculous mistakes of what CIA minions call the "Company." Moreover legislative prohibitions of specific acts such as assassination may be unavailing in the larger policy sense if Congress does not confront at the same time underlying organizational motives which may only reappear in new abuses.

The missed signals on the October war were largely the result of a common bureaucratic phenomenon. Like the Foreign Service, in whose embassy precincts they masquerade, CIA stations abroad are heavily dependent on "client" relationships with their counterparts in host countries. Up to a point, sharing intelligence with friendly powers is simply maximizing channels of information. But as so often happens in the Foreign Service, these relations may tend to obscure the critical boundary between US interests and the client's.

The strength and accuracy of the client's views can affect the standing of the Americans dealing with him, can influence the rationalizations of US officials abroad and the scramble for attention and money in Washington. The CIA has other problems: the credibility of shared intelligence in the past, and the sheer laziness that grows with such dependence. The dangers are worst when the client is also "targeted" at the Soviet Union and thus able to provide information of great interest to Washington. By several accounts, all this made CIA reports from the Middle East in the fall of 1973 particularly vulnerable to the flaws and neglect in Israeli intelligence, whose nearly fatal miscalculations were almost identically reflected in US estimates.

Israel is hardly unique in this respect. For many of the same reasons, US intelligence in the Cyprus crisis was crippled by reliance on the Greek junta, while officials were skeptical of less "reliable" contacts among a more independent Makarios government in Nicosia. If an international race war broke out tomorrow in Southern Africa, CIA intelligence in the region would be similarly blinded by the cozy relations cultivated over the years with the Rhodesian and South African security services, the outgrowth less of overt racism than of CIA's amoral operational affinity for technically sophisticated clients who also worry (or at least say they do) about Russian trade delegations and Chinese textile engineers. Obviously there is ideology in this problem. Yet if they probe deeply enough, congressional investigators will probably discover the CIA's zeal often owes as much to the "professional" seductions of efficacy as to cold war passion.

Ideology may be most easily jettisoned at the agency's higher levels in Washington, where the fate of whole sections, and the careers in them, can depend on staying in the action, often regardless of the political niceties. This constant bureaucratic search for a *raison d'être* is another time-honored motive for policy throughout Washington, and the CIA, however bizarre its methods and purposes, is no exception.

As a member of Henry Kissinger's National Security Council staff in 1969, I was once invited to a lunch at CIA headquarters where a high official discreetly sounded me out about the receptivity of the Nixon White House to a little CIA mercenary operation to save a failing side in a distant civil war. There had been " inklings," as the official put it, that the President actually disagreed with prevailing State Department policy. A quiet operation could be mounted, at minimal cost, of course, to see that the President's "side" got at least an even break—and Secretary of State Rogers and his boys need be none the wiser.

It was a classic twist, worthy of John Le Carré. The CIA, we both knew, was already supporting the other side through the auspices of a friendly intelligence system; and the people the agency official was now proposing to help were getting aid from the Chinese Communists and were opposed by most of our allies. The whole war lay far beyond any political or military interest of the US. The unspoken point was that his colleagues were busily reporting successes and perils to the director at staff meetings, while this man, graying heir to a swashbuckling tradition, ran a section that hadn't toppled a government in almost a decade. My impression was that in his condition, he could have been persuaded to turn his operation on London or Ottawa; the political stripe of the "target" was of next to no importance.

The episode illustrated another prosaic bureaucratic drive in the CIA, one that the current congressional inquiry has too frequently ignored. For all its arrogance and license, the CIA has also been, like other bureaucracies, anxious to cash in on the momentary policy whims of the White House, and there have been abundant opportunities in the last 15 years. The official who came to lunch ready with his mercenaries would have been, after all, serving "national policy" if he had been given a presidential go-ahead, which was not impossible. Similarly the CIA did not embark on its own on a decade of ruthless meddling in Chilean politics. That intervention proceeded from the paranoia of Presidents Johnson and Nixon about the impact of left wing electoral successes on the fragile order in Latin America. Though it exploited and often distorted policy for its own purposes, the CIA did not originate the embroilment in Laos, the commitment to autocracy in Iran, the preference for repressive if pro-American regimes throughout Latin America and Africa, the myth of Fascist "stability" in Portugal and Spain.

As Congress and the public recoil from many of the CIA's past actions, from murder to political mayhem, they are also seeing a faithful, albeit sordid reflection of American foreign policy over the last quarter century. Nor is there any wonder that so many CIA officials, past and present, are said to be bitter about the current attacks on the agency while, they argue, responsible State and Defense Department officials of past

administrations, men who sanctioned or applauded the most savage covert actions, now sit unsummoned and uncharged in foundation, law or Wall Street sanctuaries. It is in this sense too that the CIA must be seen as one more bureaucracy, part of a larger problem. For liberal congressional critics of the CIA, this unacknowledged dimension of the investigations will demand much more courage and wisdom than the burial of a discredited cold war zealotry among lesser, largely anonymous officials. To blame and purge the failed James Bonds will be too easy; to finger their numerous high-ranking Democratic cohorts around Washington at the time will test Sen. Church and his colleagues severely.

None of this should diminish or cloud the sinister quality of the CIA record. No government organization in American history has operated with such pervasive contempt for the democratic basis of public policy, nor, up to this point, with such shocking collusion from the Congress and the rest of the Executive. But the absurdities and dangers of the past will not be dispensed with until there is an awareness that much of the outrage is simply the way of life in Bicentennial Washington. The anxious claimant on dwindling budgets, the victim of clients and careerism, the leading but hardly the lone participant in government-wide disdain for Congress and obeisance to presidential power and secrecy, the CIA has also been a bureaucracy in search of a mission, not unlike NASA gambling its last thrust on the dubious scientific virtues of the Space Shuttle, or the navy hustling to extract from Congress nuclear aircraft carriers ("You can't strut on the deck of a submarine," said one observer.)

There will no doubt always be a need for a sizable national intelligence apparatus, in machines if not in men. But there seems no question either that with political and technological change, the CIA has lost a good part of the reason for its bloated bureaucratic being. And the real stopper to genuine reform is not some stentorian guard of cold war assassins, but rather what mires reform all over Washington—that legion of little people, whose cloaks are knit suits and daggers are government-purchase cafeteria butter knives, with suburban mortgages, children in college, and lives invested seemingly beyond return. When Congress faces up to the humane purge demanded by that problem, it will not only begin to bring intelligence under better public control, but also will chart the way toward needed reform in other areas of government.

CONSTITUTION, Atlanta  
11 September 1975

## The Bombshell

Rumors have been flying recently about a "bombshell" to be exploded anon by Sen. Frank Church's committee investigating CIA misdoings.

With allegations of domestic spying and other illegal CIA activity confirmed by the Rockefeller Commission, with reports of assassination plots and deals with Mafiosi, with revelations concerning experiments involving mind-altering drugs, people naturally wondered what sort of bombshell could top all that.

Some information has appeared

and it now appears that the "bombshell" was of a megalotnage, perhaps sufficient to ruffle the petals of a peacock. It seems some minor CIA functionary disobeyed President Nixon's order and the law by hiding small amounts of super-deadly poisons. Bad news—but not exactly explosive.

Two lessons may be drawn from this episode: (1) The CIA has stepped out of bounds far too many times and needs to be put firmly under control and made answerable for its activity; and (2) Bombshells sometimes turn

Failing surgery on the bureaucratic heart of the problem, however, the prospect seems inescapable that the CIA, like its fellow bureaucracies, will improvise new ways to justify its size and perquisites, to establish its worth, whatever the structural, nominal changes contemplated by the Ford administration.

The possibilities are interesting. In an era where scarce resource is power and where spreading international corporate control and price manipulations can topple regimes faster than troops around the presidential palace, covert action will turn from jungles to boardrooms and stock exchanges. It will no longer be the minister of defense or the police chief we must own, but the director of minerals or the economics professor close to the premier. And there still should be a chance for some old-fashioned fun: pipelines to be blown, refineries to be sabotaged, strikes and demonstrations to be mobilized. Even assassination might be easier to justify when that oil potentate is trying, as Kissinger put it, "to strangle the industrial world."

The catch in all this is that an anachronistic, overpopulated CIA finding its outlet in international economics will expose its own customarily unwitting public to reprisals in kind. There is no reason to assume that such a CIA will be more discreet or more successful than in the past, and there is ample precedent to predict that its newly powerful adversaries in the developing world would retaliate with embargoes and their own price fixing. The cost of CIA adventures then goes beyond national embarrassment to the pocketbooks of families in Duluth and Dallas.

Whatever the plausibility of this speculation it is clear that the world of the 1970s is far too diffuse in power and delicate in allegiance to afford the bureaucratic impulses toward intervention we have learned to expect from the present incumbents in the CIA.

The Congress now has the CIA in one of the rare moments of public censure and presidential diffidence in which genuine reform is at last possible. But the moment is fleeting. The investigation must dig deeper and wider than Congress has been willing to go thus far, and the senators and representatives must be prepared to confront not only generally condemned aberrations, but also equally repulsive products of business as usual. The banality of the CIA is a searing commentary on the whole structure of government. There will never be a better place—or perhaps another time in this generation—to begin the reconstruction.

Roger Morris

NEW YORK TIMES  
20 September 1975

### C.I.A. Suit Opposed

PROVIDENCE, R. I., Sept. 19 (AP)—The federal Government has asked United States District Court here to suspend a suit dealing with Central Intelligence Agency surveillance of mail because it could interfere with a Justice Department investigation. A statement filed by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin T. Maroney argued against continuation of the suit brought by Prof. Redhey Driver of the University of Rhode Island. The court has issued no decision on the Government request.

# The Paulsen Doctrine

## And Life With the CIA

**A**NYTIME A MAN runs for President of the United States, the effort should yield something lasting, some lesson or truth in all the campaign speeches and slogans spewed out over the electorate. When Pat Paulsen ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in the winter of 1971-72, he gave to the New Hampshire electorate the doctrine that underlies the way this country runs the Central Intelligence Agency.

He may not have known it, but Pat Paulsen, serious comedian and funny politician, provided a reconciliation of philosophies that ranks with the work of Thomas Aquinas. He explained how it is that a democracy—a government of, by and for the People—can have a secret government agency whose size, cost and activities are unknown to the people who pay for it and in whose name it acts.

Paulsen had a flair for pointing out the absurdness of serious matters and the seriousness of absurdities, allowing and encouraging his listeners to examine the two together without for a moment confusing which was which. The Paulsen Doctrine came in a stock campaign speech he deadpanned to audiences of young people newly enfranchised by the 26th Amendment. It went something like this: "I feel very secure and comfortable being an American, because in America any boy can grow up to be President. It's not so much that you'd want to. It's just knowing that you could."

It was a good line. Because here was Paulsen, a most improbable candidate, running for President. Everyone knew that he didn't stand a chance of carrying a New Hampshire township, let alone the election.

And it was a good line because Richard Nixon had grown up to become President. In retrospect, it seems an even better line because we now know that in the same primary election campaign in which Paulsen was giving that speech, Richard Nixon's dirty tricksters were plotting to put in the fix so that for four more years only their boy could be President.

But mostly it was a good line because that concept—"It's not so much that you'd want to, it's just knowing that you could"—underscores a major irony of our democracy: too much hinges upon the necessity that people not exercise their prerogatives. Nowhere in government is this forbearance more evident, and nowhere does democracy intrude less, than in the secret activities of the CIA.

### Auditing in the Dark

THE VERY EXISTENCE of secret intelligence operations depends

By Edward Roeder

Roeder is a freelance journalist based in Washington.

upon noncompliance with the constitutional stricture requiring that "... a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."

Virtually all of the highly classified activities of the CIA are overseen at one level or another through the Paulsen Doctrine. Those responsible are satisfied knowing that they could find out what's going on, so they don't bother actually to find out. The people, the Congress, the White House, the supervisory boards and committees, the high and mid-level officials, the auditors and inspectors, and the managers don't seem to want to know any more about the government's deep, dark secrets than is absolutely necessary. But everyone in a responsible position insists upon being told that they could find out, if they had a "need to know."

CIA internal auditors can hardly be expected to review signed receipts for bribes to members of a foreign parliament. Who would sign their true name to a receipt for a bribe? Auditors can't ask foreign politicos to certify that they are on the take from the CIA and to verify which votes they sold for how much. Suppose the bribes go through many intermediaries? Suppose the person being bribed doesn't even know it is the CIA bribing him? It's just expected and hoped and certified that the bribes find their way into the right poackets.

Of course, if an auditor suspected that a CIA employee or agent was skimming off the money budgeted for bribes, the auditor could make an issue of it and possibly trace the route of the money by demanding to know the true names of people who handled the funds. But in order to gain access to such information, the auditor would have to make a good case that he had a "need to know." That's Catch-22: Unless you know something is wrong, you can't get access to information to prove it. And without access, you can't find out that something is wrong.

So the auditor takes his satisfaction from reviewing records made available to him, certifies that the books he's been given balance and feels secure knowing that, if he knew anything was wrong, he could request authority to find out more. It's not so much that he'd want to...

One result of operating under the Paulsen Doctrine was that CIA audi-

tors were unaware of Operation CHAOS, the CIA's domestic spying operation, until they read about it in the Rockefeller Commission report. According to that report, CHAOS went on for six years, employing at its peak 52 people (not counting agent-informers) and three branch chiefs. Not being "witting," the auditors didn't inquire about the program. So they didn't learn of its excesses. So they didn't report on them. So it went on.

### "Congressional Oversight"

THE PAULSEN DOCTRINE also works in Congress, to keep members comfortable without keeping them informed. Because information is compartmentalized, it is possible to learn a great deal about how the Agency theoretically works, and to learn about a number of programs, without even getting a hint of the existence of other programs hidden in other compartments.

Being a co-equal branch, Congress has the authority to learn whatever it wants about the CIA. But because much of the information is so "sensitive," Congress has set up elaborate procedures to restrict the flow of "sensitive" information to and around the Hill. The formal rules and informal procedures provide that only the legislative and appropriations subcommittees dealing with defense/intelligence matters are informed of CIA activities, and usually only the chairman is apprised of the most sensitive matters. Even when the subcommittees hold formal closed hearings, on highly sensitive matters, members are forbidden from discussing what they've learned with other members. The briefing papers, charts and even the hearing transcripts are not kept in congressional safes for easy access, but are stored out at Langley. These remain subcommittee property, and will be brought to the Hill on request by special couriers who wait while materials are examined and then return with the papers to CIA. No photocopies are kept on the Hill.

This doesn't prevent members from overseeing the CIA, it just makes it difficult. The subcommittee chairmen know they can examine any CIA documents—at least any they can identify—at any time. And knowing that they could...

The remaining members of Congress have put themselves in a more ambiguous position. They have passed rules

and accepted customs that deny them access to the information they would need in order to make reasonable judgments about CIA appropriations and legislation. A majority doesn't want to know and doesn't want the rest of the members to know. But in theory, at least, the rules could be changed and the chairmen could be challenged—if the members wanted to...

The CIA's secret budget for fiscal year 1976 has been marked up in the House. It probably has been more closely examined than any other CIA budget in history. And probably less is known about it, and known by fewer people on Capitol Hill, than is known about any other federal agency's budget (with the possible exception of other intelligence agencies). The CIA isn't trying to prevent congressional analysis; the last thing the CIA wants is to appear to be avoiding congressional scrutiny. No, the CIA wants Congress to be implicated as much as possible in the agency's activities, and that means Congress must be at least tacitly aware of the agency's budget. And the members are trying to learn what they can, if for no other reason than to avoid being accused of what they surely will be accused of anyway for their past oversights: nonfeasance. Every time one hears the phrase "congressional oversight" applied to the CIA, one wonders whether the term was deliberately chosen for its ambiguity.

The difference between Paulsen enunciating his doctrine for a humorous campaign speech and public (or secret) officials using it as a philosophy of governance is that Paulsen knew that the notion of finding security in "just knowing that you could" is often absurd. Paulsen had really tried to pick up a few convention delegates to expand his forum. He was spending time, effort and money, and he was failing. He knew how absurd it was because he had tried.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
18 September 1975

## She'd Probe CIA's City Attack'

By SAM ROBERTS

Councilman Carol Greitzer, chairman of the City Council's Mass Transit Committee, called yesterday for a full-scale investigation into the "simulated attack" on the city's subway system by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Ms. Greitzer, a Manhattan Democrat, urged the city's congressional delegation to pursue an investigation. She also promised to question Transit Authority chief executive officer John De Roos about the incident when he testifies before her committee tomorrow.

### She's Shocked

"I'm shocked to think that the federal government not only turns down New York City for aid," she said, "but now it turns out that they've actually had us under attack."

The councilman's call for an inquiry followed CIA Director William Colby's disclosure Tuesday that the agency con-

ducted a "simulated" attack during the mid-1960s in the city's vast subway system to develop ways to infect passengers with deadly germs.

A 1967 staff memo to the chief of the CIA's technical services division reported that no germs actually were released, although certain harmless gasses were used to check how germs would be distributed through the miles of underground tunnels. The project, developed by the agency's biological branch, was to study the vulnerability of the subway system to germ warfare.

Asked yesterday for further details on the project, a CIA

spokesman politely declined. "You're talking about operations, traditionally the agency does not discuss them," he said.

But city Air Resources Commissioner Ethan Eldon said he would ask the agency for all available information on the incident. Eldon's department does not monitor air quality in the subway system, and any such testing would require approval of the Transit Authority.

Daniel T. Scannell, former chief operating officer of the authority, said he had no recollection of any CIA request to conduct tests in the subway system.

## Probing the Past

NOW CONGRESS is trying to see what it can learn about the CIA, about things members thought all these years they didn't have to learn because it was enough to know that they could. But the fact is that at the agency and in Congress responsibility and accountability atrophy when they are not used.

Congress has not exercised its responsibility to find out what it is paying and allowing the CIA to do. Now Congress finds itself lacking in members and staff with insight and talent to find out. The CIA has not been held accountable for its actions. Now it finds itself in the awkward position of not knowing how to go about being investigated.

Compartmentalized secrecy and a history of non-oversight by the executive branch and by Congress have produced a situation whereby the only people who know where the bodies are buried are the members of the burial parties and the only people who know who was in the burial parties are the members of the hit squads. And they ain't talkin'.

The current hassle and hustle on Capitol Hill concerns the past: what has the CIA done? The agency is not reluctant to be chastized for its past sins, so long as it is not precluded from future sins. So the Senate committee investigating intelligence is grabbing headlines by picking up on CIA suggestions that it interrogate past and present CIA officials about failure to destroy poisons when ordered to do so by the President—an "aberration," according to former CIA director Richard Helms.

What will come of all this—a law requiring that executive branch officials obey presidential orders? No one is asking, "What is the CIA doing now?" or even, "What have they done to us lately?"

And on the House side, Chairman Otis Pike's committee is fighting the wrong battle on the wrong battleground, asserting its right to release classified information about past in-

telligence failures. The committee will win, and find that it has won nothing: the material could have been released in the committee's final report, when it would have been too late for the President to cut off the committee's access to classified information. Chairman Pike's pique is aroused by executive branch assertions that the Congress may not unilaterally disclose classified information, an implicit suggestion that elected officials in the House cannot truly perceive the national interest because they are just cheap politicians (the executive branch, currently having no elected officials, has no such taint).

## A New Mechanism

TO A DEGREE, Congress will succeed and fail in finding out what the CIA has done in the name of the United States. Except for historians, it doesn't really matter. But what does matter is the degree to which Congress sets up a mechanism for knowing what the CIA is doing henceforth—in every sensitive detail. This mechanism can't be another you-can-if-you-want-to system that requires congressional initiative before information flows to the Hill. It must provide that many members of Congress, not just a handful of sympathetic chairmen, are force-fed information about CIA's activities, so that Congress can be held accountable for having known of the CIA's activities.

The fact is that no official entity of government—not the White House, not the CIA, not the Congress, not any of the oversight boards and committees—is capable of learning with certainty what went on under the CIA's aegis during parts of the agency's 27-year past. In theory, of course, they could find out. In theory, of course, Pat Paulsen could become President. But to the extent that we rely upon the Paulsen Doctrine to run the government's most sensitive operations, we will only in theory have a government of, by and for the unwitting People.

# Toward Restoring the Necessary CIA

It was a year ago this month that the first revelations of Central Intelligence Agency dabbling in Chilean politics came out. Since then, more than a quarter-century's worth of skeletons (not to mention exotic weapons) have tumbled from the agency's closet. Today the CIA is the least secret espionage service in the world, and its director, William Colby, the most visible and interrogated master spy in recent history. The agency has been in hot water before, of course. But unlike the uproar that followed the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, the current controversy threatens the very existence of the CIA.

The CIA has lost, perhaps forever, the special dispensation that it was allowed by many Americans and their elected representatives for the first 27 years of its existence. Few people today accept unquestioningly the notion that clandestine foreign operatives are a necessary evil. Even fewer would unblinkingly buy the assurance voiced by former CIA Director Richard Helms: "The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service." Almost daily, newspaper editorials, legislators and some presidential hopefuls characterize the CIA as a wasteful anachronism at best, an international menace and national disgrace at worst. This month populist Candidate Fred Harris drew cheers from an audience of Democrats in Minneapolis when he proclaimed, "We've got to dismantle the monster!"

In light of the reports of the commissions headed by former Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, released in June, and of the recommendations that will be forthcoming (probably next February or March) from the Senate committee headed by Democrat Frank Church and also from Democratic Congressman Otis Pike's House Select Committee, there is no danger that the agency will escape long-overdue reforms. The real danger is that all this intensive scrutiny will lead to ill-conceived corrective measures that could damage the CIA. The legitimate and vital functions of the CIA have already suffered severely (TIME, Aug. 4). So has morale. "Until this becomes a truly secret agency again," said a high CIA official last week, "a lot of our people are not going to be able to do their jobs." Thus the challenge to Congress is not how to pull the agency apart but how to put it back together. Few critics have questioned the CIA's intelligence-gathering activities; they zero in on the agency's covert activities, which should be defined and controlled but which cannot be abandoned altogether.

Part of the problem has been that the assorted Washington hearings on the CIA have concentrated too narrowly on specific horror stories, which have led many Americans to regard the agency as a bureaucratic Frankenstein's monster that has run amuck both at home and abroad. This is a simplistic and unfair impression. Considering the size of the agency (an estimated 20,000 employees operating on a budget that may be as big as \$6 billion a year) and the enormous volume of activities it has been called upon to perform in its 27-year history, the provable instances of malfeasance are comparatively few. Moreover, the CIA to some extent was a victim of historical circumstance. When the Chile story broke last year, the military and foreign policy establishments had met their Viet Nam. The presidency had met its Watergate. Congress was reasserting itself. The CIA was the obvious next candidate for scrutiny.

In the welter of publicity that followed the Chile revelations, much of the evidence confirmed that the CIA had indeed from time to time violated its charter and the constitutional rights of Americans, not to mention common sense. A number of these violations can be blamed on the zealotry, villainy or stupidity of some CIA operatives, especially among the "spooks," or covert-action specialists. Many other abuses were, at root, presidential abuses. For example, the agency's illegal surveillance of the anti-Viet Nam War movement reflected Lyndon Johnson's obsessive suspicion that Communist infiltrators were behind much of the opposition to his Administration. "I just don't understand why you can't find out about all that foreign money that is behind those war protesters," Johnson complained to Helms in 1967. The CIA was just one of a number of federal agencies that Richard Nixon tried to subvert. Although the agency gave some assistance to the plumbbers who broke into the office of Daniel

Ellsberg's psychiatrist, it later sidestepped White House ploys aimed at involving it in Watergate. Partly as a result, Nixon replaced Helms in 1972.

If Presidents have misused and abused the CIA, Congress has ducked its responsibility to supervise the operations and activities of the agency. So far, there has been relatively little evidence proving that the CIA acted without presidential authorization. On the other hand, there is much to indicate that it bypassed congressional oversight—largely because Congress did not want to be bothered, or was embarrassed by supervising its activities, particularly the agency's covert operations.

What then should be done? Gerald Ford has indicated his determination to supervise the CIA closely. Legally he has to: Congress last year attached an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act requiring that the President personally "certify" all foreign covert actions. A case can be made that this law should be repealed. The President of the U.S. is now the only head of state of a major power who is not insulated from public responsibility for a clandestine operation should it be exposed.

To help protect the presidency, and perhaps to restore a sense of checks and balances in the field of intelligence, Congress should establish a joint Senate-House oversight committee that would replace the four congressional units that have so inadequately watched over the CIA in the past. Indeed a similar proposal was made by the Rockefeller commission in its report to the President. The committee membership should rotate in order to avoid the past situation, which allowed the agency to mount covert operations abroad—and counter-intelligence activities at home—with the passive, usually *ex post facto* blessing of a few old reliable friends in the legislature. Presumably, the agency might also find it more efficient and secure to report to one committee of Congress rather than four.

The new committee should be empowered to approve—or disapprove—in advance any major clandestine activity by the CIA, like the army of Laotian tribesmen supported by the agency from 1962 until 1973. The Constitution's provision that Congress alone has the right to make war should extend to small, secret wars as well as large ones. Covert armed intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, apart from being expensive and often ineffective, has fostered worldwide suspicions that the U.S. is behind nearly every political upheaval that conforms to American interests. More congressional supervision might reduce the number of such operations and reduce those suspicions—though there is no guarantee of either result. On the other hand, the CIA probably should be allowed some leeway to carry out, on its own recognition, smaller-scale projects, especially those in which intelligence gathering and covert operations overlap.

The CIA must also be able to carry out nonmilitary clandestine actions, such as the funding of pro-American political forces in countries where the Soviets are backing their own candidates, as they did in Portugal earlier this year. But these too should be regularly reviewed with the oversight committee. It should also be allowed to see a breakdown of the CIA's budget, and should be informed about the agency's use of "proprietary," like the defunct airline Air America, cover firms (private companies that allow the agency to use overseas branches as fronts), and any American individuals or organizations it intends to enlist in its projects. Closer congressional scrutiny of the CIA, combined with more thoughtful presidential supervision, would provide a check against the CIA's getting involved with organized crime, as it did in the anti-Castro ventures.

But even stronger congressional scrutiny cannot assure that the CIA will run properly. There is a basic contradiction between the secrecy and even deceit required by an organization like the CIA and the full disclosure and responsibility expected of a democratic government. It is a contradiction that the U.S. somehow must live with, since no organizational reform can completely solve this problem.

Moreover, Congress is a large and sometimes undisciplined body of individualists. The more widely a secret is known in the Capitol, the more likely it is to be leaked. Thus both the House and Senate need to strengthen their existing regulations for pre-

venting breaches of security—perhaps by penalties as severe as dropping from committees those members who can be proved to have illegally leaked secrets to the press or the public. One danger involved in having more congressional scrutiny of the CIA is that members of the House and Senate, as well as their staffers, will become the target of increased espionage by Washington-based foreign agents. One Communist secret service is known to be beefing up its Capitol Hill contacts already in anticipation of Congress's playing a more active role in U.S. intelligence.

Unfortunately, the facts of international life that always made the CIA more of a necessity than an evil are still real. Despite détente and the ending of the cold war, for example, the branch of Russia's KGB (committee for state security) that is in charge of foreign operations has stepped up its clandestine projects around the world, often using foreign Communist parties as conduits for money and bases of operation for agents. Western experts report that the KGB department with responsibility for Japan, India, Indonesia and the Philippines has increased its budget, apparently in response to Moscow's belief that the U.S. is still on the defensive in Asia following the collapse of South Viet Nam.

In the current furor over the CIA, genuine reforms undertaken within the intelligence community have tended to be overlooked. During his brief tenure as CIA director in 1973, James Schlesinger ordered an extensive housecleaning and began sweeping out the unreconstructed cold-warriors. Colby, a veteran of the covert side himself, has followed through on that program and reoriented the agency toward more relevant, "cleaner" enterprises, such as providing economic and agricultural intelligence and combatting international terrorism and narcotics smuggling.

While much of the controversy so far has concentrated on covert actions, there have also been shortcomings in the collection, evaluation and dissemination of information through the Government. Ray Cline, a former deputy director for intelligence at the CIA and chief of State Department intelligence and research at the time of the Yom Kippur War, is convinced that

BALTIMORE SUN

28 September 1975

## Rogue Elephant Is Right

When Senator Frank Church predicted in an interview with Muriel Dobbin of *The Sun* some time ago that the Central Intelligence Agency would be revealed as "a rogue elephant rampaging out of control," a number of knowledgeable officials responded that the spy agency had never done anything without presidential approval. Now, after two weeks of public hearings by the select Senate committee studying intelligence operations, the Church prediction looks right on the nose.

Present and former high-level CIA officials have justified to the effect that various agency operations were carried on illegally and without orders from higher authority. Indeed, in two cases, the CIA did things expressly forbidden by Presidents. In one case it opened mail after President Richard Nixon "ordered it to, then changed his mind and ordered it not to. The CIA was already doing that when Mr. Nixon considered ordering it to. His order to do it and his subsequent order not to do it were something of a joke to the CIA. As Senator Church, chairman of the select committee, put it, the President is not the "commander in chief to the CIA, just a problem."

In another case President Nixon ordered the agency to destroy some poisons so toxic as to sound like science fiction potions rather than something from the real world. The then director of the CIA, Richard Helms, said under oath he relayed the order only orally and didn't check up because he "read in the newspaper" that the poisons had been destroyed. If that doesn't make Mr. Helms a perjurer, it makes him a singularly incompetent chief spy. The CIA official directly responsible for destroying the poison says he didn't do it because he considered the presidential order "unwise." That is the hallmark of a bureaucracy out of control.

Each revelation creates a new picture of the formerly inviolate agency. Not only have its top officials casually and routinely broken the law by open-

ing mail (and breaking into homes and offices, wiretapping and planting bugs, combing through income tax returns, etc.); not only has it ignored presidential directives. It has also bungled its principal function of gathering and assessing foreign intelligence. The House select committee demonstrated that in 1967-8 the CIA totally misjudged or, what may be worse, deliberately misreported, Communist strength in Vietnam. In 1973 the agency believed no war was likely in the Middle East—even as hostilities were about to begin.

Presidential Candidates Harris and Morris Udall, former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford and other CIA critics have recommended that the CIA should be confined exclusively to intelligence gathering. They propose that covert actions, now in the hands of the CIA's deputy director of operations, should be assigned either to the Pentagon or to a new agency. This is not a good idea. First, intelligence gathering, especially by covert means, and clandestine foreign operations inevitably overlap and often involve the same agents. To divide them artificially would risk duplication, inefficiency and—more serious—the possibility of intelligence gatherers and clandestine operators bumping into each other and being discovered. For the Pentagon to oversee covert actions, as Harris suggests, would give the military a license to initiate paramilitary adventures. That might be a cure worse than the disease. Since clandestine operations are justifiable chiefly as a means of heading off full-scale conflict—what Colby calls "an alternative between diplomatic protest and sending in the Marines"—they should be kept separate from the Defense Department.

The best official report to date on the CIA—more thorough and fair than the Rockefeller study, in the view of impartial intelligence experts—was produced by former Under Secretary of State Murphy's Commission on the Organization of the Government for Conduct of Foreign Policy. The report concluded: "Covert action cannot be abandoned, but it should be employed only where clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes and then only after a careful process of high-level review." The CIA is still the most appropriate Government agency to carry out that difficult, often unpleasant but inevitable mission.

*Strobe Talbott*

ing mail (and breaking into homes and offices, wiretapping and planting bugs, combing through income tax returns, etc.); not only has it ignored presidential directives. It has also bungled its principal function of gathering and assessing foreign intelligence. The House select committee demonstrated that in 1967-8 the CIA totally misjudged or, what may be worse, deliberately misreported, Communist strength in Vietnam. In 1973 the agency believed no war was likely in the Middle East—even as hostilities were about to begin.

The congressional investigations have already developed facts far beyond anything found by the Rockefeller Commission, many of whose cautious recommendations now seem inadequate to the task. It is easy to understand why many critics want to disband the agency, but that is too drastic a remedy. The Ford administration's current attempts to shore up the CIA during the remainder of the investigation may be necessary but should not be confused with real reform. A start toward the basic changes that are needed could be made now by dusting off one Rockefeller recommendation that does deal with one of the underlying problems. It proposed that an "individual of stature, independence and integrity" from outside the intelligence community be brought in to head the CIA. The time has definitely come for that. If ever an organization needed a tough manager, it is the CIA. Many of its top and middle leaders developed their ideas of their mission in World War II and the worst days of the early Cold War, when anything went. A complete shakeup at the top may be needed, and possibly extensive reorganization of the middle levels, too. Only a new director, from outside the agency, can be expected to do the extensive work that is needed. Even that is likely to be only a beginning. But it is not too soon to start, even while the congressional committees probe deeper into the rot.

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NEW YORK TIMES  
20 September 1975

# Dignity Restored

By Russell Baker

The news that Dr. Frankenstein is alive and flourishing in Washington will surprise no one who follows world politics and international death plans. Politicians everywhere commonly view science primarily as an instrument for conveying death to disagreeable peoples, and if science is at the service of death in Washington, it is not a unique alliance of genius and hack. The same alliance functions around the earth, and has through the centuries.

The peek we are now getting into Washington's scientific chamber of horrors is merely a titillating reminder of the alliance's existence. What makes it entertaining, if not particularly startling, is the small-bore triviality of the death plans in which the Government has been dabbling.

Death on the scale deliverable by nuclear physics appears such a dull mathematical abstraction that it scarcely seems like death. The Pentagon does not even talk much about deaths any more when nuclear weaponry is discussed. The common term is "megadeaths." It takes one million deaths to make just one megadeath.

If one succumbs in a nuclear strike causing eighty megadeaths, one's loss to humanity can be measured as one eighty-millionth of a megadeath, which makes it seem a thoroughly negligible event.

In a sense, this is the worst of all the indignities heaped upon us by politics' perversion of science. A person's death ought to be an event of some note, not a fractional triviality, so negligible that it would bore a baseball statistician.

The scientific corpse-production labor now being discussed in Washington has the virtue of restoring some meaning to death because of the small scale on which these weapons were built to operate. As a result, it is a refreshing reminder of what the grandeur of nuclear science has conditioned us to forget: to wit, that politics and science between them never close down the charnel house.

The C.I.A.'s secret stash of cobra venom and shellfish poison, so suggestive of bad spy novels, reminds us that death is officially prepared by men who act like people in bad spy novels. The few deaths these poisons could create are ludicrously insignificant compared to nuclear science's megadeath, and for this reason, they suggest real death more pungently than anything the physics experts have been able to conjure in our imaginations.

We may assume that similar death instruments are being created in laboratories abroad, of course. Primitive politicians were quick to turn mineralogy into weapon science. Surely, Russians and Englishmen have been no more reluctant than Americans to do the same for biology.

The C.I.A.'s electrically-fired poison-dart gun, with silencer, presumably

WASHINGTON STAR  
28 September 1975

Crosby S. Noyes

# Unimpressed with the CIA flap

You will have to forgive me. It must be some kind of glandular deficiency. But for whatever reason, I am simply incapable of working myself into paroxysms of moral indignation about the Central Intelligence Agency. I am even beginning to feel sorry for the poor slob.

I realize, of course, that all of our problems in this country today are the result of "abuse of executive power", with its "mania for secrecy," and that if only the "representatives of the people" in Congress were running things, we would be spared such vexations as the Vietnam War and Watergate. I also realize that the CIA, as an untouchable, super-secret branch of the executive, is an awfully inviting target for congressmen who hold that "full disclosure" (of other people's secrets) is a surefire political formula.

I suppose, therefore, that I should find something pretty ominous in the news that a CIA laboratory worker failed to carry out a presidential order from Richard Nixon in 1970 to destroy existing stocks of toxins and various kinds of bacteriological weapons. It was discovered last May that about 11 grams of shellfish toxin and 8 milligrams of cobra venom had been locked away in a CIA storeroom.

But, alas, I can't. For one thing, it seems to me that the presidential order of Feb. 14, 1970, applied to military stocks. For another, it specifically exempted toxins (such as snake venom or shellfish toxin) being used for experimental purposes. The order reads:

"The United States renounces offensive preparations for and the use of toxins as a method of warfare.

"The United States will confine its military programs for toxins, whether produced by bacteriological or any other

for creating death in fairly important individuals displeasing to our Government, is the kind of weapon small boys dream of. A rush job at the toy factory might create one of the surprise merchandising successes of the approaching Christmas shopping season.

Its charm, of course, is that it is designed to cause one single death, not the boring megadeath of physics. Here we have government dispensing the favor of dignified, individual death, thus making one's demise an event.

Even the more elaborate death programs which the C.I.A. was preparing when it made a mock attack on New York subway riders by pumping harmless substances into the underground would cause deaths only in the thousands if duplicated in Moscow with real poison gases and germs. If things came to that, presumably, we and the Soviets would both be dispensing megadeaths hither and yon on the landscape, so that the few thousand dead in the Moscow subway would enjoy deaths of uncommon singularity.

Reading the Dr. Frankenstein stories from Washington, one is struck by the playful spirit of politicians and scientists engaged in these labors. It is almost as though they were trying to get us interested again, by amusing us, in their varied death programs.

biological method or by chemical synthesis, to research for defensive purposes only, such as to improve techniques of immunization and medical therapy.

"The President has further directed the destruction of all existing toxin weapons and all existing stocks of toxins which are not required for research programs for defensive purposes only."

Kindly note that this order did nothing to eliminate huge stocks of lethal chemical warfare agents — such as nerve gas — which still exist for retaliatory military purposes. It does nothing about hundreds of substances quite as deadly as shellfish toxin or cobra venom. Rattlesnake venom, for example is extracted daily by a number of public and private agencies for a variety of purposes without anybody making a fuss about it.

In all, I find nothing very sinister in the fact that a middle-level CIA scientist should have locked up his shellfish poison on the quite understandable theory that it was valuable for purposes of research and/or defense. To think otherwise, I suggest, is symptomatic of the paranoia of the day.

I am equally unimpressed, I'm afraid, by the revelations of the House investigation that the CIA failed to predict the Communist Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968 and the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East in 1973.

Underestimating the capacity and intention of the enemy in Vietnam was par for the course throughout the war in Indochina. In 1973, the Israelis were even more surprised than we were. When it comes to the present harassment of the CIA, the important thing to remember is that imperfect intelligence is better than none at all.

Why else would the C.I.A. have chosen the poisonous hole that is the New York subway to test mechanisms for spreading infectious diseases? The same ironic humorist's hand is at work in the C.I.A.'s choice of the Food and Drug Administration's drinking-water supply to test techniques for spreading death through the water cooler.

We detect him again in the use of the public health service facilities to help create the killer shellfish poison, and in the frolicsome fraternity-house spirit with which both C.I.A. and Army scientists slipped LSD into the coffee of unsuspecting human guinea pigs.

It would be idle to fault science for its faithful service to politics in the death industry. American scientists who serve it can justly point to more unpleasant states abroad and say, "They all do it." On the other hand, it doesn't hurt the rest of us to be reminded from time to time that scientists are secretly working away at death with politicians, and that secrecy favors lunatics.

Ah, here is the latest warning to the public from a consortium of concerned scientists. It tells us to beware of astrology. A false science, says the bulletin. That must mean the Government can't find a way to use it for killing somebody.

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
13 September 1975

## ANT POISON CALLED DEADLIER

BY GEORGE ALEXANDER  
Times Science Writer

The last thing in the world that Dr. Findlay Russell wants to find plastered someday on the door of his USC laboratory is a sign reading: Closed because of the danger of mass poisonings.

Russell, a USC professor of neurology, physiology and biology, and a widely recognized expert on toxins, is worried that some state or local governmental body might take a cue from U.S. Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.) and pass legislation that would ban the sort of medical and biological research that Russell has been working on for years.

Church revealed earlier this week that the Central Intelligence Agency had kept small amounts of paralytic shellfish poison (PSP) and cobra venom for the last five years, despite a 1970 presidential order to destroy all

NEW YORK TIMES  
25 September 1975

## The C.I.A. Toxins Should Be Preserved

To the Editor:

Unfortunately, the recent investigation of the C.I.A.'s "stockpiling" of two toxins has led to serious misconceptions on the part of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, headed by Senator Frank Church, and the news media.

Although we do not condone the C.I.A.'s apparent intended use of saxitoxin (produced naturally by "red-tide" bacteria and concentrated in shellfish) and cobra toxin, we applaud the foresight of the C.I.A.'s chemical section to preserve these invaluable substances. It is ridiculous to assert that the eleven grams (less than one-half ounce) of saxitoxin and the eight milligrams (a tiny drop) of cobra toxin could be used as a "mass murder weapon" in the same sense as the tons of nerve agents and the countless plague and other germs that were stockpiled by the Defense Department until recently. Indeed, most pest exterminators have much larger quantities of lethal chemicals (e.g., parathion, the rat and insect poison that is only 200 times less toxic than saxitoxin)

WASHINGTON STAR  
27 SEPTEMBER 1975

HUSH, HUSH, DISCONTENTED CUBANS ET AL. . . The CIA soon won't have to open any letters to read nasty things about itself in print. Ear hears a lot of folks are getting in their licks in books. Victor Reuther, this letters were opened, Earwigs, because he was Unionmeister Walter's brother and UAW foreign policy chief reportedly reveals some startling stuff on CIA and unions abroad in his book-to-be. Then, "Cuban Terror and the CIA," coming soon from Harper's Magazine Press, was fed by Watergate burglars. Earwigs

stocks of such toxins.

In making the announcement, Church said that the toxins—10.9 grams of PSP and eight milligrams (thousandths of a gram) of the snake venom—were capable of killing "many thousands of people." The toxins attack the central nervous system.

While agreeing with the senator that the CIA's acquisition of the poisons should be looked into, the USC expert disagreed with Church's evaluation of their public hazards.

"Oh, if you injected 200 people with a few micrograms (millionths of a gram) of these toxins," Russell said, "you'd kill a few. But there are more effective poisons commercially available, including ant poison."

The USC professor-physician said that if Church was worried about terrorists pouring toxins of this sort into a city's water supplies to kill large numbers of people, then the senator's

concern was both dated and remote.

There was a time when a number of nations, particularly Israel, feared that such biological warfare might be waged against them. But, said Russell, these toxins lose their potency when mixed in large volumes of water and, moreover, they are not very effective when taken orally. "It's just not very lethal this way," he said.

"Everybody looked into this sort of thing a few years ago," he said, "and we all pretty much came to the same conclusion—warfare with these toxins was not possible, probable or practical."

But if these poisons aren't of much use for widespread killing, Russell said, they are eminently useful in legitimate biological research and medical treatment for certain diseases.

One of the constituents of cobra venom, isolated and purified, is currently being used by physicians to relieve the pain suffered by some patients and to treat certain neurological disorders, he said.

Russell himself is deeply involved in biological and medical research of this sort and he maintains a colony of several dozen highly poisonous snakes in his laboratory. He "milks" them for their venom and he said he can make 10 times the 8 milligrams now held by the CIA without any trouble at all.

The shellfish toxin, however—the PSP—is a different story. This can be obtained only from clams and mussels contaminated with dinoflagellates, the microorganisms that give rise to the red tide.

Russell estimated that it would cost \$100,000 or more to harvest enough contaminated shellfish to yield even a small quantity of PSP to satisfy his own USC laboratory's research needs.

He said that he would prefer that the Senate committee distribute the 10.9 grams to legitimate researchers like himself, but that he doubted if it would be done.

"A key issue here is whether all these stocks were destroyed as they were supposed to be," Russell said of former President Richard M. Nixon's command to destroy such chemical and biological warfare materials.

Russell said that he was most worried that some state legislator might try to go the U.S. Senate one step better and ban all research involving poisonous substances. "We wouldn't be able to keep our snakes," he said, "and we'd be out of business."

on han dthan the C.I.A.'s stockpile." To destroy this priceless supply of saxitoxin would be nothing short of criminal and makes as much sense as destroying the heart drug nitroglycerine because it is used in explosives or morphine because it is found in the opium plant.

Saxitoxin's potential value to medical and chemical research cannot be overstated and we urge that the Senate Committee recommend that these materials be turned over to the research laboratories of the National Institutes of Health. Not only does it seem probable that knowledge about saxitoxin and its toxic effects will provide an antidote to "red-tide" (paralytic-shellfish) poisoning, which can be fatal to people who eat contaminated shellfish, but also, as Dr. Murdock Ritchie of Yale points out, it will provide essential knowledge about nerve action and the diseases of the central nervous system.

This supply of saxitoxin must not be destroyed simply because it was studied as a possible espionage agent.

(Assoc. Prof.) GORDON W. GRIBBLE  
Research Assistant  
PHILIP D. KUTZENCO

Dept. of Chemistry, Dartmouth College  
Hanover, N. H., Sept. 18, 1975

and Bernard Barker. It's busting with inside stuff. For example: the CIA spent the past 15 years recruiting and training thousands of discontented Cubans, with a little help from pals in the Marine Corps; to help fight American battles in the Congo, Cambodia and Vietnam. In exchange, they got the CIA's promise to help overthrow Castro. The CIA is wel-

SING ALONG WITH BILL COLBY . . . On top of that, the Village Voice says that poet Allen Ginsberg's song "CIA Dope Calypso," which goes on about the CIA's role in dope traffic in Southeast Asia, is on the verge of publication.

The  
Ear

28 September 1975

# The Case of Redford vs. the C.I.A.

By WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY Jr.

"Three Days of the Condor" has everything, and one thing too many, wherein alas lies its chic. But for the terminal protuberance, we would have an expertly directed, trimly jigsawed, adequately acted spy-suspense story which catches the viewer with the opening scene: What can that mysterious man in the parked car be about? . . . checking off the names, one by one, of the half-dozen people as they saunter into the "American Literary Historical Society" on Manhattan's East Side to begin a day's work? Why, what he is doing is making sure there's a full house, because at lunchtime, he and his accomplices are going into that staid old building to shoot them all down in cold blood, made colder by the special ice pellets used—at least, that is one inference—by specially designed carnage-machines.

What was Robert Redford doing while his colleagues were being mowed down? He was out for lunch. Specifically, out to fetch lunch for his colleagues, it being his turn to go to the delicatessen. But, in order to avoid the rain, he ignores prescribed security regulations and bounds down the staircase and out the back door, which is closer to the deli; and anyway, it is time to establish him as a man of rather independent habits, who makes the boss of this super-secret C.I.A. front perpetually uneasy ("Are you sure you are quite happy working for us, Turner?") with that roaming, restless intelligence. (The director, Sydney Pollack, is unwilling to blemish Redford's beautiful face with any of the scars of *The Thinker*, but makes the concession of having him, occasionally, wear glasses. He does not wear glasses when he makes love to Faye Dunaway, but then this is not a moment when his restless intelligence is his dominating concern).

Redford's job at the "American Literary Historical Society" is to apply his encyclopedic knowledge and omnivorous curiosity to the scanning of routine material in search of surreptitious enemy activity. He has recently come on an anomaly: A cer-

tain bestseller has been translated only into Dutch and Arabic. So what, you say? So you would never qualify to work for the C.I.A. because of your restless intelligence. Redford has sent down to Washington, through his superior at the Manhattan front, the datum, on which he frames a hunch which is mercifully unexplained, and the lunch-hour carnage is the result. Redford had stumbled over an operation of international significance, and it is a lucky, lucky thing that it was his day to go to the deli and that he used the back door, else he'd be stone-cold dead, along with the boss, the beautiful Oriental secretary, and all the others.

On bringing in the hot dogs and finding everybody dead, Redford decides he had better report the event to Washington, but he is good and scared, and so are you in his behalf, I'm telling you. So when he calls Washington, and is told by the bigger boss which alleyway to report to at exactly what hour, Redford says, No sirree, I'm not going to report to any alleyway to meet up with a perfect stranger. How do I know I'm not talking to the chief killer himself? It is therefore arranged that the unknown boss will be accompanied by an old friend of Redford's from another division of C.I.A. Recognizing his old friend, Redford will say to himself—and would even if he didn't have a restless intelligence—"That's my old friend all right, so the guy with him must be O.K."

But what happens is that as soon as the three men get together, the boss suddenly whips out a pistol and in the general shoot-out Redford's friend is killed, the boss is fatally wounded, and Redford knows he's in real trouble. So he kidnaps Faye Dunaway, a perfect stranger of the kind Robert Redford would come upon, and over the next couple of hours the plot proceeds along its anfractuous way, and the viewer has a superb time as assassins come and go, and gets a true sci-fi thrill out of the display of intelligence hardware, of which my favorite is a machine that flashes a map showing the location of the telephone being used by the caller. However, Redford's restless intelligence at some point in his life put him on to everything anybody ever knew about telephones, and he manages to cross the lines of half the

telephone trunks in the city and sits comfortably on a ganglion that makes a laughing stock out of the Central Intelligence Agency's telephone-spotting machine.

By now we all know that the Mr. Big who ordered the killings is very high up in government. Our government. Indeed, by the laws of compound interest, if the movie had endured another half an hour, one would have been satisfied only if the President of the United States, or perhaps even Ralph Nader, had proved to be the energumen behind it all.

Thus it goes, right to the smash ending, as an unbalancing as Jimmy Durante's nose. The viewers would, at that point, have been left totally satisfied by a traditional double-agent theme—Mr. Big was really working for the Soviet Union; or, if that is not trendy enough for Pollack-Redford, a Chilean colonel. It transpires, however, that Mr. Big is a 100 per cent American who had to eliminate all those people at the "American Literary Historical Society" because they might have become privy to a contingent operation by following the lead turned up by Redford's restless intelligence.

Then, in a dramatic side-walk confrontation, Mr. Junior Big explains to Redford that it is all high patriotism, working against a future national shortage of oil, and invites Redford to come back into the company and accept

the requirements of orthodoxy in the modern world. But Redford says, taking off his glasses, No, never! This very day I have told everything to . . . the camera slithers up to a marquee above the two men who are talking and you see the logo of . . . The New York Times. The director failed only to emblazon under it, "Daniel Ellsberg Slept Here." Mr. Junior Big reacts like the witch come into contact with water. He snarls and shrivels away, and says, half-desperately: "Maybe they won't print it!" But Redford has by now sceded the audience with his restless intelligence, and we all know that The New York Times will print it, and we shall all be free.

The film's production notes state: "Over a year ago, Stanley Schneider, Robert Redford, Sydney Pollack and Dino de Laurentiis decided to create a film that would reflect the climate of America in the aftermath of the Watergate crisis." "The climate of America" is a pretty broad term. They really mean: The climate of America as seen by I. F. Stone, Seymour Hersh, Susan Sontag and Shirley MacLaine. One recalls Will Rogers, returning from the Soviet Union where he had seen a communal bath. "Did you see all of Russia?" he was asked. "No," Rogers said, weighing his answer. "But I saw all of parts of Russia!" Redford-Pollack-de Laurentiis have shown us the climate in all of parts of America. It sure is cold out there.

## CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY'S

## ADULT EDUCATION

29 September 1975

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William F. Buckley Jr. is author of the upcoming novel, "Saving the Queen," based on the adventures of a C.I.A. agent.

WASHINGTON STAR  
22 September 1975

# Ex-CIA Analyst Disputes Tet Offensive Charges

By Norman Kempster  
Washington Star Staff Writer

Skepticism about their own conclusions and "petty bureaucratic" restrictions — not deliberate distortion of the facts — muted the CIA's warning of the 1968 Communist Tet offensive in Vietnam, according to the former intelligence analyst who accurately forecast the attack.

James V. Ogle said he tried to tell his version of the story to the House Intelligence Committee but was rebuffed. So he provided a copy of his prepared testimony to The Washington Star instead.

"We had predicted the Tet offensive," Ogle said. "It was all there, on paper, in the cables. But we didn't believe it...."

**THE PREDICTION** was based on captured documents and the speeches of North Vietnamese Communist leaders, Ogle said. The evidence pointed to an offensive but there had been similar evidence before which had proved incorrect.

Later, when the Saigon office where he worked was riddled with bullets and spattered with blood, Ogle said he and a fellow analyst finally realized just what had happened.

"Now we know what they meant," Joe (Hovey) said. There were tears in his eyes. "They meant what they said."

**ALTHOUGH** earlier reports had indicated that a Communist offensive was planned for sometime between Jan. 15 and Feb. 15, Ogle said a cable which would have pinpointed the start at Jan. 30 was not dispatched to Washington even though the evidence was available three days before the attack.

"The cable was never sent for the petty bureaucratic reason that the translation of the captured document had not yet been assigned a combined document exploitation number and so did not pass the tests set up to avoid double reporting," he said.

Ogle said he decided to speak out after Samuel A. Adams, also a former CIA intelligence analyst, told the House committee Thursday that the CIA and the military intentionally underestimated Viet Cong troop strength for domestic political reasons, resulting in an underestimate of Communist military capability.

Ogle said he prepared the testimony after receiving indications the Pike committee wanted to hear it. However, he said he was not called as a witness and was told later by a staff member that his testimony would not be required.

**ADAMS SAID** the intelligence community was guilty of "corruption" of its reports. He said the intention was to fool Congress

and the public but that it ultimately contributed to U.S. losses in the offensive.

In his testimony, Adams said a CIA team in Saigon — Ogle, Hovey and Bobby Laton — forecast the offensive but underestimated its power because of too low troop estimates.

Sipping black coffee from a yellow mug, Ogle said in an interview that Adams' charges were "irrelevant" because the Communists only used about 67,000 troops in the offensive.

"It was not an intelligence breakdown," Ogle said. "I realize the conventional wisdom is that it was, but it was not."

Ogle was bitter at the failure of the House committee to listen to his rebuttal of Adams.

"I THOUGHT they were trying to get at the truth," he said. "I am now sure they were trying to make political hay. They are guilty of the same thing Adams accused the CIA of, ignoring some of the facts for political purposes."

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who briefly headed the CIA, said yesterday the Tet offensive did represent an intelligence failure.

But Schlesinger, who appeared on the CBS interview program "Face the Nation," said present congressional investigations of the CIA already may have gone too far and damaged national security. He said it is appropriate for Congress to review the agency's activities but "we do not want to throw the baby out with the bathwater."

**IN ANOTHER** reaction to Adams' sensational charges, two members of the House committee, Reps. David C. Treen, R-Tenn., and Dale Milford, D-Tex., demanded that Chairman Otis Pike, D-N.Y., call as witnesses 12 individuals who Adams said had played a part in developing phony troop estimates.

"Mr. Adams made serious and personally damaging charges against a number of persons," Treen and Milford wrote. "In accordance with rule 4.4 of the rules of our committee we believe that all such persons should be afforded an

witnesses."

"We believe that it is extremely important that the committee pursue the allegation that distortion of the military capacity of the enemy was the result of deliberate policy," the lawmakers said. "If the allegation is true, we need to know who is responsible for the formulation of the policy and the means by which it was carried out."

TREEN, MILFORD and Rep. Robert McClosky, R-Ill., tried unsuccessfully Thursday to end the public testimony of Adams and take the rest of his statement in a closed committee meeting. They were outvoted 6-3.

Treen and Milford are part of the conservative bloc on the committee which has been consistently outvoted by a bipartisan group of liberals.

Ogle insisted that contrary to public opinion, the Tet offensive was a defeat for the Communists because of the frustration of their hopes that the South Vietnamese civilian population would join the insurrection. But he conceded that most Americans view it was a defeat for the allies.

UNION, San Diego  
11 Sept. 1975

## CIA Should Stay

Since early this year the Rockefeller Commission and congressional committees have been turning up instances of abuse and potential law violations by the Central Intelligence Agency. It is significant that these revelations have not changed the public's conviction that the United States of America needs its CIA.

A recent national poll showed that an overwhelming 80 per cent of the respondents oppose the idea of abolishing the CIA. Further, the weight of opinion is that the agency's problems can be solved within its present framework, rather than by restructuring it entirely.

Washing the CIA's dirty linen in public — as harmful as this has been — has also demonstrated to Americans how dangerous it would be to our national security if an intelli-

**OGLE ALSO** disputed Adams' claim that the only reliable U.S. infiltrator who was able to penetrate the Viet Cong was killed in the Tet uprising. Ogle, who was in Saigon while Adams was assigned to the CIA's Langley, Va., headquarters, said the man Adams described had not penetrated the Viet Cong at all.

He said the man was really a very skillful "analyst" who was able to predict Viet Cong actions on the basis of information he obtained from the outside.

Ogle said the CIA did not rely much on information supplied by infiltrators anyway because he said most of them were "at least triple agents," who were usually unreliable.

On one thing, Ogle agreed with Adams — the problem with intelligence in Vietnam was a failure of proper analysis, not a lack of information.

"THERE WAS never a shortage of intelligence in Vietnam," Ogle said. "There was always too much, too many low-level bits and pieces. As in all intellectual endeavors, if the bits and pieces didn't fit the puzzle you were working on you tended to ignore them."

Several members of the Pike committee have complained that the CIA spends too much of its time gathering bits of information and too little trying to make sense out of the data.

ARGOSY Magazine  
September 1975

# Listening In With the CIA

GEORGE CLIFFORD

If you want to know what goes on  
in the briny deep, ask the  
CIA. They've got the ocean bugged!

The cluster of Navy men strained in silence as they listened to the radio transmission. Their sensitive equipment amplified many strange sounds from under the sea, but there was one distinctly different, more unusual and more frightening than any they had ever heard.

Tapes of the transmission were played back for other experts and for high American defense officials. All sat in horror as they heard what no one had ever heard before: the terrible pressures of the Atlantic depths were crushing a submarine. It was like a fat man stepping on a light bulb.

"They just sat there," one government source told *Argosy*, "and they could hear the bulkheads snapping."

The technology that permitted the sounds to be heard had been one of America's greatest military secrets. It was this fact, as much as any other, that the Central Intelligence Agency tried to keep secret. When several news organizations learned of the CIA's attempt to salvage a Russian sub from the Pacific floor this summer, for example, it was CIA Director William Colby who personally interceded to keep the cover on the story for reasons of "national security." Nevertheless, the story did get out that the *Glomar Explorer*, a deep-sea mining ship ostensibly owned by Howard Hughes, was attempting to recover a Soviet sub that was lost 700 miles northwest of Hawaii in 1968. How, the public wanted to know, did the CIA know when and where the vessel went down?

The secrets contained in the crushed hull of the Russian Golf class sub were not as important to the men in the Pentagon and their cloak-and-dagger comrades as keeping their own secret, and the Russians would soon know if it were publicized that the U.S. had located the Russian sub.

Now the Russians know, yet the secret is still kept from the American people who paid the bill for one of the most successful enterprises of the Cold War: the coastal boundary of the United States, and of other places

held vital to America's defenses, are guarded by ultra-sensitive listening devices. The equipment, though improved from time to time, has been in these locations for some years.

The shrouds of secrecy around the project are so thick that we have not been able to learn precisely when America first began using the underwater listening devices, but sources insist that the first submarine disaster recorded by the equipment involved an American ship. Some say it was the nuclear sub *Scorpion*, which was lost with 99 aboard off the Azores on May 21, 1968. Others believe it was the *Thresher*, also a nuclear sub, which disappeared with a crew of 129 at a still undisclosed location in the Atlantic on April 10, 1963.

The knowledge that it was an American ship added to the horror of the moment when men, safe and warm at their post, listened to the sounds of a submarine disaster for the first time. On huge plotting boards the Navy keeps track of the movements of all major ships on the world's oceans. Within minutes after the listeners heard the bulkheads break, they were able to determine that the doomed submarine was one of their own.

There was nothing anyone could do to save the crushed vessel.

The United States and the Soviet Union have spent untold fortunes for the ability to detect and—if necessary—destroy each other's submarines. Submarine rescue, however, remains a virtually unknown art. Yet even if a rescue ship had been nearby, it could not have helped. The listeners knew from the sound of the splintering steel that everyone aboard would have been dead in seconds.

It was not merely the Navy's ability to detect submarine sounds that pushed CIA Director Colby to beg for continued secrecy. Sources pointed out that the Navy's use of sonar buoys has been common knowledge for years. These buoys have a relatively short range and short lifespan.

What was significant about the in-

formation brought to light by the mission of the *Glomar Explorer*, they said, was the proof of America's ability to pinpoint the location of a Russian submarine more than 700 miles north of Hawaii in the vast, rolling Pacific. This, the sources said, represents a major increase in the range and accuracy of underwater sound systems over that of any previously known to exist.

Ever since the Russians equipped their long-range subs with nuclear-tipped missiles, American defense planners have been using all the technology at their disposal to keep track of the underwater attack platforms. Regularly, American submarines pick up Russian subs as they leave their bases in the Atlantic and Pacific, and follow them on their cruises like gumshoes after a philandering husband. There is little secrecy involved in the exercise; the subs can hear each other. But the information about the way the Russian subs move, and the direction of their voyages, is important to U.S. officials. (Russians similarly monitor American submarine movements.)

Still more Americans are employed listening to all radio communications to and from Russian subs. This not only gives more information about submarine locations, but offers the cryptologists and computer experts at the National Security Agency an opportunity to crack the Soviet codes.

More information on the activities of the Russian subs and other ships is gathered daily by "spy-in-the-sky" satellites, which regularly send their information back to U.S. listening posts. All of this data is correlated in Washington, and in times of international crisis, the National Security Council and its co-ordinating committee, the Washington Special Action Group, receives maps every day showing the position and direction of the Soviet vessels. These movements can be a key to Russian policy.

At the time of the war between India and Pakistan over the independence of Bangladesh in December, 1971, for example, knowledge of the movements of Russian submarines and other vessels toward the Indian Ocean was crucial. It demonstrated that promises made by top Russians to Indian officials to prevent—by force if necessary—a task force from the U.S. Seventh Fleet from intervening on the side of Pakistan could be backed up with steel.

The ability to pinpoint the location and direction of Soviet ships was also crucial following the capture of the American freighter *Mayaguez* last May. Both diplomatic and intelligence sources indicated that neither Russia nor China was eager to block a U.S. mission determined to recapture the container vessel.

Coded cables arriving in Washington under the highest security classifications indicated a number of reasons for the apparent lack of interest by the communist powers. The Can-

bodians had not shown proper gratitude to their sponsors in Moscow and Peking during the first sweet days of their victory celebration. The capture of the *Mayaguez* was thought to be a foolhardy act by an inexperienced government. Most importantly, it seemed that the Americans, just booted out of Southeast Asia, needed a taste of an old Asian remedy—the face-saver. The recapture of the *Mayaguez*, or so the reasoning went, might cool American tempers enough to prevent a bigger, more ambitious adventure. The whole world knew that an American naval task force had been ordered into the Gulf of Siam, where the *Mayaguez* rode uneasily at anchor under the droning buzz of American patrol planes. The men responsible for co-ordinating the military alternatives were aware of the words in the cables, but were also on the lookout for cold hard facts.

They knew, of course, that China lacked significant air and naval forces, and separated from Cambodia's coast by more than 1,000 miles of Laotian and Cambodian terrain, was incapable of a military response.

Russia, however, was another story. The Soviet navy had made the Indian Ocean its own, with constant patrols by modern, missile-equipped destroyers and cruisers, ever-present submarines lurking beneath the waves, and a cluster of space satellite support ships, whose powerful electronic equipment is also useful for intercepting radio messages from American ships and planes. Russia was not only capable of stopping an American assault to free the *Mayaguez*, but could have used the incident to touch-off a nuclear Armageddon.

All of these were factors that had to be weighed in the State Department, the Pentagon and, most of all, the White House. Nervous officials waited for reports to come in from around the world. The information arrived quickly, considering its scope and the vast stretches of the globe to be covered, but to the men in Washington, it seemed to trickle like a water torture. At last, the positions of the Red fleet were marked on charts, and copies were made for the Na-

tional Security Council. It did not take expert analysis to determine that the Russians were staying far from the Cambodian shore.

If there were to be a response from Russia, it would be in words, not bullets. The way was clear for the Navy and Marines to move in and free the *Mayaguez*.

This is where the exact location of enemy submarines in wartime is vital knowledge to the United States. One Russian sub, equipped with nuclear missiles and properly positioned, could conceivably destroy the key sections of the megalopolis that sprawls from Boston to Washington, or the West Coast population centers. Now the American undersea listening network gives the U.S. the awesome power to hear the foot-by-foot progress of Soviet subs as they glide beneath the surface far off our shores. With exact knowledge of the submarines' position, chances for a successful pre-emptive strike are greatly increased.

Such a listening system has been under development for years off the coast of Florida. There, sonic devices have been tested and proven so sensitive they can even detect the maneuvers of small boats smuggling drugs and other contraband into the U.S.

The stories that finally appeared about the *Glomar Explorer* and its partially successful attempt to raise the Russian sub also focused attention on the long-standing and cozy relationship between the CIA and the even more secretive Howard Hughes. There were many reports of their interdependent relationship.

Probably the most recent one was the tax dispute over the ownership of the *Glomar Explorer* itself. In June, Los Angeles County assessor Philip Watson told the press that men purporting to be from the CIA had assured him the ship was owned by the Federal Government—not Howard Hughes—and that the \$300-million vessel was therefore exempt from local taxes. Since the men declined to produce a letter from the CIA stating the Government's ownership, Mr. Watson sent a tax bill to the Summa Corporation (Mr. Hughes' holding

company) for \$7.5 million.

One man who connects Hughes with the CIA's less publicized dealings is John Meier, who was Hughes' science advisor in the 1960's. Now involved in complex litigation with the billionaire recluse, Meier asserted that Hughes had him place business consultants in a number of Latin American countries.

"I helped a bunch of these people get themselves set up," the former Hughes employee said. "I used my own contacts to open doors for them. Then one of the men I was helping let it slip that he—and all the others—were CIA agents. He thought I knew. I sent word to Hughes that I wasn't going to help with that project anymore."

Meier was soon off the Hughes payroll, and burdened with legal suits that only a person of Hughes' wealth could afford to defend.

Meier insists that the CIA has continued to side with Hughes in their dispute. Earlier this year, Meier was hospitalized while in London on business, and sent word that he would have to postpone a court hearing in Nevada. Meier asserts that a CIA agent then came to the hospital and took copies of his medical records.

"The CIA," Meier said, "is paying a hell of a price for Hughes' help."

In the meantime, the *Glomar Explorer* has returned to California for modifications and refitting. It was only partially successful in recovering the Soviet sub, part of which sank again as it was being raised, and the CIA is trying to get permission from the White House to make another salvage attempt. According to informed officials, such permission may never be given.

Maybe one of the reasons for this is the great stir that was created in the newspapers, which made it clear that we were, after all, investigating a Russian vessel. There's a good chance, however, that the reason might also be to allow the American people to forget the incident—and possibly cease wondering what the CIA has going for it under the sea waves. ■

NEW YORK TIMES  
23 September 1975

## Ex-CIA Analyst Denies Distortion Of Tet Troop Data

The Washington Star

WASHINGTON, Sept. 22—Skepticism about their own conclusions and "petty bureaucratic" restrictions—not deliberate distortion of the facts—imated the Central Intelligence Agency warning of the 1968 Communist Tet offensive in Vietnam, according to a former intelligence analyst.

tried to tell his version of the story to the House Intelligence Committee but was rebuffed. So instead he gave The Washington Star a copy of testimony he would have presented.

"We had predicted the Tet offensive," Mr. Ogle said. "It was all there, on paper, in the cables. But we didn't believe it."

The prediction was based on captured documents and the speeches of North Vietnamese Communist leaders, Mr. Ogle said. The evidence pointed to an offensive, but similar evidence before had proved incorrect.

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with bullets and spattered with blood, Mr. Ogle said, he and a fellow analyst, Joe Hovey, finally realized just what had happened.

"Now we know what they meant," Joe said. There were tears in his eyes. They meant what they said."

Although earlier reports had indicated that a Communist offensive was planned for some time between Jan. 15 and Feb. 15, Mr. Ogle said, a cablegram that would have pinpointed the start at Jan. 30 was not dispatched to Washington even though the evidence was available three days before the

**GENERAL**LONDON OBSERVER  
21 Sept. 1975**WHOSE SIDE ARE  
THE OIL GIANTS?**

The price of your petrol will depend on the meeting of OPEC next Wednesday. But are the big oil companies who buy the oil from OPEC really battling on behalf of the consumers to bring down the price and break the OPEC cartel? ANTHONY SAMPSON is author of a new book on 'The Seven Sisters': Esso, Shell, Texaco, Gulf, Chevron, Mobil and BP. Here he investigates the curious relationship between the companies and the producers.

NEXT WEDNESDAY in Vienna, the members of OPEC will meet once again to set the world price of oil, while the consuming countries will watch helplessly to await the size of the bill.

It is two years since the crisis first broke, which first doubled, and then doubled again, the oil price. The first sense of outrage at the power of the cartel has given way slowly to a sense of pained resignation to the fact that it will not break apart, together with an acceptance—at least in Britain—that perhaps the price of oil should remain where OPEC has fixed it.

At the same time the consuming countries have been questioning the role of the Seven Sisters, the international oil companies to whom for the last four decades they had virtually delegated the task of obtaining cheap and secure oil.

First the consumers and politicians—particularly in America—were appalled in 1973 to discover that the companies had lost overnight all their bargaining power to keep prices down, and were powerless to prevent the embargo. Then they were further enraged by the vast increases in the company profits. After the crisis, the oil companies have emerged as the richest of all corporations. In the annual list published by the American business magazine *Fortune*, the ten biggest world companies now include eight oil companies, led by Exxon (or Esso) with Shell close behind.

Then a sinister aspect of this financial power was revealed in a succession of disclosures in Washington about oil company bribes. First it emerged that Gulf oil had paid large bribes in different countries, including \$4 million since 1966 to the ruling party in Korea. Then several oil companies were found to have paid bribes to Italian political parties; Esso alone had made secret political payments totalling \$51 million over eight years in Italy. These huge bribes, coming out of the immense profits, raise sharply the old question (in both the literal and general sense) of the accountability of the oil companies.

But the most serious question about the giant companies from the West concerns their relationship with the OPEC cartel. Are the companies really representing the interests of the consumers? Or are they in fact serving to underpin 'the' producers' cartel?

It is important in the first place to look back at the way in which OPEC came about. From the moment of its foundation in 1960, OPEC was conceived (as one delegate put it) as 'a cartel to confront the cartel.' Without the past history of connivance of the companies, who for 30 years had administered the Middle East's oil production between them, OPEC would never have happened. Nor could it have solidified without a single extraordinary blunder in the New York

boardroom of Esso.

In July 1960 the Esso directors agreed—against the advice of their Middle East expert, Howard Page—unilaterally to reduce the 'posted' price for Middle East oil: a decision which was swiftly followed by the other six Sisters (with some protests from BP). Thus all the producing Governments found their revenues from oil taxes, which were based on this 'posted' price, drastically reduced overnight by the actions of a group of private foreign companies. It was a certain recipe for Arab unity, as many experts had warned; and it worked. The key producers clubbed together to form OPEC, and even the Shah swallowed his resentment of Arab radicals, in his anger at not being consulted, and joined the new club.

In spite of such mistakes, throughout the sixties the oil companies were permitted by the Western Governments, and particularly by Washington, to maintain effective control over international oil policy. Thus, in the critical October of 1973, the confrontation with OPEC was once again left in the hands of the Seven Sisters (now joined by a few independents), in spite of the fact that, only two days before, the Middle East War had broken out, which transformed the whole political equation.

**Politicians  
astonished**

The negotiation about the oil price, not surprisingly, quickly broke down. The breakdown marked the historic turning-point when the West suddenly lost all its ability to settle the price of oil, producing the precise reversal of the situation at the formation of OPEC 13 years earlier. The OPEC cartel was suddenly established, to the astonish-

**ON?**

ment of consumers and the incredulity of politicians: the old cartel of the seven companies was abruptly replaced by a cartel of 13 nations.

Many experts, including William Simon at the United States Treasury and (for a time at least) Henry Kissinger at the State Department, confidently expected the OPEC cartel to disintegrate, letting prices once again tumble down. The immediate world shortage of oil was soon over, as the world recession, itself partly caused by the oil prices, cut down consumption everywhere. The economists and advisers waited expectantly for the strains on OPEC to show themselves, as each country would compete to keep up production, and thus push down prices.

But nothing happened. Consumption went down and down: tankers were laid off, storage tanks were overflowing, freight-rates dropped lower and lower. There were even hopeful signs of disunity between the chief members of OPEC: the Shah of Iran talked with increasing rancour about Sheikh Yamani, while the Saudis became increasingly worried by the Shah's imperial ambitions. Yet still OPEC held together; and the basic price—with small local variations—held up. What on earth had gone wrong?

An important part of the answer lay in Saudi Arabia: for the Saudis, as far the biggest producers, were the key to the cartel. Like the Texans in the 1930s, the Saudis realised that they must bear the chief burden of regulating production. And the Saudis had one huge advantage over the Texans, as guardians of the cartel: they did not particularly need the money from extra production. As Yamani explained to me, talking in Riyadh last February: 'Usually any cartel will break up, because the stronger members will not hold up the market to protect the weaker members. But with OPEC, the strong members do not have an interest to lower the price and sell more.'

The Saudis, as Yamani was able to show in the following months, were quite prepared to cut back their production, to make sure that the price did not come down: in the first six months of 1975 they produced an average of only 6.6 million barrels a day, compared with 8.1 million the year before. Other big producers, Kuwait, Iran and Libya, followed suit: in Libya production in the same period went down from 1.9 barrels to 1.2 barrels.

But why were the old political forces of disunity between nations not splitting up the cartel?

split up so many attempts at cartels in the past? Why were Iran and Saudi Arabia not constantly competing for production, as they had done through the sixties, using every manoeuvre to produce an extra barrel? It was not that none of them needed the extra money, for even at the quadrupled price the Shah was soon expecting to go back into debt. No, the real key to the continuing cartel was not the self-restraint of the producers: it was the fact that the oil companies, the familiar Seven Sisters, were in effect conducting their rationing system for them.

It was the companies, with their global system of allocation, and their control of world-wide markets, who were making sure that there would be no glut, who were holding the balance between the rival producers. The Shah and his oil Minister, Dr Amouzegar, both explained to me that they had to be grateful for the companies' role in running the cartel: 'With the Sisters controlling everything,' said the Shah, 'once they accepted, everything went smoothly.' 'Why try to break them up,' said Amouzegar, 'when they can do the work for us?'

The fact that the giant companies were fully 'integrated,' with their own tankers, refineries and gasoline pumps throughout the world, made the maintenance of the OPEC cartel system infinitely easier. It was the kind of situation that the producers of other commodities, seeking to form their own cartels, might dream of: in the words of *The Economist* (no enemy to the oil companies): 'Many poor primary producers would give their eye-teeth if big foreign capitalists would kindly arrange a semi-monopolistic distribution network for their products in the West, down to tied filling stations.'

What had happened, it emerged as the evidence slowly unfolded, was not that OPEC had usurped the old cartel of the oil companies, but that they had simply joined themselves on to it, and had manoeuvred the companies into the position of being their allies and instruments, with no interest in breaking the OPEC cartel.

In the words of Senator Church's report in January 1975, at the end of the most comprehensive set of hearings on the oil crisis, 'the primary concern of the established major oil companies is to maintain their world market shares and their favoured position of receiving oil from OPEC nations at costs slightly lower than other companies. To maintain this favoured status, the international companies help prop up the OPEC

members.'

## Not such a mystery

Thus the puzzle of why the OPEC cartel did not break was not really so mysterious: it was being underpinned by seven of the biggest corporations in the Western world, who had no commercial interest in destroying it.

In fact this had all been part of the grand design of OPEC, and particularly of its most intelligent delegate, Zaki Yamani. Back in 1968, in the aftermath of the earlier Middle East war when Arab fortunes seemed at their lowest, Yamani had conceived of his plan for 'participation,' by which Arab Governments would acquire shares in the oil companies' concessions. The object was not only to increase the producers' revenues and give them a stake in their own resources; it was also, as Yamani carefully explained to correspondents in March 1969, to create a bond between the producing Governments and the oil companies which 'would be indissoluble, like a Catholic marriage.'

Yamani knew that outright nationalisation of concessions was a dangerous policy: it might cut off the producing country from whole networks of world markets, as it cut off Mussadiq of Iran in 1951. Instead, participation would guarantee the co-operation of the companies, who would be lured into the agreements by the promise of cheaper oil than their lesser competitors.

Yamani's policy, after some resistance from the companies, was triumphantly successful: the seven companies, and some others, had all been persuaded to enter into marriages by 1973; and though some producers, like Algeria, preferred outright nationalisation, they took care to give preferential treatment to favoured companies, thus ensuring their support. In the immediate wake of the 1973 war there were new demands for total nationalisation, but in the subsequent negotiations the producers took care that the marriage would not be damaged to the point of divorce.

It was the embargo, in fact, that revealed in a highly-dramatised form that the oil companies had already changed sides, and that they were most vulnerable to pressures from the producers. As the Shah put it to me: 'The companies were the first to say "I serve and obey the orders of the producing countries".' The embargo could never have been effective if there had not been comparatively few com-

producing countries of the Persian Gulf. As Professor Stobaugh, an oil expert from Harvard, explained, giving evidence about Saudi Arabia to the Church committee: 'It is clear that it is easier to have an embargo when you have only four companies to deal with.'

The embargo was really a forewarning, in the heat of battle, of the situation which was to emerge in the following two years: to put it bluntly, in the language of the business, the companies were found in bed with the producers.

It was an ironic outcome to the long history of the Seven Sisters. They had been encouraged, sometimes even pushed, by the Governments in Washington and London to go abroad to find cheap oil for Western consumers; later they had been given huge tax benefits, and special clearance from anti-trust laws in Washington on the grounds that their presence in the Middle East was crucial to Western defence and the future of the free world. Yet now, when the real crisis broke in 1973, they were found to have suffered the fate of so many dubious adventurers in the past: they had gone native. When the Saudis insisted that the Aramco partners must cut off all oil from the United States Sixth Fleet, they meekly submitted—at the height of the international emergency.

We are thus, I believe, faced with a remarkable new transformation in the character of the Seven Sisters. Here are the biggest corporations in the world, owned by American or European shareholders, and theoretically dedicated to safeguard cheap oil and democracy, which have now emerged with their principal loyalties directed towards foreign powers. The interests of these powers might become diametrically opposed to those of the 'home' governments of the oil companies, which now find themselves committed to a cartel to maintain expensive oil.

In the context of this dependence, it is now much easier to see why the OPEC cartel has continued unbroken for two years; and why Kissinger and Simon have, like the Big Bad Wolf, huffed and puffed but not blown the house down.

There is nothing consciously conspiratorial about the company's support for OPEC. The oil executives can, and do, insist honestly that they are constantly operating according to the market, trying to take oil where it is cheapest and refusing it where it is too expensive, as they have done in Abu Dhabi and Libya. Like Rockefeller's executives a hundred years ago, they can boast that they are operating the most eco-

nomic and efficient system imaginable. But they are operating within a monopoly, and they will do nothing, beyond exploiting the local differentials, to offend or break that basic cartel. Of course there are plenty of smaller adventurous companies which would be glad to buy and sell cut-price oil wherever they could find it; but the OPEC countries can easily enough keep them under control, provided they have the use of the global networks of the Seven Sisters.

## How they dodge tax

The Seven Sisters have existed for so long—Exxon for a century, Shell for 70 years—that they have become regarded as facts of life, like nations or mountains. The need for giant integrated companies has been held to be essential to security of supply; so that Shell oil can be pumped into Shell tankers to be carried through Shell refineries to Shell filling stations. But in fact there has been nothing inevitable or irreversible about these oil empires: they have been the result, more than anything, of deliberate governmental decisions in past years, which have guaranteed tax relief and diplomatic support overseas, as part of a deliberate foreign policy which is now totally outdated.

The integrated companies developed increasingly into tax-dodging devices: the tax concessions led to absurd distortions in the accounting of the companies, who arranged to make most of their profits out of foreign production, where they paid minimal taxes.

But now the whole logic of the integrated company has been turned upside down. The vast machinery for extracting cheap oil and selling it through global networks has been used for the opposite purpose: to ensure that expensive oil will always find markets, and will not be undercut by cheap oil. The integrated companies have become like a heavy blunderbuss, seized and turned round by the opposite side.

This new role of the companies, together with their increased profits, and the revelations about bribery, all point again to the question, are such huge companies really necessary? It seems clear that, without the instruments of the Seven, OPEC's maintenance of their cartel would become much more difficult. If the big companies pulled out of their participation agreements and long-term contracts, and became more like trading companies in other commodities,

OPEC's outlets would be much less assured. And if Western governments were to take over directly the task of buying oil from OPEC they would present a much more effective counter-group on the consumers' side.

The old argument that huge companies are essential to supply the resources for development is now much less convincing. It is often the smaller companies, like Atlantic Richfield in Alaska or Occidental in Libya, who have been most adventurous in exploration; and the real strength of the giants, Esso and Shell, rests on their control of the markets more than their record of exploration.

The giant size of the Seven, and their joint consortia in the Middle East, were originally the product of a quite different historical context. Thus the Iranian Consortium (which includes all Seven Sisters) was encouraged by the State Department in 1953 as a means to restore the Iranian economy after the disaster of Mussadiq; and thus the four partners of Aramco (Esso, Texaco, SoCal and Mobil) were given tax concessions and diplomatic support to keep Saudi Arabia in the Western camp.

Now the tables are turned, and the giants have become much more useful to the producers than to the consumers; meanwhile, their size is so overwhelming, and so unaccountable, that they raise growing fears about democratic control of them.

*'The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made,' by Anthony Sampson is published by Hodder and Stoughton tomorrow. price £4.95.*

LONDON OBSERVER  
28 Sept. 1975

# Anatomy of the oil game

by CHRISTOPHER TUGENDHAT

THE SEVEN SISTERS by Anthony Sampson  
(Hodder and Stoughton £4.95)

ONE of my most vivid memories of writing about oil is of asking a director of Esso's parent company in New York what he considered to be his company's greatest achievement. 'To have survived,' he replied, and he was quite right. In most industries the great names of the 1920s have either disappeared, merged, or been taken over by governments. One has only to look at aircraft, cars and coal, to appreciate how difficult it is for individual companies to withstand far-reaching political, economic, and technical changes.

But in oil the seven sisters —Exxon (Esso's parent), Mobil, Standard Oil of California (Chevron's parent), Shell, Gulf, Texaco, and BP—remain among the world's largest companies from one generation to the next. Their names change from time to

time, but their vitality continues unimpaired. This is a remarkable achievement.

Anthony Sampson sets out to describe how it was done. Half his book traces the story from their nineteenth and early twentieth century origins to the formation of OPEC in 1960, and the final third deals with the last five years during which OPEC has assumed responsibility for setting oil prices, and raised them to undreamed heights. He concentrates on personalities, and confines himself to those aspects of the companies' record that now seem most newsworthy, notably the attempts to form cartels, the acquisition of concessions, and dealings with governments.

As one would expect from his previous books, the result is highly readable. There are some marvellous descriptions of individuals and

events, and his eye for the vignette which tells more than several thousands words of explanation is as acute as ever. At times he succeeds in transmitting a sense of atmosphere so vividly that one almost feels he must have been present at the occasion he is describing.

But this approach gives the impression that the companies are run, like Mogul and other TV creations, by small groups of polymaths constantly taking key decisions, jetting across the world, and carrying all the details of their business in their heads. The reality is, of course, far more complex and prosaic. The arguments against considering the history of a nation with reference only to kings and battles are now widely appreciated, and apply just as much to directors and companies.

The directors of the seven sisters are popularly supposed to be masters of politics and diplomacy, but that idea hardly survives this book. As the author points out, most of them have technical backgrounds, and he describes the route to the top at Exxon as being through the "Texas pipeline" up through the technical universities, the refineries, and tank farms. He suggests that top oilmen are generally out of their depth in politics and diplomacy, and his account of some of their activities bears this out.

The US sisters failed entirely in their attempt to influence Nixon's foreign policy in favour of the Arabs before the Yom Kippur War, and Sampson is very critical of BP's handling of the events leading up to Abadan. The mistakes he describes

and the misjudgments for which he holds them responsible are such that many readers may find it hard to understand how they have survived for so long. The more recent fiascoes of the political payments in Italy, Bolivia, and Korea, revealed since this book went to press, must only confirm that impression. Certainly politics and diplomacy do not provide the explanation of the companies' longevity.

This lies, unfortunately, outside the terms of reference he has set himself. The companies have been astonishingly successful at finding oil under conditions of every sort in practically every part of the world, at developing new uses for it which in turn enabled them to expand and diversify, and in creating a distribution system that even today most governments feel unable to replace. That is why even so chauvinistic a country as France still relies on them 50 years after launching an official policy designed to build up French alternatives, and why they still handle the vast bulk of Middle East oil. Their executives are also formidable, highly professional, and sometimes ruthless businessmen, who usually manage to get the best of their rivals.

However, within his terms of reference Sampson has produced an exciting and enjoyable book. Anyone wishing to understand how the relationship between OPEC and the companies has evolved over the last few years, and what it means to the consumers, will find this account absolutely fascinating. When it comes to describing a power struggle Anthony Sampson has few masters.

WASHINGTON POST  
30 September 1975

Joseph Kraft

## The OPEC Charade

The price rise set by the foreign oil cartel last week shows how little this country has a foreign economic policy. For the increase comes at a time when excess supplies should have forced the cartel of exporting countries known as OPEC to cut prices.

That OPEC was able to stick together and then to hike prices at all is only thanks to help from major Western oil companies. The big companies favored the foreign cartel largely because they got no contrary signals from their own governments, notably from the Ford administration in Washington.

To understand all this it is necessary to have a feel for the strengths and weaknesses of OPEC. The cartel is powerful when demand for oil exceeds supply. It can then set very high prices which member countries will gladly adopt and enforce. That is what happened in 1973 and 1974.

An excess of supply over demand, however, poses vexing problems for OPEC. In order to hold prices high, production has to be cut. Deciding which member countries should accept which cuts in production—and therefore in income—has up to now proved beyond the capacity of OPEC.

Thus Abdul Amir Kubbah, a former OPEC official, mentions in his book on OPEC that its first resolution spoke of the need to ensure the "regulation of production." But, he

adds mournfully, "nothing ever came of it."

Thanks to the recession and a mild winter, 1975 was a time of oil glut which put OPEC to the most severe test in its history. Consumption of OPEC oil fell from a capacity of about 40 million barrels a day to an actual figure of about 25 million barrels per day.

So if the cartel was to hold, if prices were to be kept steady, the exporting countries had to withhold from the market 40 per cent of their productive capacity. They had to eat—or, as the term goes, "lock in"—15 million barrels a day.

The great miracle of 1975 is that the OPEC countries passed the test. They sustained prices (at a basic level of about \$10.50 for the marker crude) all through the year by huge cutbacks in production.

Moreover, they assigned the cutbacks not in a crude, across-the-board manner, but in a highly sophisticated way which inflicted least harm on those countries least able to bear pressure. Thus the biggest producer, Saudi Arabia, which takes in much more revenue than it can spend, absorbed by far the biggest cut in production. It locked in nearly 50 per cent of production in April and well over 40 per cent subsequently.

Conversely, countries heavily dependent on oil imports—such as the United States—had to make only small cutbacks. The

United States, for example, with only tiny cuts in production. Thus the second-biggest producer, Iran, which consumes almost all of its oil income in development, cut back its production by only between 15 and 20 per cent.

Exactly how the cutbacks were arranged in a way so well calculated to minimize friction among OPEC members is not known. But it is very clear that the OPEC countries and the international oil companies were in collusion.

For example, Aramco, a conglomerate of American companies which runs the Saudi oil industry, decided on the level of Saudi production each month according to the world market. But the Aramco decisions were subject to the control of the Saudi government which owns 60 per cent of the company. In this way Aramco combined with the Saudi government to make the cartel work.

Conversely, American companies did not use their power to break the cartel. Iran, for example, would have been highly vulnerable to a threat by companies to cut back, say, 90 per cent of their purchases from that country. Under such a threat the Shah would have probably been forced to break the price and bust the cartel. Conversely, American companies did not use their power to break the cartel. Iran, for example, would have been highly vulnerable to a threat by companies to cut back, say, 90 per cent of their purchases from that country. Under such a threat the Shah would have probably been forced to break the price and bust the cartel.

company. But the State Department discouraged any such counter-cartel actions by the American companies.

What all this seems to say is that the Ford administration — despite much official huffing and puffing — actually helped the cartel raise prices. The OPEC deliberations of last week were a kind of charade which made it

NEW YORK TIMES  
28 September 1975

## U.S. IS SAID TO LAG IN STRATEGIC WILL

Ex-Intelligence Aide Finds Soviet Purpose Stronger

By DAVID BINDER  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 27 — The Soviet Union has twice the "strategic purpose and will to pursue national strategy" of the United States, according to Ray S. Cline, a retired American intelligence official who has devised a mathematical formula to support his thesis. His formula provides a basis for his book, "World Power

Assessment — A Calculus of Strategic Drift," published this week.

Mr. Cline, a former high official in the Central Intelligence Agency and director of intelligence in the State Department, has been critical of Secretary of State Kissinger and has deplored the impact of recent investigations of the intelligence community.

The formula devised by Mr. Cline, now an executive at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, states that political power is a combination of more or less measurable quantities: population and territory, and military capability, multiplied by coefficients of strategic purpose and the will to pursue national strategy.

The formula states:  $PP = (C+E+M) \times (S+W)$ . PP stands

for perceived power, C for the "critical mass" of population plus territory, E for economic capability, M for military capability, S for strategic purpose and W for will to pursue national strategy.

### Equal on the Basics

Applying this part of the formula, Mr. Cline finds that the Soviet Union, the United States and China have roughly equal coefficients of population and territory followed by India, Indonesia, Japan and Brazil.

In terms of economic capability, the formula finds the United States leading the Soviet Union by about 12 per cent; trailed at some distance by

Canada, China, Japan, West Germany and France.

As for military strength, Mr. Cline estimates the United States and the Soviet Union to be equal in strategic weapons, trailed at a great distance by Britain, France and China. But in total military capability he ranks the United States slightly ahead of the Soviet Union, with China, North Vietnam, Taiwan, North Korea, Pakistan and Britain following.

It is in the area of strategy and will that Mr. Cline finds the United States seriously lagging. He rates the Soviet Union at a coefficient of 1.5 and the United States at 0.7. He also finds the Soviet bloc, including Cuba, to have coefficients of 1.0 or better. He rates West Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Mexico and Israel much higher than the United States in this field.

### The American Problem

In his description the American problem is this: "At present, the power of the United States is declining, not because it has become a weak nation, but because it is strategically muddled and because the number of its reliable allies is declining."

As a remedy he proposes "to reconstitute a pattern of key alliances—a kind of latter-day Athenian League." He speaks of this as an "oceans alliance" that would link the United States to a core group in which he includes Canada, Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Israel, Japan, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand.

The core of 12 would be augmented, according to the formula, by a group comprising Mexico, Spain, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa.

The book was published as a paperback by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and in hardcover by Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, Colo.

LONDON TIMES  
18 September 1975

## Less Red

The new edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, published last year, is to have all 15 of its articles on the 15 Soviet republics revised. It is being done after readers complained of a pro-Soviet slant in the articles —hardly surprising, since they were written by Soviet scholars provided through Novosti, an official Soviet press agency. In the previous edition the articles on the republics were written by non-Soviet experts.

Professor Ronald Misiunas of Williams College, writing in the *Slavic Review*, complains that the articles are written from a distinctly Soviet standpoint and do not conform to Western standards of objective fact. In none of them is it stated, for instance, that the Communist Party is the only political organization permitted.

Warren Preece, editor of the new edition, said: "We are changing that. We are making it perfectly clear in the articles that some version of the Communist Party is running things, that there is a single party."

None of the articles reports that the 15 Republics are controlled from Moscow. "I concede the possibility of prejudice by omission", said Preece.

# Eastern Europe

NEW YORK TIMES  
14 September 1975

## ART VIEW

BY EILTON LEAMER

# The Dark Side of Cultural Détente

**I**he politics of détente is a wondrous thing—urging us, as it does, to believe that the earth is flat—and no less wondrous are the cultural policies that have followed in its wake with a promptitude that can be effected nowadays only by commissioners operating on large budgets under government fiat. The astronauts keep their rendezvous in space, the Bolshoi performs the operas of Prokofiev at Lincoln Center, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art dispatches its prized Old Masters to Moscow. God's in his heaven, you might say, and all's right with the world! Right?

Of course there are isolated cranks, like Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, who, refusing all invitations to amnesia, insist on drawing certain lessons from experience, but there is no shortage of liberal pundits eager to discredit them. Between, say, The New Republic's recent attack on Mr. Solzhenitsyn's warnings and the statement by Leonid I. Brezhnev that "the Communist party of the Soviet Union and our Government believe it necessary to support and develop all kinds of cooperation which serve to facilitate the strengthening of mutual understanding and mutual respect among the peoples," there is a perfect unanimity of sentiment. Who could ask for anything more? Certainly not the Communist party of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Brezhnev's statement is quoted from the Letter that appears as a preface to the handsome catalogue of the exhibition called "Master Paintings from The Hermitage and The State Russian Museum, Leningrad" opening this week at M. Knoedler & Co. Mr. Brezhnev's passion for the masterworks of Western painting has heretofore been a well-kept secret, so far as one can tell, but that is the wonderful thing about the politics of détente: it brings out all sorts of unsuspected tastes in art, science and the humanities. Yet, not perhaps in the humanities, where the requisite occasion of memory has a certain inhibiting effect, but what does it matter? Art is what counts, does it not? For an exchange of Rembrandts, we can be expected to forgive some of the squalid sides of Soviet culture. After all, we are not being asked to stand in line to look at them. Out of sight, as the saying goes, out of mind.

So the Cranach purchased by Nicholas I, the Tiepolo purchased by Catherine II and the great Picassos and Matisses acquired by those Jewish bourgeois merchants, Sergei Shchukin and Ivan Morozov, in the bad old days before the Revolution, are coming to New York, and marvelous pictures they are. In Washington, where these "Master Paintings" were shown at the National Gallery, they drew a large and appreciative public, and the experience is likely to be repeated in New York. And after New York, the show travels to Detroit, Los Angeles and Houston, where lines of eager viewers can likewise be expected.

In addition to the 50 glorious paintings by Western masters—Carracci, Poussin, Velázquez and Cézanne are among the older artists represented—the show also includes 13 works by Russian painters of the pre-Revolutionary era. These cannot be expected to cast the same spell, but they are not without interest. How delightful, for example, to see Léon Bakst's 1926 portrait of Sergei Diaghilev! Only afterwards, perhaps, are we overcome by sober thoughts about the fate these astute émigrés would have suffered if, like so many others, they had had the misfortune to live long enough in their native land to experience the tender mercies of Stalin's cultural policies.

There is, by the way, no representation in this

exhibition of anything produced by a Soviet painter since the victory of the proletariat—as they say in the U.S.S.R.—altered the conditions of artistic culture. Lest this omission be mistaken for undue modesty on the part of Mr. Brezhnev's government—a body not usually inclined to minimize the achievements of Soviet culture—it is well to be reminded of the reasons for this conspicuous lacuna in a show designed to reflect glory on the Soviet state.

The work of the Soviet avant-garde, which flourished in the early years of the Revolution, is still under a rigorous ban in the Soviet Union, and in the period since Lenin first introduced the policies that led to the complete destruction of the avant-garde—some 50 years ago now—Soviet culture, so far as the visual arts are concerned, has become for the most part a dead culture, tethered to the dictates of the Politburo. Its death is the direct result of the kind of murder and coercion one finds spelled out in stomach-curdling detail in Mr. Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago"—not a book much recommended by tender-hearted partisans of détente, but not exactly irrelevant, either, to that "mutual respect among the peoples" we are being asked to bear in mind while our eyes feast upon the handiwork of Poussin and Picasso.

There are, to be sure, those intrepid "unofficial" artists in the Soviet Union who persist in trying to keep alive the idea of a free and independent artistic life, but their work could scarcely be expected to receive the imprimatur of Mr. Brezhnev's cultural ministry. So there was little choice, really, in what to send on this mission of "mutual understanding." The selection of masterpieces might vary—there is plenty to pick from in The Hermitage certainly—but it had, perchance, to be confined to paintings that found their way into Russian collections before the blight of Revolution had its profound effect. Amid the undeniable pleasures of the "Master Paintings" exhibition, we might, then, give a moment's thought to what this signifies about the fate of Soviet culture.

We are, apparently, to have a great many more of these détente exhibitions. Dr. Armand Hammer, whose "fruitful initiative" Mr. Brezhnev gratefully acknowledges in his catalogue statement, shows no sign of slackening his activities in this realm, and neither does Thomas P. F. Hoving, the director of the Met, who sounds positively euphoric these days in speaking about his dealings with Soviet officialdom. It must be a relief, I suppose, for Mr. Hoving to negotiate—commissar to commissar, so to speak—with Soviet ministers after his recent experience with curators on his own staff.

At the opening of the show of master paintings from the Met in Moscow this summer, Mr. Hoving was reported to have said of these Soviet officials: "There are the best people we at the Metropolitan have ever dealt with outside our own country." What comparisons, do you suppose, he could have had in mind? Perhaps those French officials who refused to suffer in silence when he unilaterally reduced the size of the recent "French Painting" show? Whatever he meant, this is the sort of thing we can now expect to be commonplace in the rhetoric surrounding détente exhibitions. The language of diplomacy has never been famous for its moral rigor, and Messrs. Hoving and Hammer are not the men to challenge custom in this regard.

What we can expect, too, is that nothing in these exchanges will be allowed to cause the Soviet Union the least trace of ideological inconvenience. This means, among much else, that the art in which the Western mind has made its deepest avowal of feeling in this century will not be accorded the slightest sign of acknowledgement. The principles of détente require us to act as if we too belonged to a dead culture.

# Western Europe

WASHINGTON STAR  
25 September 1975

## Turkey, Kremlin Friendlier Since U.S. Arms Embargo

By Ralph Joseph  
Special to the Washington Star

TEHERAN, Iran — Since the congressional suspension of American arms aid to Turkey and the subsequent takeover of the U.S. bases in Anatolia, a noticeable softening of Ankara's attitude toward the Soviet Union has taken place.

There are even some indications that Ankara may be ready to negotiate a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with Moscow.

The suggestion was first made to Turkey by the Soviet Union in April 1972, when President Nikolai Podgorny made a state visit to Ankara. The Turks turned down the idea then. When Podgorny flew back to Moscow, all he had to show for his effort was a joint declaration between the two countries to develop bilateral ties on a basis of peace, friendship and good neighborly relations.

TURKISH officials then pointed out that Turkey's membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization made it inconsistent to sign a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with the Soviet Union, but that a joint declaration along the lines of one signed between Russia and France the previous year would be better.

The Russians left it at that for the time being. A year after Podgorny's visit, feelers were again put out by the Kremlin, but once again nothing came of it.

Moscow has not since renewed its efforts. This time the feelers appear to be coming from the Turkish side. Last month, Turkish President Fahri Koruturk took advantage of a tour of some Black Sea provinces to make pointedly friendly references to "our northern neighbor, the Soviet Union."

Reporters covering the

tour were quick to point out that Koruturk's remarks were made soon after references by him to the strained relations between the United States and Turkey.

THE ISTANBUL daily Milliyet a few days later commented in an editorial that it was not commonplace for a Turkish president to stress the significance of Turkish-Soviet friendship and to praise Russia. Nor, it said, was it common for a Turkish minister of state to say that Turkey could buy arms from the USSR, and could cooperate with it in establishing a war industry. The minister had indeed just made such comments.

The paper also said that a "desire to sign a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union had emerged and was spreading" among Turkish politicians.

It is probably too early for Moscow to have shown any response, but the expectation is that when it comes, the response will be positive. In July the Kremlin extended a large new credit to Ankara, said to be worth about \$700 million. (The exact figure has

apparently not yet been established). This loan offer reportedly came from the Russians when a Turkish delegation was in Moscow earlier in the year seeking a much smaller credit. The Turks were surprised by the Russian response but gratefully accepted.

THE RUSSIAN offer appeared to be a response to the U.S. Congress which had had cut off about \$200 million in military and economic aid to Turkey for fiscal 1975 in February.

ALL THE WHILE the Soviets have been wooing the Turks, their stand on Cyprus has been softening. Before Podgorny's visit in 1972, the Kremlin's friendship gestures through economic aid seemed to be consistently ruined by a hard line on Cyprus.

It's pro-Makarios stand invariably angered the Turks, and Moscow even called for Turkish troops to leave the island, though both Greek and Turkish troops were stationed there, along with British forces, under the tripartite agreement between Turkey, Greece and Britain.

At the time of Podgorny's visit Moscow merely called for a solution of the Cyprus issue by direct negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1975

## The Reign in Spain

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1—America's interest in Franco's reign in Spain falls mainly on the planes—that is, the air and naval bases we have been renting, whose leases are now being renegotiated.

The world's interest in Spain these days centers on the execution of five terrorists, including two Basque separatists, convicted by a military court of murdering policemen in the course of bank holdups. General Franco evidently decided that one way to discourage cop-killing was to put a handful of cop-killers in front of a firing squad.

The world little notes nor long remembers the stern measures used behind the Iron Curtain to "repress" killers of public officials. No voices are raised in the United Nations to demand an accounting of the death

march ordered by Cambodian Communists. No ambassadors are withdrawn to protest the absolute termination of press freedom in Saigon.

But General Franco is a Fascist, not a Communist, dictator, and an aging one at that. That's why his stern response to the murders of a score of policemen so far this year, including three yesterday, met this international reaction:

• Fifteen ambassadors from European countries, including the entire

establish a footing with the people who will come after Franco, expressed its displeasure after the Spanish Government would not heed the Pope's plea for clemency.

What can we learn from this? And what should our own reaction be?

The first lesson is that solemn declarations not to interfere in the "internal affairs" of sovereign nations are hogwash. Almost every nation feels free to meddle and to moralize, restrained only by threat of military or economic retaliation.

Lesson number two is that leftist leaders are much better at meddling in rightist nations' affairs than vice versa. Sweden's Prime Minister is now contributing money to Spanish opposition groups; he would cry havoc if the Shah of Iran or somebody were to help finance anti-Socialist activities in Sweden.

Our first reaction should be to recognize the right of any nation to im-

### ESSAY

Common Market, were recalled from Madrid or kept home.

• Mexican President Luis Echeverria, with no relations to break off, found a way to express his rage by cutting off postal communications with Spain.

• The Vatican, hardly a leftist redbolt but conscious of the need to im-

pose a death sentence on murderers of police or prison guards. We may disagree on capital punishment, but the penalty is not beyond the pale of civilized national behavior.

Next, we should set aside the temptation to bedeck murderers with the verbal garland of "guerrilla" or "commando" or even "revolutionary." A person who kills another human being in a bank holdup, whether in the name of Basque separatism or Symbionese Liberation, is a murderer. (Radicals change terrorist to "guerrilla" in the same way liberals soften "involuntary" to "court-ordered" and conservatives harden "involuntary" to "forced.")

Does this mean the Government of the United States should continue to say nothing, to hold that terrorism in Spain—and the repression it desires and has triggered—is "an internal matter" off-limits to comment, and to keep our eye on the ball of the mili-

WASHINGTON POST  
30 September 1975

## *The Executions in Spain*

THE WORLD UPROAR over the execution of five convicted terrorists in Spain is entirely the result of a characteristic political decision by Generalissimo Francisco Franco. By responding to appeals to commute those death sentences, he could have ridden out the European left's storm. But he apparently calculated that a stern display of executive will was required to stabilize Spain in this the terminal stage of his rule. Thus did he assure that a far wider spectrum of opinion in Spain, in Europe and elsewhere would join the outcry, and that the object of protest would spread from the executions to the whole fact and manner of Spanish fascism. The five, convicted by military courts under a new law denying appeal, had chosen violence as a political method to provoke state repressions and hasten the disintegration of the old order. General Franco's harsh overreaction plays directly into their hands.

At 82 General Franco cannot last forever, and at his death the archaic Spanish political system is bound to start catching up with the forces that have been helping modernize the country's economy and its foreign outlook in recent years. In this sense, the terror which has been so prominent in Spain—12 police officers have been killed this year; the prime minister was assassinated in 1973—is not aimed so much at ending his rule as establishing a position to participate in the political changes sure to come. With that in mind, one can only express astonishment at some of the protests that have rolled in. Sweden's Prime Minister Olof Palme, for instance, so fervent in denunciation of American inter-

vention in Vietnam, now proposes his own intervention; he intends to donate \$46,000 to Spanish opposition groups with a view to ending the rule of "satanic murderers." Mexican President Luis Echeverria, who as interior minister a few years ago commanded the police accused of killing more than 100 unarmed demonstrating students, at once cut off postal and communications ties with Spain and demanded its expulsion from the United Nations. The moral selectivity of the international left can be a wondrous thing to behold.

As for the United States, President Ford yesterday had his press secretary make a statement evoking all the compassion for human life and all the feeling for justice that you would expect from a government that is currently negotiating a renewal of the American bases agreement with Madrid. Secretary of State Kissinger, well known for believing that a great power cannot afford to bend to public breezes, is due to meet again with the Spanish foreign minister today to continue the negotiations. Mr. Kissinger should quickly get himself a cold. Nothing new or surprising about the Franco regime has been revealed by its latest harsh response to its tormentors. No new factor has arisen, in our view, to alter the strategic grounds on which the bases agreement has been made. In due course, the negotiations should go forward. But it is an affront to too many Americans, and to too many good Spaniards, for the United States to be doing business as usual with Generalissimo Franco at the very moment when the smell of blood is in the air.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
30 September 1975

## *U.S.: the strain in Spain*

By Richard Mowrer

to discover that the defense agreements signed in 1953 prohibit the flying of the Stars and Stripes over the American-built bases here manned by 10,500 U.S. airmen and sailors.

"I urge you, Mr. President," Congressman Kowalski cabled Dwight Eisenhower in Washington, "as Commander-in-Chief of our great nation, to initiate steps to restore to our fighting men in Spain the right and privilege to see our flag fly over the bases at which they serve."

Madrid  
In 1959 a member of the House Armed Forces Committee visiting American military installations in Europe got a rude jolt when he came to Spain.

Congressman Frank Kowalski

But nothing happened, and the prohibition remains. Never in the 17 years since the bases became operational has the American flag been permitted to fly over them, not even alongside the colors of the host nation as is done in other countries where the U.S. maintains a military establishment. Not even on Independence Day, wryly dubbed by some Americans here as "the Furtive Fourth." Nor was the Stars and Stripes flown at half-mast in memory of General Eisenhower's passing as was done on other American-manned

military bases around the world.

Spanish pride and sensitivity about anything that might seem to infringe on their country's sovereignty is not the only reason for the American flag ban. Gibraltar is another. The strategic Rock on Spain's south coast was wrested from Spain by the British 271 years ago and the Union Jack has fluttered over it ever since. For many Spaniards this is an affront that makes them extremely touchy about any foreign military presence on their soil, with or without their consent.

From the start of the Spanish-American association the Americans have leaned over backward to avoid jarring Spanish susceptibilities — and those of Franco's authoritarian regime. Strict censorship rules were drawn up by U.S. officials for the American Forces Radio at Torrejon Air Base. The basic aim was to avoid broadcasting news items about Spain that the Spanish authorities had censored out of their own broadcasts.

A "sensitivity briefing guide" was compiled by the U.S. military which said, among other things:

"References to dictatorship should be avoided. Be especially wary of comparisons between dictatorship and freedom." On one occasion Torrejon radio slipped up and was reprimanded for having broadcast a thriller set in a fictitious Spanish-speaking country in which the word "dictatorship" cropped up.

NEW YORK TIMES  
1 October 1975

## MUCH TORTURING OF BASQUES CITED

Amnesty International Tells  
of Findings in Spain

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Sept. 30—Basque prisoners have been tortured "on a massive scale," an Amnesty International report said today.

The report said that a two-man mission that visited Spain in July received "personal and direct evidence" of the torture of 45 Basques and "credible and convincing evidence" that torture was used systematically against at least 250 detainees.

The 24-page report said that Basque prisoners were severely beaten, burned with cigarettes, nearly drowned, prevented from sleeping and subjected to psychological stress through mock executions, sexual threats and threats to relatives.

The evidence was compiled by Thomas Jones, a lawyer from Washington, D.C., and Burkhard Wisser, a West German professor of philosophy. Amnesty International is a London-based organization that campaigns for the release of persons detained because of their political or religious be-

The American military's self-censorship led, on occasion, to elaborate contortions to avoid connecting some event with Spain. In 1967 the former premier of the Congo (now Zaire) living in exile in Spain was kidnapped and flown to Algeria, where he passed on in captivity. Torrejon radio reported, "Tshombe had been living in exile and the country he had been living in may consider the kidnapping a breach of its sovereignty."

Since then the Franco regime's control of Spain's information media has eased and the Americans' self-censorship has followed suit. But by and large Torrejon continues to steer well clear of Spanish political news.

The American bases complex in Spain took two years to negotiate and five years to build. Total cost: \$395.6 million. When the job was done \$30 million worth of construction equipment was given to Spain.

Most of the installations have gradually been handed over to the Spanish so that today the American military presence in Spain is concentrated at Rota and Torrejon. In 1964 Rota was expanded to serve as a base for U.S. nuclear submarines. The air base at Moron was put on caretaker status in 1970. Zaragoza was also closed down but later partially reactivated so that United States Air Force planes stationed in northern Europe, deprived of a fair-weather gunnery range in Libya, could use Spanish facilities as a substitute.

Throughout 22 years of a military partnership Spanish-American relations have generally been good, but on two occasions things got rather strained. The first crisis was in 1966 when a B-52 armed with four H-bombs crashed on the south coast of Spain. The unexploded bombs were recovered, one of them from the sea. But thereafter Spain banned U.S. planes armed with nuclear weapons from flying over Spanish territory.

Another crisis developed during the Mideast war of 1973. The pro-Arab government of General Franco announced that the bases in Spain would not be permitted to be used "in any way, directly or indirectly," in operations related to the Middle East conflict. But U.S. Air Force tankers based at Torrejon nevertheless took off and refueled planes bound for Israel somewhere over the Mediterranean.

The United States has furnished \$3.2 billion in economic and military aid to Spain as the price for using the bases here. Now General Franco is asking for a lot more: \$1.5 billion in sophisticated military equipment over the next five years.

The price is high because Franco has been unable to get from the United States what he really wants: a full-fledged military alliance, which would require the approval of the U.S. Senate.

Mr. Mowrer is the Monitor's special correspondent in Spain.

liefs, ethnic origin or color.

Mr. Jones and Mr. Wisser interviewed 15 torture victims—a "comparatively high number, in view of the prevailing fear of reprisals in the Basque region," said Amnesty International—and 30 witnesses to the torture of others. Additional testimony was taken from lawyers whose clients asserted they had been tortured in jail.

The investigation was carried out during the last days of a three-month "state of exception"—imposed after the killing of four policemen by the Basque separatist organization—that suspended certain civil rights in the Basque provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa.

The report did not name any of those who said they had been tortured or had witnessed torture. It declared that every victim who gave testimony for the Amnesty International report had been subjected to at least one daily session of interrogation and torture, and some to as many as five a day. Interrogation sessions lasted from half an hour to six hours, according to Amnesty International and one victim asserted that he had been tortured 30 times in 21 days of imprisonment.

Aged 17 to 72

The ages of the 45 victims whose cases were covered by first-hand evidence ranged from 17 to 72 years, but many

were in their 20's.

The women torture victims, of whom there were 11 interviewed, "were so sadistically beaten and humiliated that it was not easy for them to come forward," the report said. "They told of sexual threats, including sterilization, of being made to walk naked in the police station."

Several of the men spoke of having a pistol put to their heads and the trigger pulled on a blank cartridge. One man broke his leg while trying to escape and was tortured by having the broken limb twisted.

The report said that Spain's three main police forces—the regular armed police, the paramilitary civil guard and the special security police—collaborated in the torture of the Basques. "The torture and other acts of official intimidation," the report said, "were aimed not only at dismembering the separatist organization but at undermining its support and at discouraging aspirations to Basque autonomy."

Amnesty International appealed to the Spanish Government to investigate the report's findings. It asserted that torture of political detainees was not confined to the three months of the state of exception or to the Basque region.

# Near East

NEW YORK TIMES  
27 September 1975

## Some in Cairo Now Feel Kissinger Misled Them

By HENRY TANNER  
Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, Sept. 26—Some leading Egyptian officials have begun to express great bitterness over the attitudes taken by the United States and Israel since the conclusion three weeks ago of the Sinai disengagement agreement.

Some of these men are said to feel that Secretary of State Kissinger misled the Egyptian negotiators by not telling them he had promised that Washington would sympathetically consider supplying the Israel's with Pershing missiles.

The Pershings, with their range of about 450 miles, would put the Aswan dam as well as Cairo within firing distance of the Israelis. They have become a psychological and political symbol here.

**Assurances Unconvincing**  
Egyptian officials knew that large quantities of powerful and advanced American weapons would st conclusion of the agreement. But the Pershings, in the view of these

officials, constitute a dramatic move for quality of American weapons for Israel. American assurances that they will not be equipped with nuclear warheads are unconvincing here. Arab critics of President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt take it as a confirmation of their belief that the United States will never be "evenhanded" in the Middle East and that Mr. Sadat's move to associate himself with Washington was wrong.

Sayed Marei the Speaker of the National Assembly and one of Mr. Sadat's closest intimates, suggested in a conversation the other day that the only possible way the United States could correct the damage done to Egyptian-American relations would be to provide Egypt with similarly powerful American weapons as well as with much greater and more visible financial and technological assistance than is now contemplated.

Even the Pentagon's state-

ment that deliveries of Pershings could not begin before the early nineteen-eighties struck Egyptians as ominous, rather than reassuring. It was seen as a sign that the United States and Israel both remained convinced that a state of war would still exist 10 years from now.

"This makes a mockery of Kissinger's step-by-step approach," an Egyptian said.

### More Spending on Arms

The issue goes to the heart of the considerations that have led Egypt to accept Mr. Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy. It is taken for granted here that Egypt, the most powerful Arab nation, must always match Israel's armaments. If Israel is slated to receive Pershing missiles the Egyptian Government will try to get comparable weapons somehow.

As a result, it will be impossible for President Sadat to reduce military expenditures and shift resources to civilian reconstruction and rehabilitation, Egyptian officials say.

They add that it was precisely the hope of being able to turn to civilian tasks that led President Sadat to accept American mediation and American offers of economic and technological assistance.

The feeling here is that the burden on the United States to prove its friendship for Egypt is greater than ever. Mr. Marei, in a bitter mood, recalled the summer of 1956 when Secretary of State John

Foster Dulles withdrew his offer of American help in building the Aswan dam, and opened the way for the Russians to do so, starting a 15-year period of Egyptian dependence on Moscow.

Israeli attitudes since conclusion of the agreement have also caused bitterness here.

Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, one of the chief negotiators, said in a conversation that Egypt had regarded the agreement as a test of American and Israeli intentions and that the result had been negative on both counts.

The stationing of American technicians in Sinai, he said, could have become the beginning of a new approach by Israel and the Arabs to the issue of their mutual security because it gave them an alternative to an arms race.

Instead, he charged, Israel has gone ahead with her past policies as if nothing had changed. Her shopping list, including the request for Pershings, showed she still had an insatiable appetite for arms, he said.

Second, he charged, the Israeli Government chose the days after the conclusion of the agreement to announce that it would build a new kibbutz on Egyptian territory in Sinai just south of Gaza.

This, he added, showed that Israel had no intention of relinquishing the territory she occupied in 1967 even though both sides are pledged to regard the new agreement as a step toward a full settlement.

from Capitol Hill," he said in a telephone interview. "They came from the State Department."

### Intent Is in Dispute

Two officials said that, before the documents were transmitted to Congress, they were re-typed to change the numbering of various sections and to make stylistic changes. The purpose was to be able to trace leaks, they said.

"The documents that Anderson obtained could only have come from the Hill because that was the only place the documents existed in that form," one of the officials said.

When asked about this today, a high State Department official acknowledged that the documents, as leaked, were unique to Congress, but he insisted that the alterations were inadvertent and no effort had been made to trap Congress.

He said that because of a clerical error, one sentence had been omitted from one document titled "Memorandum of Agreement Between Israel and the United States." He said a secretary, in typing the document, had left out one point of agreement and this, in turn, led to the renumbering of the sections.

The charge was promptly denied by Jack Anderson, the columnist, who first obtained the documents.

## A DISPUTE FLARES ON MIDEAST LEAKS

Some U.S. Aides Say Secret Documents Were Modified to Trace Disclosure

By LESLIE H. GELB  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1—High Administration officials said today that the State Department, before giving Congress secret documents about United States assurances to Israel, had made stylistic changes to be able to trace future leaks to the press.

The officials said the documents, as published by various newspapers two weeks ago, had a numbering system and a style that were unique to the copies that had been confidentially provided to Congressional committees. Therefore the leak must have been on Capitol Hill, they contended.

The charge was promptly denied by Jack Anderson, the columnist, who first obtained the documents.

"The documents did not come

### Several Papers Altered

He said the missing point was subsequently provided to Congress. But the other Administration officials insisted that changes had been made in more than one document.

A Senate aide said the documents published by Mr. Anderson could not have been unique to Congress since the State Department typed these documents in the first place and must have retained copies.

"They could have leaked their own doctored version," he added.

Senator Dick Clark, an Iowa Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, commented:

"If it is true that the documents were intentionally altered, I can't imagine that it will do too much to restore a cooperative spirit between the two branches."

"It will only exacerbate the present situation because it reveals distrust."

who denied that the alterations had been intentional said it had never been the practice of Secretary of State Kissinger to play this kind of game with Congress.

A former Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball, said of State, George W. Ball, said Democratic administrations had never coded documents sent to Congress.

"I can't recall any time we ever did this and I doubt we did," he said. "And I had two presidents who were concerned about leaks. Our problem was leaks within the Administration, not on Capitol Hill."

The documents in question are the memorandum of agreement between the United States and Israel, assurances from the United States Government to Israel, assurances from the United States Government to Egypt, and a memorandum of agreement between the United States and Israel on the Geneva peace conference.

NEW YORK TIMES  
26 September 1975

## JORDANIANS STUNG BY MISSILE AFFAIR

Officials Complain About U.S.  
Treatment in Deal for  
Hawk Batteries

By TERENCE SMITH  
Special to The New York Times

AMMAN, Jordan, Sept. 25.—The compromise worked out last week to break the crisis over Jordan's desire to purchase 14 batteries of Hawk antiaircraft missiles illustrates the problems that arise from the United States policy of trying to influence both sides in the Arab-Israeli dispute and the delicacy of Jordan's position in trying to appear to her Arab neighbors as more than a client of the United States.

The \$350-million Jordanian purchase from the United States seemed gravely imperiled last Thursday when the Jordanian Government angrily denounced the restrictions on the deployment and use of the missiles imposed by the Ford Administration at the demand of pro-Israel forces in Congress. A formal Amman Government statement attacked the conditions of the sale as "unique and abusive of Jordan's national pride."

But just 24 hours later the State Department announced in Washington that the "misunderstanding" had been cleared up and the deal would go through.

This 180-degree switch, the sources said, came about as the result of a face-saving formula under which it was agreed that the actual purchase contract would not include the restrictions on the use of the missiles demanded by the pro-Israel elements but that King Hussein's Government would make similar pledges separately and privately.

### Promises Already Made

The pledges include promises King Hussein had already made in a letter to leading Congressmen in which he explained that the missiles would be used in fixed installations to protect the capital, army camps in nearby Zerka and air bases and airports in the heart of the country.

Under the agreed formula Jordan will be able to contend to her citizens and fellow Arab states that there are no strings attached to the sale agreement, while the United States will still receive the assurances it sought.

This formula was apparently hammered out in a hurried

meeting last Thursday night between United States Ambassador to Amman, Thomas R. Pickering, and Jordan's Premier, Zaid al-Rifi, although the United States Embassy here declined to confirm this or discuss the incident.

Jordan's threat throughout the summer-long controversy over the Hawk sale was that if the United States refused to meet her air defense needs, she would turn to the Soviet Union. It now seems clear that the deal will go through and that this will not happen, but reliable Jordanian sources said today that the Government would probably seek supplementary air-defense systems from European suppliers.

### It Strained Relations

In any event, the "tempest over the Hawks," as one Jordanian official put it today, has left the Government here smarting over what is regarded as a humiliating and unnecessary episode. An element of strain has been injected into the traditionally friendly Jordanian-American relations and left King Hussein and his top advisers with deep doubts about the value of Administration commitments that must run the gauntlet of the pro-Israel forces in Congress before final approval can be reached.

"We were stung by this experience," Jordan's Information Minister, Salah Abu Zeid, said in an interview in his Amman office today.

"What, after all, do 14 Hawk batteries really amount to?" He continued, adding: "They are the bare minimum we need to protect our capital and airports. And they are nothing compared with what you provide Israel with in arms every year."

From the Jordanian point of view, it was deeply insulting to have an agreement reached in principle in late 1974 blocked as a result of the efforts of the pro-Israel lobby in Congress.

### The Original Request

The Jordanians originally asked for 24 batteries of Hawks when they first raised the possibility of buying them two and a half years ago, reliable sources reported here. The number 14 was reached by a Defense Department team that came to Jordan early this year to study both her requirements and her ability to absorb the complicated systems.

When the Administration proposed this to Congress this summer, however, it created an uproar. Numerous Senators and Representatives protested on the ground that the sale would equip Jordan to enter a future war against Israel with relative security against the Israeli Air Force.

The Jordanians denied that this was their purpose and pointed out that Jordan was the only country in the region, Israel included, that lacked a modern air-defense system.

NEW YORK TIMES  
28 September 1975

## ARABS WARN U.S. ON AID TO ISRAEL

Groups at U.N. Says Arms  
Will Endanger Mideast

By PAUL HOFMANN  
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Sept. 27.—The Arab League warned the United States today that moves to supply Israel with large quantities of advanced weapons, including missiles, were endangering peace in the Middle East.

"The Arab states are following this situation with grave concern," said a statement made public today. "This supply of further offensive arms

by the United States to Israel will lead to consolidation of Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories and her continued denial of the national rights of the Palestinian people."

The statement added that the new American weapons would "encourage Israel toward a new aggression, as well as maintaining her expansionist policies."

The warning for Washington was unanimously adopted at a day of foreign ministers and other officials of the 20 countries of the Arab League. The group has permanent observer status at the United Nations.

Representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the guerrilla movement that also has permanent observer status at the world organization's headquarters, participated in the session.

NEW YORK TIMES  
29 September 1975

## Sadat Says Experts From U.S. Helped Israel in '73 War

CAIRO, Sept. 28 (UPI)—President Anwar el-Sadat said today that American technicians had helped Israel in the 1973 war.

He said that he had accepted the cease-fire ending the October war with Israel when the United States sent technicians and new weapons into battle against Egypt and the "Soviet Union was on my back." Mr. Sadat spoke at a meeting of parliament and the Arab Socialist Union, the country's sole political party, to observe the fifth anniversary of the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

"When I accepted the cease-

fire on Oct. 22, 1973—and I want our brothers in the Syrian Ba'ath party to hear this—I was facing both the Americans and the Jews," Mr. Sadat said.

"Entered the Battle"

"America with its strength and its new weapons that had never before left the United States," he said. "They brought the weapons and experts and entered the battle in the days of the breakthrough." This was a reference to the Israeli move across the Suez Canal.

"Just as America and Israel were in front of me, the Soviet Union was on my back," the president said. "The air bridge which brought in weapons was bringing weapons that should have been delivered in 1969."

Mr. Sadat said that the Russians had flooded Syria with weapons after his decision to expel Soviet advisers from Egypt in July, 1972.

WASHINGTON POST  
19 September 1975

## India Scores Criticism By Ford

From News Dispatches

NEW DELHI, Sept. 18.—The Indian government sharply criticized President Ford today, saying that he has no business commenting on India's internal affairs or criticizing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's takeover of emergency powers.

"It is amazing that the President of the United States has chosen to comment on the internal affairs of a friendly country without due appreciation of the issues involved," a Foreign Ministry spokesman

said in a prepared statement approved by the government.

The rebuke, the strongest aimed at the United States since the emergency was proclaimed June 26, was directed at Mr. Ford's remarks in an interview Sunday with three reporters.

It marks a sharp shift in gradually warming U.S.-Indian relations, with the United States planning to resume development aid to India—cut off since the 1971 India-Pakistan war—and Mrs. Gandhi attending a small dinner party at the U.S. embassy in New Delhi.

In his interview, President Ford said that Mrs. Gandhi's recent actions represent "a very sad development, and I hope that in time there could be a restoration of the demo-

eratic processes as we know them in the United States."

He also indicated that he is unlikely to visit India this year, as scheduled. "We have a very full slate between now and January 1," he said.

The Indian statement accused the President of overstepping diplomatic propriety, and added that India had re-

frained from making similar comments about America.

"There are many aspects of the internal politics of the United States on which it is possible to comment, including the situation of civil liberties and the extra-ordinary powers exercised by the executive in certain circumstances," the statement said.

"But the accepted norms and courtesies of international relations do not permit of official comments from outside."

All actions taken under the state of emergency have been taken within the Indian constitution, the statement said, noting: "Every society takes measures to protect its stabil-

ity and ideals, India no less than the United States."

The emergency began with the arrest of major non-Communist opposition leaders, suspension of most civil liberties and the imposition of press censorship, including the expulsion of several foreign journalists.

WASHINGTON POST  
21 September 1975

*Jack Anderson*

## The Peace Price: \$15 Billion

The closer Congress scrutinizes Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Middle East peace pact, the louder the grumbling grows, particularly over the price tag and those 200 American "technicians."

As it turns out, from secret State Department briefings of senior lawmakers, the American taxpayers will be asked to provide well over \$15 billion in aid to Egypt and Israel during the next five years.

And the 200 U.S. peacekeepers, according to intelligence sources, will likely include "retired" CIA agents, an invitation to controversy no matter how good a job they do in the Sinai buffer zone.

Before the agreement can be put into effect, of course, the lawmakers must approve the stationing of technicians between the two hostile camps. And a half dozen committees or more will get a crack at one phase or another of the five-year \$15 billion aid package.

But this has not made Congress any more comfortable with the interim agreement. Some of the legislators we queried in the past few days were worried that there is still more "fine print" or "oral understandings" to come.

For example, last week we revealed that President Ford and his wizardly Secretary of State have virtually promised the Israelis spanking new F-16 fighters and Pershing missiles. The missiles can reach targets 400 miles away and can easily be equipped with nuclear warheads.

Other portions of the secret accords have been privately disclosed to a few chairmen and ranking members of committees in both the House and Senate, but younger members have been kept in the dark both by the administration and their own chairmen.

Some lawmakers have even stopped us in the halls of Congress and fumed, "How come you find out about these things before we do?"

WASHINGTON POST  
28 September 1975

## Secrecy Dispute Delays Hill Action On Mideast Accord

In this wavering economy, every million in foreign aid counts, and Kissinger and his public relations men have been citing the figure of \$2.3 billion in economic and military aid for Israel and \$600 million as the outer limit for Egypt.

But at an executive session of the House International Relations Committee, members were told that these figures are bound to rise in coming years. By putting together these projections, congressmen quickly came up with a five-year figure of well over \$15 billion.

The price of one portion of the Israeli aid package is bound to soar. About \$400 million of the money promised to Israel is in compensation for the oil they will lose next year by surrendering the Abu Rudcis oil fields back to Egypt.

Such payments will continue for all five years. Since the price of crude is going nowhere but up, the American contribution for Israel's lost oil is certain to follow suit.

In addition, Ford and Kissinger have given the Israelis an ironclad, written guarantee that they will be supplied with oil until at least September 1980.

According to the secret accords, Israel is expected to "make its own independent arrangements for oil . . ." However, if they are unsuccessful for any reason, the documents state, "the United States government will promptly make oil available . . ."

In the event of an oil embargo, the secret agreements imply, Israel would be supplied with oil from American stockpiles. Kissinger further vowed, if necessary "to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport."

Another aspect of the Sinai pact that has created some furrowed brows on Capitol Hill is the proposal to provide American technicians.

Those "technicians," top-level intelligence sources confided to my associate Joe Spear, will have very close ties

to the Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, say our sources, many of them will probably be regular CIA employees who will be "retired" shortly before they report for their desert duty.

The idea of placing American technicians in "early warning" stations was first suggested by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat at a meeting with President Ford in Salzburg, Austria.

Concerned that Congress would see the technicians as an echo of Vietnam in the early 1960s, Ford and Kissinger originally balked at the proposal. Sadat was eventually persuaded to settle for United Nations personnel.

Israel, however, adamantly insisted on an American presence. No Americans, no peace agreement, they declared. Kissinger, faced with the awful prospect of once again limping back to Washington in defeat, went along.

Some key congressmen, however, are convinced that Kissinger is secretly delighted with the proposal to put Americans in the Sinai. It forces Congress to put the stamp of approval on his peace pact and thus absolves him of full responsibility if it flops.

In fact, say some of the experts we have consulted, the American technicians are not needed. Ostensibly, they will be there to give impartial warning of menacing maneuvers by either side.

Both the Egyptians and the Israelis, however, will be provided with sophisticated American electronic equipment to establish warning stations of their own.

From their perch atop a 2,500-foot prominence known as Umm Hashiba, the Israeli radars will be able to "see" aircraft taking off in Cairo. The Egyptians will have a comparable facility, enabling them to monitor Israel's huge Sinai air force base at Bir Gifgafa.

The American presence, therefore, will be largely symbolic. In more ways than one, it may prove to be one of the most costly symbols the American public has ever purchased.

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tration critics charge.

U.S. officials concede that this appears to be a hair-splitting conflict. In fact, they maintain, it is profoundly significant in diplomatic terms, and unless soon resolved it can wreck the agreement laboriously negotiated by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and due to begin taking effect in early 1976. The accord, which the administration

hoped to have cleared through Congress by now, is still stuck in committees.

Unlike the other secrecy disputes between Congress and the administration, the central documents in this controversy have been published in the press. The administration insists, however, that they must not be published as official records by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House International Relations Committee.

To do so, administration officials maintain, will destroy "diplomatic confidentiality" and "the protection of the diplomatic process."

In an attempt to compromise, the administration submitted to the committees a summary of the secret documents.

The Senate committee spurned the summary as totally inadequate. The State Department has offered to give the committees a fuller and franker summary. Even this, critics protest, will make Congress look foolish, putting into its public reports less than has appeared in the press.

Some senators have proposed reprinting in the committee report the texts of four documents published in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and republished in other newspapers, whether the administration likes it or not.

Another suggestion in the Senate committee was to print the secret texts "without quotation marks," making them appear to be paraphrases or summaries.

"We didn't leak these documents," said one State Department official. "They (the Congress) are not going to engage the administration in a squeeze play."

One high-ranking official said adamantly: "This goes to the heart of the confidentiality of the diplomatic process... We do not intend to publicize (the texts) of confidential agreements... It is one thing for documents to appear, based on a leak, in the press and therefore continue to be unofficial. It is something far different for us to sanctify these documents as official."

To compound the problem, administration leaders do not want to specify officially exactly what the distinction is in this case between official and unofficial disclosure. That, they say, would

only produce the consequences they deem so damaging.

"It should be obvious what kind of repercussions there would be," said one-source, especially on the position of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, "who has steadfastly denied that there are any secret agreements."

When Egypt and Israel initialed three-formal, public text of them few accord on Sept. 1, Sadat's Arab opponents charged he had sold out to Israel and the United States at the expense of other Arab nations.

Press disclosure of secret American pledges to Israel has exposed Sadat to more stinging attacks, especially over the U.S. promise to give favorable consideration to supplying Israel with 460-mile-range Pershing missiles, which could reach many Arab capitals..

Any supply of the Pershings is years off, and many U.S. officials privately believe they never will be given to Israel, but that has not prevented a furor over the disclosure.

Many U.S. officials outside the negotiations regard the promise concerning the Pershings as a major blunder. But the real blunder Kissinger's associates argue, was unauthorized disclosure of the issue at a sensitive moment.

Administration officials have been surprised by the way the controversy has escalated. The immediate issue before Congress, and the only issue that Congress is being asked to act upon, they emphasize, is authorizing up to 200 American civilians to be stationed at electronic early-warning stations between Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai desert.

"At the beginning," a senior associate of Kissinger said acidly, "everybody was rooting to get the agreement. Now that we got the two others to agree, we are in the position of frustrating it ourselves."

Before Kissinger even completed the negotiations at the end of August, however, demands were raised for "full disclosure" of all American commitments surrounding it.

Kissinger later said there was "an unprecedented effort to put before the Congress any American undertaking, to either of the parties."

He also said, on Sept. 9,

that there were consultations with the Senate and House committees to make sure that "their definition of what constitutes an undertaking does not differ from ours."

"There is, however," said Kissinger, "an area of diplomacy that no country has ever made public and that does not involve undertakings, commitments of the United States." The State Department, he said, was letting Congress see "documents that have never been made available to congressional committees before," and will work with the committees on "an agreed method of publication" that "will be the fullest disclosure of a diplomatic record that has ever been made."

All Kissinger's pledges, State Department officials say, have been kept.

Nevertheless, Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) and many other committee members, especially in the Senate, insist that the central issue is still public disclosure of secret commitments. "I think we've had it to the teeth with secrets," Church said last week.

In a letter to Kissinger last week, Church protested that, "Obligations toward foreign governments are not properly regarded as state secrets."

Two senators, Floyd K. Haskell (D-Colo.) and Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.), yesterday urged the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to keep up the pressure on the administration, delaying action on the 200 American technicians "until the administration discloses all agreements."

An aggrieved high official said on Friday, "This is being put in terms of a secrecy issue, which it is not."

"We agree fully," he said, that nothing "should be hidden from the Congress or the public that involves American undertakings." He said, "We proceeded in a most extraordinary process—we voluntarily submitted documents on a classified basis" with "memoranda that are not linked to the U.S. proposals" for assigning American technicians.

"We don't have any intention," he said, "of submitting these pieces of paper for approval of the Congress." Instead, he said, they were only submitted on a "agreement" with 60 days after confidential basis to assure Congress that nothing perti-

nant was being withheld from it.

To many members of Congress, there was little that was "voluntary" about this process at all, except timing.

Under 1972 legislation, stimulated by alarm that the executive branch was bypassing treaty requirements on a wholesale basis, and committing the United States to overseas involvement through executive agreements, Congress passed what is known as the Case Act, named for Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.).

This law requires the President to transmit to Congress "any international agreement" within 60 days after it has entered into force, other than a treaty, which has to be submitted in advance. However, this legislation does specify that the information will be sent to the Senate and House foreign affairs committees "under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President."

The State Department's legal adviser, Monroe Leigh, in a letter to the House committee, has acknowledged that two secret memoranda between the United States and Israel (among the four leaked to the press) do amount to "international agreements."

One member of the Senate committee, Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa) maintains that beyond being an executive agreement, one of the documents virtually amounts to a treaty of alliance and should be submitted to the Senate in that form.

It refers to "the long-standing U.S. commitment to the survival and security of Israel" and calls for consultations on assisting Israel if there are "particularly grave threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power."

Administration officials contend that this only repeats what has been said by "five U.S. administrations" in support of Israel.

In that event, critics counter, why is the administration so alarmed about the disclosure of the document?

Again, U.S. officials contend, it is to avoid formally acknowledging what they say are, in many cases, only "expressions of intent" which "leave our options open" as long as they are kept confidential, without the public label of official documents.

# Africa

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
21 September 1975

## U.S. Should Reassess Africa Policy

BY CHARLES C. DIGGS JR.

Despite the increasing strategic importance of the African continent, this Administration continues to accord low priority to that part of the world.

U.S. policy, which traditionally has been the by-product of America's relations with its NATO allies and its Soviet adversaries, has not kept pace

*Rep. Charles Diggs (D-Mich.), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired subcommittee hearings on Africa. He has visited Africa frequently.*

with new international realities. Three principal developments have drastically altered the power relationships of the international community:

—The end of empire in Africa and Asia, resulting in three times as many developing countries as industrialized European powers:

—The nuclear stalemate, which made war between the United States and the Soviet Union unthinkable, reversed the direction of the cold war and opened up an era of detente which included the rehabilitation of the Peoples Republic of China;

—The destruction of the post-World War II economic order accomplished in international monetary affairs by President Nixon's New Economic Policy of August, 1971, and the two subsequent dollar devaluations, as well as the consolidation of an effective oil producer cartel that could manipulate the supply and price of oil.

These events have profound implications for U.S. policy toward Africa. In the past, America attenuated its support for liberation of the African continent in order to mollify its European allies whose good graces were required to bolster Western defense against the Soviet Union. Detente has made the continuation of such policies unnecessary. During the late '50s and early '60s, African, Asian and Latin American countries were viewed as areas of East-West competition. However, it became apparent with the Soviet backdown on unilateral arms supplies to the former Congo in 1960 and 1961 and Krushchev's retreat during the Cuban missile crisis in 1963 that the Kremlin was not willing to risk military confrontation with the United States over Havana or Kinshasa.

As it became clear that the Americans and Russians had some common political and economic interests that transcended ideological differences, the source of potential world conflict was transformed from that of East-West competition to one of North-South confrontation over international economic disparities between rich and poor nations. The need for economic security and an assured supply of raw materials is more urgent in the aftermath of the Vietnam war. The flagrant waste of American resources in that conflict seriously weakened the United States' economic and political position in the world.

Hence, the greatest threat to U.S. security today is economic and not military. The United States will have to reduce its traditionally Eurocentric bias and seek a direct accommodation with Africa and the other developing countries who are the principal suppliers of our raw materials.

There are several economic reasons why U.S. interests dictate an improvement in its relations toward Africa. Trade between Africa and the United States nearly tripled between 1960 and 1970, and reached \$4.3 billion in 1973. (Total U.S. foreign trade for 1973 was approximately \$140 billion). The African continent has deposits of all of the world's 53 most important minerals including 96% of the world's diamonds, 60% of the gold, 42% of the cobalt, 34% of the bauxite and 17% of the copper. Moreover, Africa supplies 54% of U.S. manganese requirements and the Malagasy Republic provides 22% of our graphite.

In addition, Africa's energy resources are diverse and plentiful. Nigeria, the world's sixth largest producer of crude oil, is the second largest supplier of petroleum to the United States after Saudi Arabia. Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Angola and Gabon have substantial oil resources and the full extent of Africa's oil and natural gas reserves is as yet unknown. Furthermore, Africa holds 23% of free world uranium. There is a vast, largely untapped potential for investment in the majority ruled states of Africa.

In order to improve its relations with Africa, the United States will have to demonstrate greater responsiveness to African concerns for rapid economic development, end its support of minority rule in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and ac-

cord Africa the consideration and status its position in the global community merits.

Paradoxically, while our NATO allies, especially Britain, France and Portugal, have admonished us to go slow on pressures for ending colonial rule in Southern Africa, they have made an end run and concluded mutually beneficial economic agreements with African states—such as the recent Common Market accord with 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific states signed at Lome, Togo, early this year. They also have taken steps to decrease their support of South Africa. France has announced a modification of its arms sales to South Africa. Britain has abrogated the Simonstown agreement with the Pretoria government, thereby ending special ties to a base once considered vital to the security of the Cape route. Even Portugal has approved the independence of its former territories, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. Nevertheless, after Portugal had conceded the inevitability of independence, the United States was the only country to veto Guinea-Bissau's admission to the World Health Organization.

The United States must begin to reassess its treatment and perception of African states and their leaders. Contrary to popular notions about political instability, about 11 African states have the same chief of state today as at the time of independence. For such countries as Tanzania, Senegal, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast, this involves 15 years of continuity.

Few if any African countries have been as politically unstable as the Fourth French Republic, Italy or the post-Caetano government in Portugal. Indeed, in those countries that have experienced civil war such as Nigeria, Burundi, Sudan, Zaire and now, Angola, internal strife grew largely out of hostilities resulting from differential treatment of ethnic groups during the colonial period, and have been exacerbated by overt or covert intervention from abroad. America would do well to recognize that political instability in Africa results primarily from competition over scarce resources and not an endemic inability of African leaders to rule.

African states recently demonstrated that they share common interests with the United States when they effectively blocked an Arab-led move to obtain the Organization of African Unity's support for the expulsion of

Israel from the United Nations.

On the eve of the seventh United Nations special session and the 30th session of the U.N. General Assembly, the President and the secretary of state have an opportunity to begin mending fences in Africa.

Specifically the United States should:

—Take concrete steps to stabilize earnings at reasonable levels for African and other developing country's raw materials.

—Provide more foreign assistance on better terms to African states. Africa contains 16 of the 25 least developed and 21 of the 33 countries most seriously affected by the quadrupling of oil prices. Nevertheless, this year the Administration has re-

quested only \$256.4 million in economic aid to Africa in contrast to the \$488.4 million allocated in 1972.

—Take the lead in creating an international consortium to finance a long-range comprehensive development program for the Sahelian countries and for the other African states seriously affected by the drought.

—Make a substantial contribution to food production in Africa and other developing countries and maintain contributions to a world food reserves program.

—Work for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment which allows the United States to buy Rhodesian chrome.

If the United States cannot support majority rule in Southern Africa, it should stop supporting minority rule.

Relaxation of the arms embargo against South Africa and encouragement of trade and investment there and in Namibia should cease. U.S. private investment in Nigeria now rivals that in South Africa and U.S. policy should reflect this reality.

The United States is the last major Western country to seek an improvement in its economic and political relations with Africa.

This country should use the ingenuity it has demonstrated in its China and Middle East policy to capitalize on the reservoir of African good will toward America. We must reassess African policy in light of the new international reality of global interdependence and the end of bipolarity.

WASHINGTON POST  
27 September 1975

## Toward a Sensitive and Worthwhile African Policy

It has been publicly admitted by Secretary of State Kissinger that the U.S. does not have a coherent African policy. But it is rank hyperbole to conclude, as did Michael R. Codel in The Washington Post on September 9, that as long as the State Department remains preoccupied with Middle Eastern Affairs, decisions on our African policy "will continue to come out of Kinshasa and Kampala, and not out of Washington."

Mr. Codel obviously holds no brief for the policies of Presidents Mobutu of Zaire and Idi Amin of Uganda, but there is no evidence that these two men have been able to influence our non-policies in Africa. For many months now there has been no U.S. Ambassador in Kampala. One may object to President Amin's actions and pronouncements, but the question is whether the withdrawal of U.S. representation from Kampala is the wise way to deal with him. Has the State Department not yet learned that its most successful ambassadors in Africa have been men who knew how to combine the role of ambassador with that of instructor in international affairs? For many an African chief of state, the activities in Washington are viewed as bizarre as is African behavior to many Americans. The skillful U.S. ambassador in Africa must function as interpreter to both his countrymen and to the people to whom he is accredited. Failure to do so spells disaster.

Many U.S. diplomats now admit that the Davis appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was a mistake. Although allegedly a good diplomat, lack of African experience is a serious handicap for anyone responsible for our Africa policy. Any Foreign Service officer who goes to Africa quickly realizes that the whole history of Western activities in Africa influences his/her work in not so sub-

tle ways. Had the Secretary himself been more sensitive to African opinions and attitudes, he would have recognized the liabilities facing anyone even remotely associated with our Cuban policy. Multiply by 20 our current concern over the power of the CIA and one will understand the fear aroused by this agency in the Third World.

Your guest columnist laments what he considers to be "the disproportionate influence of the Black Congressional Caucus" given "our policy vacuum." It is, however, a fact that this group, which is potentially a useful instrument for helping America develop a coherent African policy, is only now being recognized by the administration. Dr. Kissinger must certainly be given a "C" for effort in being the first Secretary of State to give an audience to this body. Had the Black Caucus been as influential as other non-elected interest groups monitoring U.S. foreign policy, they, and not the African leaders, would have automatically challenged the Davis appointment as detrimental to our relations with Africa. However, once the Africans had challenged Davis' nomination, the Secretary had to support him. No strong state can tolerate other states publicly criticizing whom it selects to conduct its policies.

It is unfortunate that Davis is now a victim of America's hesitation to develop a viable policy towards Africa. It is also unfortunate that Ambassador Hinton did not have the experience to surmount the difficulties that he faced in Zaire. But is it true that Ambassador W. Beverly Carter was a victim of Mobutu's pique at the publicity given the Popular Revolutionary Party? Or did he, as a skillful diplomat who successfully facilitated the release of the young primatologists, run afoul of Kissinger's rigid policy toward hostages?

The Secretary will eventually learn that the time is not yet ripe when the U.S. can elaborate a common policy towards all mankind. Ambassador Carter should therefore not be pilloried for meshing a worldwide policy against the reality of Africa. The mark of a brilliant diplomat is to protect the lives of his fellow citizens. It is a mark of failure if he sacrifices them to policies, which, in the nature of things, are fated to change.

Those of us who have watched the evolution of Dr. Kissinger's attitude towards Africa since the beginning of the Nixon administration have been appalled by its arrogance and naivete masquerading as "toughness" and "realism." Nixon's Nigerian Civil War policy was a disaster, our Portuguese policy unrealistic, our Sahelian drought policy miserly, and our South African policy shortsighted. Equally lamentable has been the callous attitudes of the State Department and the White House towards black Foreign Service officers. These all too few persons have been so unnecessarily humiliated that one wonders whether there is a calculated attempt to challenge both their devotion to their careers and their country. Coming as a sequel to Ambassador Carter's mistreatment is the news that another brilliant officer, Dr. Samuel Adams, Director of USAID's African Bureau, is being relieved of his position just when his approach is beginning to bear fruit. One hopes that President Ford will soon ask his Secretary of State to develop a sensitive and worthwhile African policy.

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Prans Boas Professor of Anthropology,  
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Chairman of the Board of the African-American Scholars Council,  
Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study  
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# East Asia

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London  
16 September 1975

IAN WARD on the Communist jungle of South-East Asia

**SOUTH-EAST** Asia's militant Communist movements have had their shortcomings, but failing to signal their ultimate objectives has never been one.

In South Vietnam the Viet Cong all along wanted victory through armed struggle. Broadcasts, documents, speeches and other propaganda stated the fact ad nauseum for almost two decades.

Likewise in Cambodia the Khmer Rouge, long before the Government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk was toppled, exhorted its followers to pursue the glorious revolutionary war to its logical conclusion. A similar pattern was always evident among Pathet Lao in the landlocked kingdom of Laos.

That Washington seriously thought she might deflect the Communist tide by agreeing to the 1972 coalition Government in Laos followed by the January 1973 Paris Peace document for South Vietnam is testament to the incredible naivety of liberal Americans who ultimately decided their country's policy on Indo-China.

The two-part coalition in Vientiane plus the stated objective of a government of national reconciliation for South Vietnam merely provided the Communists with text-book conditions for victories throughout Indo-China.

Yet despite the events of the past six months there still persists a wealth of world-wide public opinion—particularly in the United States and Europe—ready to believe that the Communists' drive, having wrapped up Indo-China and somehow content with the results, will now subside.

Following in the footsteps of their successful neighbouring comrades the Communist party of Thailand and the Communist party of Malaya have very different views. In clandestine broadcasts both movements have gone to great lengths to underline the importance of armed struggle and the need to gain power through it.

In Thailand, now sharing frontiers with Communist nations to the north and east, and considered by some observers to be the next-in-line domino, the political mood is one of extreme apprehension.

Local political leaders, seeking to defuse public alarm over the possibility of the country's fall to Communism, emphasise the stabilising factor of the kingdom's unquestionably respected monarchy. They also seek solace in the fact that Thai history demonstrates a nation with an uncanny ability to accommodate others.

But still the rapid fence-mending with Peking following the fall of Indo-China had all the overtones of a panic move. Accompanying this came an almost

## Will Thailand be the next domino to fall?

that July's establishment of diplomatic ties with the Chinese, by counter-balancing Russian influence in Hanoi, would somehow allay the disruptive forces suddenly tearing at the nation's vitals.

The realists have set about stiffening and expanding border patrols — troops along the Cambodian frontier and fast river craft along the meandering Mekong to the north and north-east. Security officials now recognise that border patrol police must be better armed.

Military commanders have stepped up their anti-insurgency warfare with notable successes in certain areas. But overall, observers are concerned by the inconsistent co-ordination, motivation and morale of the Thai Army.

Last month's bombing of the national memorial in Kuala Lumpur together with the grenade attack on the capital's police barracks eight days later came after the Communists promised to increase urban guerrilla warfare throughout Malaysia.

As with the assassination of the nation's police chief last year and the gunning down since of several Special Branch detectives, the culprits of these latest Communist incidents remain at large.

Malaysian officials, highly sensitive on matters involving internal security, claim that foreign observers place too much emphasis on the nation's military and police shortcomings and not enough on the Government's economic efforts for the benefit of the population at large. But the fact remains that one well directed psychological action by the Communists can negate months of well planned economic administration.

It is in this context that valid criticism is being levelled at the effectiveness of Malaysia's Special Branch, which has suffered badly over recent years.

Contrasting with their "all-is-well" facade, Kuala Lumpur leaders recently announced the formation of a country-wide vigilante organisation to guard against crime and Communist subversion.

### Rejected theories

Anti-insurgency experts in both Thailand and Malaysia overwhelmingly reject the three most popular theories offered against the likelihood of the Communist Thailand hierarchy is thought to be an ethnic Thai named Charoen Wannaram, secretary-general

military activity within the two territories in the months ahead.

The first of these is that Hanoi, so involved with setting her house in order, will not have time for further adventures among her neighbours. Taken a step further, this envisages a breathing-space of from five to 10 years during which time Hanoi and her satellites can be wooed into peaceful regional co-operation.

The second is that the Sino-Soviet split will so divide and complicate the Communist world as to make effective support of regional wars of "national liberation" virtually impossible. Finally, it is claimed that as both Thailand and Malaysia have demonstrated an adequate capability of containing Communist activities to this point there is every reason to believe they will continue to do so.

The ability of Thailand and Malaysia to cope with the expected increase in Communist terrorism, say anti-insurgency experts, can only be assessed in the light of two varying but dominating factors.

These are: the degree of political stability achieved respectively by Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur; and the speed at which Hanoi — of the region's two primary revolutionary sources — is prepared to push the action. The two influences will naturally be inter-related and should not be undermined by the fact that Peking, the other centre for revolutionary inspiration, will probably emerge ideologically at variance with Hanoi.

Some political circles have speculated that as Hanoi has so far failed to expand her involvement among the Thai Communists since her Indo-China victories, then perhaps her attentions are focused elsewhere. Against this the experts contend that they would not have expected the North Vietnamese to gear up for a fully active role within this time-frame.

Latest Western intelligence appreciations of both Thai and Malaysian Communist movements show essentially unspectacular but nonetheless broadening infrastructures over the past decade.

The Communist party of Thailand is divided into three largely autonomous military regions located in the north, north-east and southern sectors of the kingdom. Top of the Communist Thailand hierarchy is thought to be an ethnic Thai named Charoen Wannaram, secretary-general

eral. There is no permanent central co-ordinating committee as such, but on occasions that the leaders do meet the venue is usually somewhere in southern Laos.

Current estimates place full-time insurgents in Thailand's northern sector, comprising mainly Meo soldiers led by Sino-Thais, at around 3,650. In the north-east where ethnic Lai-Thais plus an assortment of tribesmen are led by Sino-Thais the statistics show some 3,650 insurgents. In the south, approximately 1,500 ethnic Thai guerrillas, with a smattering of

Moslems, are again led by Sino-Thais.

On the other hand the Communist party of Malaya, which split into three rival factions in 1970, concentrates its primary military effort in the northern regions along the Thai-Malaysia border. The three factions comprise the old Communist party of Malaya, still led by Chin Peng, the Communist party of Malaya (Marxist-Leninist) and the Communist party of Malaya (CPM revolutionary). Malaysian intelligence statistics

show combined guerrilla strengths of the three operations to be 2,047 which breaks down on national grounds to give 875 Malaysians, 1,170 Thais and two Japanese.

Despite official claims of successful joint border operations between the Thais and Malaysians the fact remains that border co-operation so far as effective anti-insurgency measures are concerned, is lamentable. And while this state of affairs exists Thai and Malaysian units will continue to be beaten by the terrorists at every encounter.

WASHINGTON POST  
30 September 1975

## Deaths in Cambodia Laid to U.S. Policy

By Dan Morgan  
Washington Post Staff Writer

At least 15,000 Cambodians died of starvation or malnutrition-related diseases in territory held by the United States-backed government in Phnom Penh in the last four months of war, according to a private study released yesterday.

It attributed the deaths to an American policy that favored efforts to sustain the Phnom Penh government militarily over food relief for refugees who poured into the beleaguered capital before it fell to Communist attackers April 17.

The 67-page study issued by the Indochina Resource Center, a non-profit organization that often has criticized administration policies in Southeast Asia, also challenged offi-

WASHINGTON STAR  
28 September 1975

cial assertions that the mass evacuation of the capital ordered by the Communist victors was an "atrocious" with a potential for causing wide spread famine.

"A study of the available evidence shows that the evacuation was ordered in response to certain urgent and fundamental needs of the Cambodian population and that it was carried out only after careful planning for provision of food, water, rest and medical care," it said.

American rice shipments to the capital in the final days of the war fell far short of requirements, and food was diverted from the neediest, it asserted.

State Department officials, who said they would have to

study the document before comment on details, took issue with most of its main conclusions.

While conceding that rice played a major role in the outcome of the war, they placed much of the blame for the starvation and misery on the Communists, who blocked rice shipments to the capital in the final stages.

The report's authors, Gareth Porter and G. C. Hildebrand, said they relied on data supplied by private relief agencies and clinics for their estimates of starvation in the capital.

Dr. Gay Alexander, medical director for Catholic Relief Services in 1974 and 1975, declared shortly before the collapse that "hundreds are dying of malnutrition every day." At the Catholic Relief Services children's clinic, 20 to 25 per cent of the children admitted died there because their conditions already were so poor, the report says.

"But these deaths were only the smallest tip of the iceberg

of death by starvation and associated illness," it adds.

State Department officials said yesterday that 80 per cent of the capital's requirements were met by an American rice airlift in the final weeks, and the rest was covered by rice brought in from the government-held rice-producing province of Battambang.

The officials said malnutrition had increased and resistance to disease had lowered in the final months but the number of deaths couldn't be determined.

In August, the State Department reported there was a "growing shortage of food in Cambodia," whose main new rice crop will not be harvested before November.

The report, called "The Politics of Food: Starvation and Agricultural Revolution in Cambodia," asserts the State Department ignored evidence of an "agricultural revolution" in the countryside that has made possible some planting of a second, irrigated rice crop during the dry season.

## Kissinger's 'atrocities of major proportions'

# What was behind the Cambodian death march tale?

By Robert W. Edgar

It has been months since the last Americans left Cambodia. Soon after the collapse of the Lon Nol regime, the American public began to receive reports that the new Khmer Rouge government was exacting severe retribution upon the civilian population through the forced evacuation of urban areas.

Based on my analysis of conversations with persons who have had experience with Cambodia, press reports and data provided by the State Department, it is my opinion that the evidence readily supports an alternate analysis. That evidence would seem to indicate that, rather than being a vindictive or rigidly ideological program of retribution, the forced evacuation of

Phnom Penh can be seen as a march away from starvation, away from urban epidemic and away from death in an overburdened city.

I make no claims to having all the relevant information, though I do believe that I sought and received information from a wide and responsible selection of sources. Nor do I speak in defense of the Khmer Rouge regime. I am merely saying that the evidence I have studied supports a different view of events in Cambodia than the one widely reported to the American public.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in a news conference on May 12, said that Cambodia was carrying out "an atrocity of

major proportions." Soon after that, columnist Jack Anderson ran a story decrying the Cambodian "atrocities," characterizing the evacuation of the urban population as a "death march." He quoted from a "White House document" which predicted hundreds of thousands would die from hunger, disease, and exhaustion as a result of the Khmer Rouge action.

Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib held a briefing for members of Congress in June during which he alleged that there was a bloodbath in progress in Cambodia. Habib said the forced evacuation was likely to result in death for up to a million people. In a followup telephone inquiry which my office made, an official at the State Department added that broadcasts of Radio Phnom Penh indicated that the evacuation was a political measure designed to purge corrupt Western influences.

The assumptions underlying this "death march" analysis are two-fold: that the urban population would starve to death if cast into the countryside, and that they would survive if allowed to remain in the cities. The evidence I have seen does not support either assumption.

In the final months of the war, Phnom Penh was a besieged, blockaded city. Supplied with food and fuel through a desperation airlift, the capital was totally dependent upon American aid. For the final years of the war, malnutrition was widespread, and in the last weeks starvation settled over the city. Although enough rice was being flown in by the United States to have fed the entire population, much of the food was earmarked for the Lon Nol military machine.

Water, power, sanitation, and food supplies were disastrously overburdened by the refugee influx from the countryside. The Department of State estimates that the population of Phnom Penh grew from 600,000 in 1969 to 2,000,000 by 1975, an increase of 333 per cent in little more than five years.

**Rep. Robert W. Edgar, a first-term Democrat, represents a district just outside Philadelphia.**

The spreading starvation among this population was described in a study by the State Department's Inspector General of Foreign Assistance in February, which documented an alarming drop in the average body weight for a sample group of two-year-olds. The statistics, according to the report, "confirm the universal medical impression given us by those involved in Cambodian health and nutrition that children are starving to death."

The situation in Phnom Penh just prior to the fall, when the United States life-line was still open, was clearly desperate. French doctors at Calmette Hospital warn-

ed of a rising incidence of cholera and the threat of plague, there was a shortage of safe drinking water, garbage collection had ceased, and sanitation services had broken down.

What then could be expected to happen to the city once the massive airlift ceased? In response to my written inquiry, the State Department stated that "there is no question that there would have been urban starvation without the U.S. airlift and U.S. airdrops to isolated enclaves."

If the situation in Phnom Penh just prior to the fall was desperate, the situation just after the fall was clearly more desperate. Reportedly, the main water purification plant had been seriously damaged on the last day of the war. Power facilities were largely inoperative. The Khmer Rouge had practically no fuel for vehicles. One can discard the notion that Phnom Penh was in any way capable of sustaining a large population when the Khmer Rouge took control.

These facts alone provide a compelling alternative to the prevailing analysis: Under the circumstances, it seems evacuation was the only thing they could do.

The other side of the question involved the manner in which the Khmer Rouge carried out the evacuation. One of the more persistent allegations is that the Khmer Rouge forced the evacuation of the sick and wounded from hospitals. There are some indications that patients from these hospitals were evacuated from the city to Khmer Rouge clinics in the countryside. Other reports indicate that it was Khmer Rouge policy to replace foreign doctors with Khmer personnel and to clear out the wards only temporarily to clean them and then put them back into operation.

I do not know for sure what happened to the hospitals after the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh, but one can get a sense of what these hospitals were like before the war's end from this eyewitness account from two *Newsweek* reporters:

"In the Khmer Sovietique hospital, more than 1,300 patients struggled for survival last week. Doctors, nurses, medical corpsmen, drugs and plasma were scarce; malaria, tuberculosis and dysentery were rampant."

In February 1975, the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance reported:

"The facilities were not only overcrowded, for the most part they were crude and unsanitary. . . Death frequently resulted from infection and lack of proper care, medication was not being administered to patients suffering severed limbs or gross traumatic abdominal wounds. . . ."

These, then, were the hospitals which the Khmer Rouge have been condemned

for evacuating.

The evacuation was not an aimless panic. Most press reports indicate that the population was directed to specific areas for resettlement. As stated earlier, many of the "urban population" were in fact refugees from rural areas who had villages and fields to return to. The remainder, apparently, are being used in the cultivation of the next rice crop.

The State Department said that "there were very few instances reported of Khmer Rouge authorities providing food for the evacuees." However, a *Time* magazine report stated that refugees interviewed had been provided a ration of one tin of rice per day by the Khmer Rouge on the evacuation route.

Although the State Department denies any knowledge of food surpluses being accumulated by the Khmer Rouge in anticipation of evacuation, William Goodfellow, an associate with the Institute for International Policy who left Cambodia in April, believes there was a sizable surplus in the rural areas. In a *New York Times* article in July, Goodfellow says that:

"Since Congress forced a halt to the U.S. bombing, farmers in the 'liberated' areas have had almost two years to rebuild irrigation canals and dikes which enabled them to harvest a large dry season rice crop this spring . . . Starvation was already a reality in the urban centers, while in the countryside there was a sizable food surplus."

Despite my request to the State Department for transcripts of any refugee interviews which tended to support the original State Department analysis of massive starvation as a result of the evacuation of the urban areas, no transcripts were provided.

Perhaps most significant is the fact that when pressed for an "on-the-record" projection of the loss of life likely to occur, the State Department offered a drastically scaled-down estimate: "While these are of course many unknown variables such as the availability of vegetables and other secondary food sources, on the basis of current information we believe that many thousands face the threat of starvation." "Many thousands" facing a "threat" of starvation represents a significant change from the hundreds of thousands who supposedly would in fact die.

Because little information has leaked out of Cambodia since May, it is impossible to provide a definitive analysis of the internal situation. Whatever toll the march itself may have imposed is not clear. But clearly the evidence available to me supports the analysis that the evacuation of the urban areas was a march away from starvation.

## NEW YORK TIMES

19 September 1975

### PILOT FOR SAIGON CALLED RED AGENT

Bombed Thieu Palace in Last Days—Trained in U.S.

By FOX BUTTERFIELD

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, Sept. 18—The

South Vietnamese Air Force pilot who unexpectedly bombed the presidential palace in Saigon last April was the son of a Vietcong official and had been a secret Communist agent for years, according to a Communist newspaper that has become available here.

At the time it was widely believed that the pilot, Nguyen Van

baby were left behind when Da Nang was abandoned to advancing Communist troops without a fight.

President Thieu escaped unharmed in the attack involving an American-made F-5E jet fighter, but the incident added to the sense of panic in Saigon that eventually helped destroy the Thieu Government. If accurate, the account in the Communist paper, South

Vietnam—The Struggle, gives a rare glimpse into the workings of the Vietcong's secret apparatus.

#### 'Lot of Comedy to Act'

According to the paper, which is described as the central organ of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front, the pilot had had "a lot of comedy to act" especially during two years he spent in the United States for training.

Several months before the actual raid, the article said, he had received secret orders "to take advantage of any opportunity to bomb Thieu's Independence Palace and then fly to the liberated zone." Several times after he informed his contact that he would carry out the attack, his unit was moved too far from the Saigon area.

The pilot's name was Dinh Thanh Trung, the article said,

and after his father, a district party secretary, was killed in 1963 in a Government attack in the Mekong Delta, he adopted the alias of Nguyen Thanh Trung. The alteration was made by "a close comrade" of his father's who also arranged to doctor their life stories.

#### Examined For A Year

Six years after the death of Mr. Trung's father, the article related, a Communist agent, identified only as "graying Comrade K," told him to enlist

in the South Vietnamese Air Force. At the time he was a science student at Saigon University.

Mr. Trung's background and qualifications were examined for a year, the article said, and after that he was accepted.

The article reported that on the morning of the attack Mr. Trung was not scheduled to fly but volunteered at the last minute to fill in for another pilot who usually came to work late because his home was in Saigon and the squad-

ron was based in Bien Hoa, 40 minutes drive away.

Most of the bombs missed the palace, the article conceded, but said it was because the pilot "wanted to avoid the servants' quarters."

After the fall of Saigon on April 30, Mr. Trung was reunited with his mother. She had never been told that he was working for the Communists.

NEW YORK TIMES

25 September 1975

## KOREAN VIETNAM IS HELD POSSIBLE

Seoul's Policies Invite It,  
Opposition Leader Says

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 — The South Korean opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung, believes his country will suffer "the fate of another Vietnam" unless the present Seoul Government is changed, he wrote in a document released here today.

Mr. Kim, who faces sentencing in South Korea Friday on political charges, made this observation in a memorandum on the security situation in East Asia that he gave to Representative Stephen J. Solarz, Democrat of New York, in Seoul last month.

"I don't believe that our present situation is the same as the Vietnamese situation," he wrote. "But if we don't change the suppressive and corrupted rule early, we can't avoid the fate of another Vietnam."

Outlining his Vietnam-Korea analogy, Mr. Kim wrote:

"I believe most people in this country are becoming skeptical about fighting against Communism under the present dictatorial rule, disappointed with the big gap between the haves and the have-nots and angry with the extent of corruption and the luxurious life of the privileged class. Their loyalties to the nation are eroding day by day."

"I don't see that there is an imminent threat of an all-out attack from the North at present," Mr. Kim suggested that Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader, "will take a lesson from Indochina and not repeat his failure in the Korean war, that of all-out attack." He continued:

"He will try to organize guerrillas to infiltrate among a people dissatisfied with suppression, poverty and corruption in the South."

"He will urge that guerrilla activities in the South are staged within the South with no obvious connection with the North. This is the precedent of North Vietnam when it communized South Vietnam."

As for the prospects of dia-

Tuesday, September 23, 1975

The Washington Star

## Indochina shock still rocks Asian alliances

Ever since the disaster in Indochina, the tone of the administration has been resolutely upbeat. Despite what happened in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, we are told, the United States will continue to "fulfill its commitments" in the rest of Asia. The Mayaguez incident — somewhat pathetically — was supposed to provide conclusive proof of continuing American resolve.

This has been backed up by a certain amount of tough talk — especially concerning Korea, which seemed for some time the most likely next victim of military aggression. Top officials of the administration from President Ford on down have vowed to keep American troops on the ground in South Korea, where they would automatically be involved in any attack from the North. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons if they became necessary for the defense of the peninsula.

But what, in practical terms, does all this mean? How much confidence can Asian leaders place in such "commitments" by an American administration at this point? In the light of Indochina, how much weight does the word of an American secretary of defense carry — or, for that

As a practical matter, American "commitments" in Asia are now mostly offshore. In addition to the Korean peninsula, they in-

clude Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines, with all of which we have defense treaties.

But even in these countries, confidence in the American performance is being badly eroded. Pressure for the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea is growing. Detente between Washington and Peking has the gravest implications for the Nationalist Chinese regime on Taiwan. Familiar complaints are heard that we are supporting repressive dictatorial regimes in Seoul and Manila.

There remains Japan. Domination of Japan by powers unfriendly to the United States would be a strategic blow comparable to the loss of Western Europe, but it could happen. At this time, Japan has three options: continued total reliance on the United States for security, rearmament on a massive scale or, in case of a serious threat from one of the great Communist powers, immediate surrender. As things are going, the final option is by no means inconceivable.

No recriminations, of course, but the need for a hard look at what is happening in Asia can't be avoided. So far, we haven't begun to measure the damage of our defeat in Vietnam — either to the Asians, or to ourselves.

logue between North and South Korea, Mr. Kim wrote:

"As long as there exists such a Government as we now have which lacks the confidence of the people in the South, the North Korean Communists will never respond to calls for dia-

"The Communists believe they may communize the South easily if the present conditions continue."

Representative Solarz said he had met privately for 90 minutes on Aug. 11 with Mr. Kim, who gave him the memorandum when they parted.

Wednesday, Oct. 1, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

# U.S. to Let 1,600 Return to

## Vietynam

By Murray Marder  
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Ford has agreed to permit about 1,600 refugees to try to return to South Vietnam from Guam, on a ship they will sail themselves.

There is no certainty, however, that Communist authorities in Saigon will allow them to land.

This is a "human dilemma," said Julia V. Taft, Vietnam task force director, in announcing the long-debated decision yesterday.

About 128,000 refugees have been resettled by the United States, she said, but the 1,600 or more wanting to go back to South Vietnam have reached "violent proportions" in their

demands to be returned, and the United States cannot hold them "against their will."

If South Vietnam refuses to accept the people on the ship, there could be a stormy propaganda battle between the Vietnamese Communists and the United States, over who is responsible for the impasse.

That possibility has troubled many American officials for months.

President Ford made the decision Monday night, with the concurrence of the National Security Council, Taft said, to meet the "adamant desire" of the refugees to sail back to Saigon.

"This cannot be a 'Flying Dutchman' situation," said one U.S. official, referring to the

legendary ship condemned to sail the seas forever. "We will receive them back at Guam" if they cannot land in South Vietnam, he said.

Most of the refugees involved never intended to leave South Vietnam. They thought they would be landed at another port in that country when they left in confusion as South Vietnam fell under Communist control last April.

They are confident they will be allowed to land, on the basis of radio broadcasts and reports reaching them from North and South Vietnam, although there is no official assurance of that.

The United States has agreed to recondition a ship that brought many of them to

Guam, the 437-foot vessel Vietnam Thuong Tin, a 6.275-ton cargo ship. It will take about two to three weeks to equip the ship for the two-week voyage from Guam to Vietnam, officials said. It will carry provisions for a round trip.

"We are not 'sending them back,'" Taft said. "We are allowing them to repossess the ship they brought."

The number of potential returnees has fluctuated. Now, in addition to 1,600 on Guam who want to return home, Taft said, there are 47 Vietnamese in camps in the United States who want to join them, plus about 50 persons so far who have been resettled and changes their minds.

Taft said "tensions have peaked in the last few weeks on Guam with a series of outbursts and demonstrations." Four U.S. marshals were hospitalized in an Aug. 31 riot.

The decision on letting them sail, U.S. officials said, came after the United Nations High Commissioner, Prince Sadraddin Aga Kahn, failed to get "any concrete word" from Communist authorities in Hanoi during a trip to North Vietnam last week.

According to Sadraddin's deputy, the North Vietnamese authorities reiterated their "policy of receiving those Vietnamese desirous of returning to their homeland," and said: "Such return will take place as soon as possible after the individual applications for return have been examined."

Taft said those applications were turned over to Communist authorities in July.

Other sources said the Ford administration concluded that the prince "struck out" for any refugee return in the near future, and that the United States would be in an impossible situation if it delayed any longer.

The U.S. veto of U.N. membership for both North and South Vietnam, unless South Korea also is allowed to enter the United Nations, clearly "has complicated this problem," one U.S. source acknowledged.

In addition, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is reported to have put South Vietnam and Cambodia on the list of nations where American passports are invalid without specific approval, against the recommendations of subordinates in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

The formal notice of that action, published in the Federal Register, cited "severe hostility" of those governments toward the United States since the Communist takeover in April.

WASHINGTON STAR  
21 September 1975

Crosby S. Noyes

## The contagion is taking hold as Asia assesses the results

The reason why all of the countries of Asia are drastically revising their policies in the wake of the American disaster in Indochina is quite simple:

The leaders of Asia — unlike some in this country — have never bought the notion that the defeat of American policy in Indochina was in some way preordained, the result of mistakes and misconceptions dating back to the early post-war period. On the contrary, they have seen it as an almost entirely self-inflicted defeat, a progressive loss of will on the part of the American people and its leadership, and, finally, a total repudiation of its commitment to prevent the military conquest of South Vietnam.

Sure, plenty of mistakes were made. The sophisticated military theories of "measured response," counter-insurgency, "search and destroy" and all the rest of it, were all singularly inappropriate to the problem that confronted us. Tragic political mistakes were made in the frantic search for local leadership in Vietnam that would be acceptable to liberal American critics of the war.

But the leaders of Asia have never doubted that the dramatic collapse of South Vietnam was simply an extension of a collapse in the United States. So far as they are concerned, it started with the proclamation of the Nixon doctrine in 1969 which sent shock-waves of anxiety through all of non-communist Asia. It progressed through the disastrous Paris agreements of 1973, the destruction of Richard Nixon's presidency in the Watergate affair to the ultimate repudiation by Congress of commitments under the Paris agreements to support and supply the government in Saigon.

The Asian governments have had a number of months to assess the results. In Southeast Asia, they have watched the emergence of a new Vietnam, possessing formidable military power and still undefined ambitions. The leaders in Hanoi may take their time in consolidating their victories. But there is no doubt whatever that they intend to extend their hegemony over Laos and Cambodia. And there is no reason to believe that they will not use some of their huge stocks of surplus captured military equipment to support the insurgencies they have backed for 20 years in Thailand and Malaysia, and wherever else the opportunity arises.

In the bigger picture, China and the Soviet Union are moving briskly to fill the vacuum left by the American retreat from the Asian mainland, and rivalry between the two communist giants promises to keep the pot boiling for years to come. For the moment, China appears to have the upper hand in picking up the marbles. But the final outcome of that competition — especially which of the two great powers dominates in Hanoi — is far from decided.

No need to talk of dominoes. The term was never more than a crude visualization of the contagion that was certain to follow an American defeat in Indochina. The public statements today of Asian leaders from South Korea to Singapore leave no doubt that the contagion is taking hold. One way or another, all of them are saying the same thing: Without the Americans, we have no choice except to make the best deal we can with those with the power and the will to take over.

# Latin America

WASHINGTON POST  
29 September 1975

## Reassuring a Wary Canal Zone Jeers Greet U.S. Aide's Explanation of Panama Talks

Special to The Washington Post

BALBOA, Panama Canal Zone—"It's kind of like watching a hawk in a cage with a canary," an American resident of the Canal Zone observed one night last week after a raucous gathering in the Balboa High School auditorium.

In this case, the canary was an official of the U.S. embassy in Panama, and the hawks, hundreds of them, were irate fellow citizens who frequently jeered at his explanations of the U.S. policy to negotiate a new canal treaty with Panama.

U.S. officials are striving, through statements and public appearances, to calm the fears of many Zonians about their future under a new treaty. Their efforts have been met with skepticism, and recently, with open hostility.

The United States and Panama have agreed in principle to replace the open-ended 1903 treaty with another of fixed duration that would lead eventually to full Panamanian jurisdiction over the 61-year-old Atlantic-Pacific waterway and the surrounding 550-square-mile Canal Zone.

Negotiators still must resolve major differences, however, and both governments face public relations tasks of assuring their respective peoples that vital interests are not being sold out.

Among the more difficult to persuade are the American Zonians. There are estimated to be 39,200 of them. Many are second or third generation Zonians. There are about 9,800 civilian employees and dependents attached to canal agencies, 969 other civilians and 28,500 military-related people, including 10,177 in uniform.

It is not difficult to understand why many are uneasy. Driving through Balboa, the Zone's main residential and commercial area, one can see a slice of small-town America transplanted to foreign soil but to a great degree insulated from the culture, customs and laws of the host country.

It is a company town. The Panama Canal Co., a U.S. government agency, oper-

ates the canal, overseeing more than 14,000 ship passages a year, and runs virtually everything that affects the lives of the Zonians. It operates police and fire departments, post office, theaters, stores, schools, housing, a hospital, a leprosarium and a 56-mile railroad across the isthmus.

The contrast to adjacent slums of Panama City is evident to Zonians and Panamanians alike, although the capital of the country has its affluent areas, too.

"I admit we have manicured lawns, but that's better than having weeds," says Frank A. Baldwin, the Panama Canal information officer, who was born in the Zone. "Some American newspapers refer to manicured lawns as if it were a sin."

What seems to worry the Zonians most is the prospect of Panama taking jurisdiction over all of these services. There is also concern over job security, wage levels and personal safety when the Zone disappears as a separate entity and becomes a part of Panama. And there is a widespread attitude that the U.S.-built canal is "ours."

Maj. Gen. Harold R. Parfitt, the Canal Zone governor, says the mood of Zonians is "great apprehension . . . because nobody really knows the details on what the impact will be on their lifestyle or on their employment."

There were some clues when Panamanian negotiators revealed certain points of agreement last weekend, although U.S. officials have stated that even these "conceptual" agreements are subject to change in a final treaty package. The Panamanians said it had been agreed that the Zone will disappear three years after the treaty takes effect, that Panama's National Guard will replace the U.S. police force, and the Panamanian laws, courts, fire-fighting and postal services will function exclusively. Panamanians are to move increasingly into canal administrative jobs.

Among points of disagree-

ment listed by the Panamanians was said to be a U.S. proposal "to maintain the privileges of the Zonians and exclude them from Panamanian jurisdiction." Panama rejected this and proposes that the Zonians' presence "diminish gradually, maintaining certain guarantees in their jobs but without detriment to Panamanian jurisdiction."

Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker, the chief U.S. treaty negotiator, met in private last week with leaders of the Zone's labor unions and civic councils. Gov. Parfitt said that Bunker did not reveal specifics of the negotiations, citing a need for confidentiality, and therefore did not allay the apprehension.

"We still know about as little as we knew three years ago," said Douglas C. Schmidt, president of the Pacific Civic Council, which has 6,200 constituents in the zone. "Mr. Bunker continues to claim that our best interest is being kept at heart. But what that best interest is, he fails to say."

Bunker recently designated John Blacken, the embassy's counselor for political affairs, as his liaison with the Zone. Blacken has appeared seven times before various Zone organizations. Last week he addressed a general Zone audience for the first time.

About 600 Zonians crowded into the high school auditorium to hear him. Others were turned away for lack of space. It was at the same school where students' insistence on running up the American flag angered Panamanians and touched off riots in 1964 in which 24 persons died. Today the U.S. and Panamanian flags fly on adjacent flagpoles at the school and other civilian installations.

Blacken argued that the Canal Zone is "Panamanian territory under U.S. jurisdiction," that a new treaty would serve the interests of both countries, and that failure to compromise in the treaty talks would create a situation in which "some form of confrontation would be probable." The warning

about a confrontation has also been used before a skeptical U.S. Congress and public by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Assistant Secretary William Rogers and Bunker.

Many of Blacken's listeners were unimpressed, as well as frustrated by the lack of details to support Blacken's assertion that "your interest will be protected in any new treaty submitted to the Congress of the United States."

Hoots and jeers greeted his remarks that the Panamanian government is "responsive to its citizenry" and will be able to carry out public services efficiently. "I live in Panama, and my garbage is picked up seven days a week," he said. Howls drowned him out.

"Basically, we are guests in somebody else's territory," Blacken said at another point in the question-and-answer period. There were shouts of "no, no."

"You champion Panama's aspirations and not mine," said one man in the audience. He was roundly applauded.

An American soldier who had been arrested in Panama while bird-watching said, "If we cannot defend American rights now, how the devil are they going to be defended in the future?" He, too, was applauded.

No one spoke out in favor of a new treaty during the meeting. But some people apologized to Blacken afterward for hostile remarks made by others, and the next day he received telephone calls of support.

The fellow who saw the evening in terms of a hawk pouncing on a canary told a reporter outside: "My views are that the alternatives to a treaty are far less desirable for the individuals in the Canal Zone, as well as the U.S. government. So therefore I think that a treaty is the best solution to the problem down here."

Thursday, Blacken will speak to another general Zone audience on the Atlantic side of the isthmus. He says that now he has a better grasp of what the Zonians' concerns are and he hopes to do a more convincing job.

NEW YORK TIMES

21 September 1975

## Chilean Junta Resisting Critics

By JONATHAN KANDELL

Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 16—Two years after the bloody coup that toppled the Marxist coalition government of President Salvador Allende Gossens, the military junta that governs Chile has developed a siege mentality against critics of its harsh economic recovery program and of its continuing violations of human rights.

Unemployment is at its highest in at least four decades and industrial production has dropped sharply this year.

But the junta has vowed to continue an austerity program aimed almost exclusively at dampening the perennial rise in inflation and diminishing the state's role in the economy.

Arbitrary arrests and ports of torture have declined in recent months, apparently because of the military's confidence that the threat of subversion has eased. On the other hand, such practices have virtually been institutionalized, and the secret police apparatus remains pervasive. There are still about 5,000 political prisoners, according to the Government.

The junta also denies any knowledge of the fate of more than 1,000 people who were detained after the 1973 coup. Lawyers and clergymen suspect that many of these missing prisoners have died in detention camps and torture centers.

### Government Cites Polls

The human-rights controversy has stiffened the attitude of Chile's main creditors, particularly in Western Europe, and has forced the junta to renegotiate the country's huge foreign debt.

In Washington, the House of Representatives has passed a bill prohibiting economic aid to countries that systematically violate human rights, and the Senate is expected to add its approval later this month. Although United States economic aid to Chile now amounts to only about \$25-million a year, a complete cut-off could further discourage private loans and investment. In the last two years, less than \$2-million in new foreign private investment has actually flowed into this country.

"Chile will not permit any foreign power to use temporary difficulties we are facing to interfere with our sovereignty, even if such attempts are made under the guise of friendship," said President Augusto Pinochet in a speech last week celebrating the junta's second anniversary.

"The immense majority of our compatriots accept and support restrictions," General Pinochet went on, "because they understand that they are the necessary price for tranquility, order and social peace that have made us an island within a world invaded by violence, terrorism and generalized disorder."

The Government has publicized recent Gallup Polls indicating that it still enjoys the backing of the majority. Skeptics, however, question the value of any public-opinion sounding in a society such as this, in which fear of repression is widespread among old supporters of Dr. Allende, who lost his life in the September, 1973, coup, and other politically dissenting groups.

According to the Government, about one out of every 250 Chileans has undergone at least temporary detention since the coup; church sources believe the figure is closer to one out of 100.

Marxist political groups have been banned; other political parties remain in a state of indefinite suspension. Leftist publications are prohibited and other journals are under Government control through self-censorship.

### Junta's Support Slipping

There are no elections at any level in society. Purges have swept Marxists from public administration, university and labor posts. Trade unions exist, but are forbidden to strike; they have no clear concept of what their role is supposed to be.

The Roman Catholic church, which counts 90 per cent of the people among its faithful, has spoken out several times against violations of human rights and the growing plight of the poorest Chileans. But it has no stomach for an open confrontation with the junta that would risk political divisions in the clergy.

Last week the Catholic bishops gave the junta a boost by asserting that the military coup saved the country "from a Marxist dictatorship that seemed inevitable and would have been irreversible." Though the church hierarchy decried the excesses of the junta, it condemned Marxists for their "atheism" and political "opportunism."

Despite the effectiveness of the political repression, in recent months a slow deterioration of enthusiasm for the junta has become apparent among some of its supporters.

Eduardo Rios, president of the Maritime Workers Union, is considered the leading labor leader in the country. After the coup, he went abroad to defend the junta at international labor conferences, but recently he refused to do so again.

"We are concerned over the growing distance between the Government and labor, because their repercussions on workers,

because of labor reforms without the advice or participation of workers," Mr. Rios said several weeks ago. "There is no dialogue with the Government."

Mr. Rios's opinions appear to be shared by most non-Marxist labor leaders.

The military inherited a chaotic economy from the Allende Government. Inflation had reached an annual rate of about 700 per cent; investment had evaporated; industrial and agrarian production had declined sharply; there were widespread shortages of all goods and a rampant black market; foreign debts had mushroomed to several billion dollars and foreign exchange reserves were down to \$3-million.

Moreover, copper—exports of which provide 85 per cent of Chile's foreign-exchange earnings—has been selling at depressed prices in the world market for most of the junta's two years in power. This was also a problem for the Allende Government.

During the junta's first year, there were production increases in most sectors of the economy. But inflation still ran at more than 370 per cent—the highest rate in the world—and unemployment rose above 10 per cent as the bloated job rolls of the Allende era were cut down.

With inflation running at similar levels this year, and with the added danger of a billion-dollar balance-of-payments deficit, the Government put into effect a "shock treatment" in May.

The guiding light of the junta's economic policy has been Milton Friedman, a conservative economist from the University of Chicago who visited Santiago shortly before the "shock treatment" program took effect. The "Chicago Boys," as the junta's economic-advisers like to call themselves slashed public spending, restricted bank credits and slowed the printing of money.

The only public expenditure that has escaped the scissors has been the military budget, a taboo topic for public discussion. Officially, defense spending is 23 per cent of the Government budget, compared with 20 per cent during the last year of the Allende era. But critics assert that a good deal more military spending is hidden in the Finance Ministry's budget.

The idea behind the "shock treatment" was to hit inflation by cutting demand. Real income would decline and force producers and distributors to sell their goods more cheaply. Price controls were discarded as ineffective, artificial mechanisms that would only hide inflation and eventually lead to a return to the black market days.

The junta and its supporters already contend that there are some optimistic signs that the treatment is working. The public deficit or gap between Government spending and one of its most

cent compared with the 50 per cent public deficit of the last year of the Allende Government.

The military rulers assert that the balance-of-payments deficit will be a manageable \$300-million. There is guarded optimism that the price spiral is slowing because the inflation index for August was 8.9 per cent, down from 9.3 per cent in July and 19.8 per cent in June.

### Soaring Jobless Rate

Otherwise, the effects of the shock treatment have been devastating. Unemployment has climbed to 20 per cent, leaving 700,000 people jobless in a work force of 3.5 million.

There was a 20 per cent decline in industrial output during the first six months of 1975, compared with the same period of 1974. Construction and automobile production have fallen by more than a third. According to Government officials, the gross national product this year may well be ten per cent less than that of 1974.

An economic survey prepared by the center-left Christian Democrats, the largest political party, estimated that real income would fall about 10 per cent with respect to 1974, by 18 per cent compared with 1973 and by a full 40 per cent from 1970. For the Chilean working class, the statistics represent a return to poverty levels not seen here in more than a generation.

The Government has begun an emergency work program that provides jobs to the unemployed for 90-day periods at a monthly salary of about \$30. There are 100,000 openings but they cover only about one out of seven jobless workers. The low income falls far short of the minimum monthly food requirements of a family of five.

The junta has also been sharply attacked by some economists and businessmen for putting the wealth into fewer hands. Before inflation is overcome, the critics say, a drop in sales and a wave of bankruptcies will enable a privileged few to buy businesses at bargain prices.

The privileged minority today are people who own finance companies. The banks, still under state control, are restricting credit, but the finance companies are extending it at exorbitant rates.

Since they are far more flexible than the banks, the finance companies also attract money from investors too scared by inflation to put their money into industries.

"Who is going to invest money in any industrial, commercial, farming or mining activity if he knows he can go to a bank or finance company to easily obtain 5 per cent in hard currency a month without doing anything?" The question was put by Orlando Saenz, a former economic adviser to the

The rise of unemployment, the decline in production and the concentration of wealth in fewer hands has led some economists and businessmen publicly to suggest alternatives.

"Right now, the biggest threat is bankruptcy, not inflation," said one of the largest automobile distributors. "The Government is seriously underestimating how difficult it is to start up production once it stops dead." He suggested that the Government act immediately to stimulate production.

#### Party Suggests Controls

The Christian Democratic party, arguing that most Chilean businessmen have had an "inflationary mentality" for years, suggested that some form of price controls be imposed on a list of key products.

The program also called for the Government to fix interest rates to prevent usurious credit dealings. To alleviate unemployment, the party suggested an immediate increase in public spending, especially on projects that employ large numbers of workers.

The most controversial aspect of the plan was the suggestion that no economic program could be successful without foreign investment and aid and that such funds would not be forthcoming until the political image of the country changed. The clear implication was that money from abroad would not arrive while President Pinochet remained in power.

There have been some hints of dissent at high military levels over the economic recovery program. General Gustavo Leigh, the only junta member with any real power beside General Pinochet, conceded publicly last month that the "social cost" of the economic program had exceeded expectations. General Leigh is said to have had an angry confrontation recently with the Finance Minister, Mr. Cauas, over unemployment.

In his anniversary speech General Pinochet gave no hint that there would be a let-up in the relentless austerity program for several more months. "To try to avoid this social cost would mean fooling the people and permitting them to live with false illusions," he asserted.

## CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

26 September 1975

### Time to cool it on Panama

The attack on the United States Embassy in Panama City by a group of 600 or more rock-throwing youths is an indication of the potential explosiveness of the Panama Canal issue. The incident, moreover, was the most serious since the 1964 anti-U.S. riots in Panama which killed 23 persons, injured dozens more, and led to a break in relations between the two nations.

It is bound to make more difficult the task of Panamanian and United States negotiators drafting a new treaty to govern control and operation of the Panama Canal. Those talks, which several months ago were said to be moving smoothly, are now apparently snagged.

Complicating the issue is growing congressional opposition to any new treaty and to any change in the present U.S. control of the canal. Added to this was a statement over last weekend by Panamanian negotiators complaining that the two governments are far apart on a number of basic issues.

Washington was right in protesting the Panamanian statement which, at best, was ill-timed. Indeed, there is some speculation that the rock-throwing demonstration was sparked by the Panamanian statement. Taken together,

the statement and the attack on the embassy add new problems to the talks. Panama has rightly apologized to the U.S. for the embassy incident, which involved "inadequate protection" by the Panamanian National Guard as the U.S. noted.

What is needed now is a cooling-off period — involving perhaps a new meeting between the chief negotiators, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker for the U.S. and Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack for Panama, to get the talks back on track. Then, too, the Ford administration should encourage Congress to hold off its attacks on a new treaty until it knows just what a proposed treaty will include. Many of the congressional statements of late have been far off target — commenting on the treaty as if it were already written.

And for its part, Panama needs to restrain both its negotiators from commenting on the talks in progress and its impressionable youth from violent acts. It ought to be self-evident to Panama that incidents such as the intemperate weekend statement and the melee at the U.S. Embassy only stir up the congressional opposition which could lead to eventual Senate rejection of a proposed treaty once it is ready.

NEW YORK TIMES  
25 September 1975

### Panama Apologizes For Youths' Attack On U. S. Embassy

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 — The Panamanian Government has apologized to the United States for an incident yesterday in which demonstrators broke about 100 windows in the American Embassy in Panama City, the State Department reported today.

The oceanside building was attacked by 600 to 800 rock-throwing youths, according to

Robert L. Funseth, the department spokesman.

They shouted anti-American slogans and demands that the United States pull out its troops from bases in the Canal Zone.

Embassy officials reported that the demonstrators also denounced Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera for "complicity" in attempting to negotiate a new Panama Canal treaty with the United States.

No Americans were injured in the attack. Several Panamanian national guardsmen were assaulted however when they sought to disperse the demonstrators, the embassy officials said.

Yesterday afternoon Ambassador William J. Jorden sent

a note to the Panamanian Foreign Ministry "protesting the inadequate protection afforded the embassy by the National Guard," Mr. Funseth reported.

Later yesterday President Demetrio B. Lakas called Mr. Jorden to apologize and this morning the Foreign Ministry sent a formal written apology.

The incident was the most serious in Panama since 1964 when anti-American riots caused 23 deaths, officials here said.

Meanwhile, the House voted 203 to 197 this afternoon to stand by an earlier resolution that the Administration should not negotiate "the surrender or relinquishment of any United States rights in the Panama Canal zone."

NEW YORK TIMES  
23 September 1975

### U.S. Warns Panama Not to Air Details Of Talks on Canal

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 — The United States warned Panama today that public airing of purported negotiating positions on a new Panama Canal treaty could "hinder the balancing of mutual interest that makes any such treaty possible."

The warning, authorized by Ellsworth Bunker, the chief United States negotiator in the Panama Canal treaty talks, which began in June, 1974, was issued in response to publication Saturday of a Panamanian Government statement on the status of the negotiations.

The Panamanian statement, made on the orders of Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera, had said that talks on the future of the canal had been stalled by United States insistence on its right to continue defending the waterway indefinitely.